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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I examine the use of transcendental
arguments for the refutation of epistemological solipsism, the
view that we can never know with certainty that objective par-
ticulars exist. In the first chapter I explain and motivate
epistemological solipsism by comparing it with other forms of
epistemological skepticism, and by explicating the central no-
tions of certainty and objective particularity. I also specify
various procedural assumptions which I adopt in deference to
the skeptic.
In the second chapter I develop and evaluate Strawson's
influential anti-skeptical arguments and the allegedly tran-
scendental method which they instantiate. I argue that his
project is defective in detail and in principle, offering no
redemptive attraction for the purposes at hand.
In the third chapter I consider supplementary anti-skep-
tical resources, including paradigm case arguments, non-vacuous
contrast arguments, verif icationist arguments, extensions of
Strawsonian-type arguments, and arguments from self-refutation.
I argue that none of these methods succeeds in refuting epis-
temological solipsism.
In the final chapter, after drawing together the results
of chapters I-III, and exposing the defects of further exten-
sions of Strawsonian argument -- what I call ' cross-categorial
priority arguments' -- I provide a partial account of a more
promising, Kantian transcendental method. I develop this
Vaccount by critically assessing several accounts of Kantian
method explicitly preferred in the recent literature. I
arp;ue that my account escapes each of the difficulties which
burden the alternatives, and conclude that my version of
Kantian transcendental argument offers genuine promise for
refuting epistemological solipsism.
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1CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM: EPISTEMOLOGICAL SOLIPSISM
AND PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
In "this dissertation I shall examine the use of tran-
scendental argument — argument which elicits the analytic
implications of the indubitable fact that an act of judg-
mental consciousness is occurring -- for the refutation of
that version of epistemological skepticism which states that
we can never know for certain that objective particulars --
re identifiable, existentially and attributively independent
particulars — exist. It is my thesis that various influ-
ential, alleged instances of Kantian transcendental method,
even when maximally supplemented by other anti-skeptical
resources, fail to meet this skeptical challenge, but that
a more faithfully Kantian transcendental argument offers
unique promise in conclusively discrediting the skeptical
thesis on its own terms.
In this chapter I shall explain and motivate the skep-
tical problem with which I am concerned, explicate the cen-
tral notions of philosophical certainty and objective par-
ticularity, and set forth ground rules and procedural assump-
tions which any adequate solution to the problem must satisfy.
I
The version of skepticism with which I am concerned,
that we can never know for certain that objective particulars
2exist, will be referred to as •epistemological solipsism. -1
Epistemological solipsism is more restricted than the
distinct forms of skepticism which state that we can know
nothing for certain, that we can justifiably believe nothing,
and that we can never justifiably believe that objective
particulars exist. The refutation of epistemological solip-
sism entails the refutation of these other skeptical posi-
tions, but not conversely. There may be alternative methods
for refuting these more radical forms of skepticism. It
may be that skepticism with regard to everything is success-
fully impugned by so-called 'argument from self
-refutation'
or argument from self
-referential inconsistency* of the
sort found in Aristotle, Husserl, and others,^ And doubts
about justified belief in objective particulars may perhaps
be dispelled by the sorts of inferences to the best scien-
tific explanation found in Michael Slote's recent book,^
But there are good reasons, I shall argue, for believing
that there is only one viable approach to the refutation of
epistemological solipsism.
The epistemological solipsist is a theoretical skeptic.
He is a participant in the philosophical debate who puts
forth the cognitively significant claim that it is possible
to know with certainty all there is to know about subjective
experience without knowing with certainty anything about the
external world. He is unlike the classical Pyrrhonist as
3interpreted via Sextus by Arne Naess. ^ who asserts nothing,
does not in principle reject any certainties, but merely
conveys that as things seem to him personally, no argument
for or against any proposition is sufficiently strong to
compel acceptance or rejection. This Pyrrhonist's announce-
ments do not function cognitively, and his complete suspen-
sion of judgment is to be explained genetically, not Epis-
temologically. Since he holds no views, his skepticism is
ad hoc, raising counterarguments to whatever is affirmed.
In contrast, our theoretical skeptic affirms and attempts
to justify some propositions. Consequently, if doubting a
proposition entails withholding belief both from that pro-
position and its negation, we should dissociate the notions
of skepticism and doubt. The skeptic need not be a doubter?
dubitability is not doubtfulness. One can be persuaded to
accept a proposition, yet question the adequacy or reliabil-
ity of the evidence that could be offered to justify that
proposition. Persuasion is not adequate evidence.
It may be that action or behavior implies propositional
belief, so that Naess' Pyrrhonism is impossible. But if the
implication does not hold, then I wish simply to ignore the
Pyrrhonist. The best a philosopher can do is defeat all
possible participants in a dispute. He need not fear a
forever silent menace.
Philosophers with epistemological proclivities as
different as the Cartesian Prichard and anti-Cartesian
Wittgenstein have argued that doubting one thing requires
being certain of something else.^ This may mean either
that only certainties can render other propositions dubi-
ous, or that some propositions or other must be certainties
if any propositions are to be dubitable. On the first inter-
pretation. the requirement is obviously false. So long as
we are not justified in believing the negation of a proposi-
tion. that proposition may be used to cast doubt on another
proposition.^ Not all propositions whose negations we
are not justified in believing are certainties. Hence, not
all legitimate doubt-makers are certainties. On the second
interpretation, the requirement rules out the radical form
of skepticism which states that nothing is certain, and
may be defensible. But there remains the still weaker
demand that one can doubt a belief only in light of other,
at least tentatively accepted, beliefs."^ This refusal to
countenance the possibility of universal and systematic
doubt does not explicitly require that there be any certain-
ties at all. However, neither this nor the previous require-
ment poses a threat to the non-radical, theoretical skeptic
I have, been describing. He can accept them both.
We further delineate epistemological solipsism by noting
that its challenge is not the challenge of discovering necessary
5and sufficient conditions for establishing the truth of
particular objective beliefs. There are well-rehearsed
skeptical arguments designed to show that we can never know
for certain, at any given time, that what we take to be an
objective particular is an objective particular, that per-
ceptual judgments are corrigible, that people who make per-
ceptual knowledge
-claims are fallible. After all. the skeptic
argues, there is an epistemological gap between representa-
tions and the non-representational independent reality one
purports to represent; claims about subjective states and
claims about objective particulars are on different episte-
mological levels. But all the evidence for our beliefs must
be drawn from states of ourselves; subjective propositions
are the basic justificatory premises. Consequently, our
knowledge of objective particulars depends entirely on these
subjective states. So unless some inferential principle
could be validated which would warrant the move from sub-
jective to objective propositions, we could never know any
objective propositions to be true.
,
All deductive principles of evidence can be shown to
be defective by showing the evidence presumed sufficient
for establishing the existence of some objective particular
is consistent with its non-existence. Since the experiences
of someone who has a true perceptual belief about an objective
particular may be exactly duplicated by the experiences of
6someone else whose perceptual belief is exactly similar but
false, whether the relation between experiences and belief
is a one-one or many-one relation, it is always logically
possible that our perceptual beliefs about objective partic-
ulars are false. But we cannot be mistaken about that
which we know for certain. Hence, we can never know for
certain that beliefs about objective particulars are true.
The relation between subjective and objective propositions
is not deductive.
Classical inductive or experimental inference, even if
legitimate, could not be used to justify objective proposi-
tions in the needed way. By hypothesis, we cannot per-
ceive the objective particulars, and so cannot check for
constant conjunction between subjective data and objective
0particulars. Further, since there can be no discernible
difference between the content of consciousness in the
cases of veridical and illusory perception, from the content
or nature of individual perceptions we can infer nothing
about relations among perceptions or relations among percep-
tions and, if there be such, non-perceptions. So one can
never tell, in a given case, whether one is perceiving ob-
jective particulars merely on the basis of inspection of
one's subjective states. Still further, inductive inference
fails to guarantee preservation of certainty. But again,
all the evidence for our beliefs must be drawn from certainly
7known subjective states. Hence, the relation between sub-
jective and objective propositions is not classically in-
ductive
.
Our knowledge of objective particulars depends entire-
ly on subjective experience, but the relation is neither
deductive nor classically inductive. So unless there are
certainty-preserving, valid, non-deductive inferences other
than classical induction, there is no justification for the
certainty of our beliefs about objective particulars.
This line of argument may seem vulnerable at several
points. First, it is controversial whether there can be no
discernible difference between the content of consciousness
in the cases of veridical and illusory perception. For ex-
ample, Lewis held that the sense meaning of an objective
belief, or non-terminating judgment, the experiential criteria
of its application to reality, consists in the (infinite) set
of direct empirical findings, presentations immediately given
in experience (terminating judgments), implied as probable
under specifiable conditions of presentation and action.^ In
an effort to save this brand of linguistic phenomenalism from
the argument from perceptual relativity, whose central proposi-
tion is that there are logically possible conditions of observa-
tion under which any statement which refers only to the immedi-
ately given would be false even though a particular objective
statement were true, Lewis argued that a perceptual presentation
8often contains clues to the conditions of observation affect-
ing it. Delusion is possible, but frequently we can detect
illusion. By taking into account distorting conditions as
they are reflected in experience, and appealing to the rela-
tivization of probabilities to the premises from which they
are determined, Lewis claims to allow for the relativity of
, 10sense perception. But unless we grant the implausible sup-
position that it is logically impossible for there to be any
distorting condition which is not reflected in immediate ex-
perience (so that we can unfailingly safeguard our non-termi-
nating judgments by incorporating all distorting conditions
into the antecedents of our terminating judgments), we must
admit that the degree of reliability of the connection between
presentations and objective particulars is never sufficient
for theoretical certainty, which is what the skeptical argu-
ment demands. Lewis himself explicitly denies that justified
perceptual judgments are instances of theoretical certainty,
though he thinks perhaps they are practically certain, so that
we may act upon them without hesitation. Hence, the truth
of Lewis' position does not entail the unsoundness of the
skeptical argument just presented.
Second, there do seem to be several valid forms of inductive
(non-deductive ) inference, valid argument-forms in which the
conjunction of the premises and the negation of the conclusion
1 ?does not imply a contradiction, other than classical induction.
9The development of theories of rational belief and evidential
support suggest that exclusive use of enumerative inductive
generalization, of both categorical and statistical form,
eliminative induction, and analogical inference, is unjusti-
fiably restrictive. For example, Kneale presents a theory of
responsible evaluation of evidence, in which • probabilifioa-
tion' denotes the fundamental relation, admitting of degrees
from rendering a proposition practically certain to barely
more than probabilifying the negation of the proposition.^^
In this theory of rational belief, probability is not quanti-
tative at all, and cannot be incorporated into a formal cal-
cuius.
Along "thcs© general lines, Chisholm develops in detail
a theory of evidential support. Beginning with the undefined
concept of epistemic preferability, governed by six axioms,
he outlines an epistemic logic in which the notions of reason-
able belief and gratuitous belief, favorable presumption and
lack of it, acceptability and unacceptability, and other deri-
vative notions, are defined and interrelated. In turn, vari-
ous 'conferring relations’ between propositions, (inductive
and deductive) evidence-, reasonability-, acceptability-,
unacceptability-, and gratuitousness-conferring relations,
may be defined. Then, moving from epistemic logic to epistem-
ology, he formulates epistemic rules or principles describing
sufficient conditions under which a proposition (or ordered
10
pair of propositions, for the appropriate concepts) may be
said to have the properties, or stand in the relations,
15
previously defined.
A proper subset of these principles is concerned with
justifying propositions about objective particulars on the
basis of propositions about subjective (
' self
-presenting*
)
states. In * On the Nature of Empirical Evidence,' Chisholm
acknowledges Heidelberger* s successful criticism of these
principles as originally formulated in Theory of Knowledge
.
and attempts to revise them.^^ I am not here concerned to
independently assess these reformulated principles. Suffice
it to say that for Chisholm the acceptability of some of
these principles is conditional upon the untenability of
the sort of skepticism embodied in the lately sketched argu-
ment. He argues that the spontaneous act of taking something
to have a certain sensible characteristic confers not only
reasonability, but evidence, upon the proposition that one
does in fact perceive something to have that characteristic,
or else skepticism with respect to our perception of the ex-
17ternal world is true . But he admits that our takings can
be false, that is, we can be mistaken, so that although
takings provide a criterion of evidence, it is not a logically
sure criterion for distinguishing veridical from illusory
perception.^® In effect, this is to assent to what, since
Hume, has been usually taken for granted, that no form of
11
induction (non-deduction) yields absolute certainty, but only
a lower or higher degree of probability in its conclusions.
jj* we accept the skeptic's presupposed requirement of
absolute certainty, the success of Chisholm's program, like
that of Lewis', fails to entail the falsity of skepticism.
Of course, the tenability of such theories of evidential
support remains an interesting and important problem, and if
the demands of the traditional skeptic are rejected as un-
acceptably stringent, perhaps the only problem in this area
worth trying to solve. But if we can defend a distinction
between practical and metaphysical certainty, and then pose
our anti-skeptical task in terms of metaphysical certainty,
these other enterprises will be inadequate to our purposes.
But our moral is not just that moral certainty falls
short of philosophic certainty, but that discovering a criteri-
on of truth for objective beliefs is not required for the
refutation of epistemological solipsism. The criteriological
problem, first raised in theological disputes between the
Church and Reformers, where the reliability of Papal authority
and appeal to scripture was challenged, was soon raised with
respect to natural knowledge, and precipitated the skeptical
crisis in modern philosophy. Montaigne's revival of the
arguments
. of Sextus Empiricus evoked attempts at reinforce-
ment, mitigation or accon^dation, or refutation, as traced
by Popkin, from Descartes, Gassendi, Mersenne
,
Pascal, Bayle,
and Hume, as well as less familiar yet influential men such
as Charron, Chanet, Huet, and Campanella.
12
The criteriological problem Is not ours. Each perception-
based Objective knowledge-claim may be nnverif iable
, so that
at no specified time can we know with certainty that the claim
is true. This is compatible with the falsity of epistemological
solipsism. I only want to evaluate the success of transcenden-
tal argument in showing that we can know with certainty that
objective particulars exist, so that the skeptical thesis which
denies this is false. Whether transcendental argument can
succeed in the face of the concessions I make and procedural
assumptions I adopt in deference to the skeptic in section IV
of this chapter, awaits further consideration. The purpose
of this section was to explain that epistemological solipsism
is a non-radical, theoretical skepticism about the possibility
of knowing with certainty that any objective particulars exist
at all.
II
I want to assess the prospects of transcendental argument
for establishing the thesis that we can know with certainty
that objective particulars exist. Two preliminary questions
arise immediately. What exactly does 'certainty* mean here?
What exactly does 'objective particular' mean? I shall con-
sider the nature of certainty first.
I begin by listing several conditions of adequacy for
the explication of philosophical certainty. If p is a con-
dition of adequacy for a proposed explication of a concept C,
13
then any explication of c which entails not-p must be rejected.
My list of adequacy conditions for the explication of philo-
sophical certainty is intended to capture those general be-
liefs about certainty shared by the disputants in the contro-
versy over epistemological solipsism, so long as those beliefs
are mutually consistent. Specifically, i shall elicit a set
of demands from Descartes, who paradigmatically posed our
skeptical problem, and accept it. In addition to being general,
these demands are not intended to be jointly exhaustive. Con-
sequently, we should not be tempted to propose the conjunction
of adequacy conditions as the explication itself.
Our first condition states that certainty is not an in-
trinsic property of propositions, but is a relation between
a person or persons, a proposition or set of propositions,
and a time or set of times. Descartes insists on this point
in several places in his reply to Bourdin’s objections (the
seventh set), in which he complains that his critic 'treats
doubtfulness and certainty not as relations of our thought to
objects, but as properties of the objects and as inhering in
them eternally. The consequence is that nothing we have once
learned to be doubtful can ever be rendered certain. Another
consequence is that a given proposition is (or is not) certain
for anyone who entertains it, regardless of his evidence. Very
many arguments in Descartes rightly depend upon treating cer-
tainty as a relation of the sort described.
Our second condition of adequacy states that a person may
14
at a time be certain about a logically contingent proposition.
Certainties need not be necessary truths. As Descartes argues,
the logically contingent propositions. 'I think’ and ’i exist.’
are certainties for me whenever I pronounce them or mentally
conceive them.
Our third condition of adequacy states the converse of
the second: Necessary truths need not be certainties. Other-
wise. Descartes could not have been, and the atheist geometer
could not remain, uncertain about the truths of mathematics?
and each person, regardless of his evidence and skills at
proof, would be equally certain of all the necessary truths
he entertained.^^
Fourth, the concept of certainty relevant to epistemolo-
gical solipsism is an epistemic. normative concept. The term
'certain* may have purely descriptive force in some contexts,
but it has some standard-setting, evaluative force in the con-
text of the Cartesian problem. Therefore, any analysis on
which certainty is not a concept of epistemic appraisal is
unacceptable
,
Fifth, no satisfactory analysis of certainty should imply
that all certainties must be inferentially justifiable. The
possibility that there are propositions which are certain for
a man at a time, even though there is no available premise-
set containing other propositions which are certain and es-
sential to their derivation, should not be ruled out. Des-
cartes held that intuition and deduction were the only two
15
routes to knowledge with certainty, and that deduction is
based on self-evident intuition. And it may be that ad-
mission of self- justifying or 'intuitive* certainties is
required to avoid the dilemma that all justification is
either viciously regressive or circular. But even if not,
we legitimately insist on retaining our fifth condition, since
we do not want adequacy conditions which beg detailed ques-
tions of analysis.
Following what I believe to be the correct interpretation
of Descartes, I want to sustain a distinction between knowing
and knowing with certainty. Therefore, I lay down a sixth
condition of adequacy for the explication of philosophical
certainty which states that knowledge does not imply certainty.
In reply to the second set of objections, Descartes allows that
the atheist geometer can know that the three angles of a tri-
angle are equal to two right angles, but denies that such
knowledge is knowledge with certainty (constitutes true
science), since it can be rendered dubious. 23 Again in reply
to the sixth set of objections, he grants the atheist knowledge,
but denies that it is 'immutable and certain. Descartes'
various remarks distinguishing the requirements of the search
for truth and the practical activities of life, where the
moral mode of knowing suffices for the regulation of life,
but falls short of the metaphysical mode of knowing, can plausi-
bly be construed as supporting the distinction between 'ordi-
nary knowledge' and metaphysical knowledge or knowledge with
Icertainty. This distinction will he defended further as
the analysis proceeds.
What about the converse of the sixth condition? If cer-
tainty does entail knowledge, then, since knowledge entails
truth, certainty entails truth. If certainty does not entail
knowledge, then we do not establish that we know something
with certainty merely by showing that it is certain for us.
An additional burden is thereby imposed on our anti-skeptical
task. But I see no justification for endorsing a condition
which either entails or precludes a knowledge- or truth-
entailing analysis of philosophical certainty. We should
refrain from anticipating the status of these entailments.
I propose the foregoing six conditions as criteria of
adequacy for the explication of certainty relevant to the
problem of epistemological solipsism. No satisfactory account
of certainty entails that certainty is an intrinsic property
of propositions, that all certainties are logically necessary,
that all necessities are certainties, that ascriptions of
certainty lack all force of epistemic appraisal, that all
certainties must be inferentially justifiable, or that know-
ledge implies certainty.
Descartes' most frequently enunciated account of cer-
tainty (indubitability ) in terms of irrevisability satisfies
these criteria. In the Discourse he resolves to accept only
what he 'could have no occasion to doubt,' carefully reflecting
'in each matter that came before me (him) as to anything which
17
could make it subject to suspicion or doubt... '26
Meditations his announced goal is to establish a
-firm and
permanent structure in the sciences.' which requires that he
withhold any opinion which
-might even in a small degree be
invalidated by reasons.- and hence not be certain and in-
dubitable. 27 He begins The Principles with the recommendation
•to doubt all things in which the slightest trace of incer-
titude can be found.- suggesting that it is
-useful to reject
as false all (these) things as to which we can imagine the
least doubt to exist. -28 m The Search after Truth he strives
to attain knowledge
-solid and certain enough to deserve the
name of science ...- 29 jr, other places he states that the
atheist's knowledge 'is not immutable and certain;' it is
subject to metaphysical, hyperbolical doubt, which can be
caused by 'the very least ground of suspicion,' lacking that
metaphysical certainty which 'all the most extravagant sup-
positions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of
shaking.
*
Descartes is demanding that no proposition be accepted
into the body of philosophical and scientific theory unless
the evidence for it satisfies his rule of clarity and dis-
tinctness, Following Frankfurt, we may say that a proposition
p is clearly perceived by a person S if S recognizes that
his evidential basis for p excludes all reasonable grounds
for doubting it. P is distinctly perceived by S if S under-
stands what is and what is not entailed by the evidential
18
basis which renders p clearly perceived.
A person cannot regard a belief as altogether solid and
permanent if his basis for belief is compatible with a suffi-
cient basis for giving it up. As long as it is conceivable
for circumstances to arise in which, given the basis he already
has for accepting a belief, it would nevertheless be reasonable
for him to reject it. then the belief does not provide him
with an absolutely secure foundation on which to build. Foun-
dational propositions must be acceptable without risks there
must be no chance that additional evidence will ever make it
reasonable for a person to abandon them. But when a person
bases his acceptance of a belief on a clear and distinct
perception, he recognizes that he cannot consistently conceive
reasonable grounds for doubting that belief, since he cannot
intelligibly forsee any circumstances that would impugn his
belief, he is justified in regarding the belief as unshakably
solid and permanent.
Goodman seems to be affirming Descartes' irrevisability
condition for certainty when he says that 'I cannot be said
to be certain about what occurs at a given moment, even at
that moment, if I may justifiably change my mind about it at
a later moment. So we might say that p is certain for S
at t only if it is impossible that there is a time t'
,
later
than t, such that S reasonably doubts that p is true at t'.
To avoid the psychological nuances sometimes associated with
the notion of doubt, let us explicitly define 'S doubts p at t'
19
as
-S withholds p or believes not-p at t.
• Then we can say
that p is irrevisable for S at t if. and only if. ft is i„,.
possible that there is a f later than t such that s is war-
ranted in withholding p or believing not-p at f. and that
irrevisability is a necessary condition of certainty.
If p is a certainty for S at t, it is impossible that
further tests on p-might yield results which warrant s-s re-
traction of p. such irretractability would be guaranteed if
no new evidence for p will ever become available for S since
the current evidence is exhaustive or complete, or if no other
proposition could ever be better justified for anyone than p
IS for S at t. since the evidential warrant for p is maximal.
But irrevisable propositions need be neither exhaustively nor
maximally evidenced. In fact, the irrevisability condition
does not even require that the credibility of p be undiminish-
able in light of new information we might conceivably have
about the future. It does not require that no amount of new
negative evidence can count against it to the slightest degree.
If p is irrevisable for S at t. not-p cannot become warranted
for 3. Therefore, there is no conceivable event such that if
S were justified at t in believing that it will occur after t,
not-p would thereby become warranted for S at t. And if p is
irrevisable, the evidence for not-p can never counterbalance
the evidence for p (for S), for then S would be warranted in
withholding p. But the evidence for p could become less, so
long as the loss was insufficient to make p unwarranted. Hence,
20
certainties need not be ivory-tower propositions whose evidence-
bases remain fixed, it is just that their evidence-bases are
sufficient to rule out the possibility of subsequent overthrow.
For this reason they can provide abiding foundations for our
©difice of true science.
But to better understand the irrevisability condition,
note that it is stronger than the condition definitive of what
Malcolm has called the ’strong' sense of knowledge. Malcolm
says, ’When I use ’know’ in the strong sense I am not prepared
to look upon anything as an investigation
. I do not concede
that anything whatsoever could prove me mistaken! I do not
regard the matter as open to any question ; I do not admit
that my proposition could turn out to be false, that any
future investigation could refute it or cast doubt on it. ’33
But it becomes clear that all this describes the speaker’s
attitude towards his proposition, what the speaker
would be prepared to admit at the time of statement. ’It
does not prophesy what my attitude would be if various things
happened. ’3^^ The irrevisability condition further demands
the constancy of my rational attitude at all future times.
Elsewhere, Malcolm denies that if at any time there
should be a reasonable doubt that a proposition is true, then
at no previous time did anyone make absolutely certain that
35it is true, in an article otherwise critical of Malcolm,
Frankfurt concurs, remarking that statements concerning ancient
history for which we have meager evidence may once have been
21
conclusively established . 36 But this counterexample works
only because the formulation of the principle fails to re-
lativize certainty to persons or evidence
-bases, as any
respectable formulation should.
By relativizing to stock of evidence, we come up with
a principle which Frankfurt later affirms, namely that if
at any time there should be a reasonable doubt that a pro-
position is true, then at no previous time did anyone make
absolutely certain that it is true, provided that the evidence
possessed at the later time includes all the evidence pos-
sessed at the earlier time. Evidence is conclusive when
it is sufficient to justify the conclusion based on it no
matter what further information is obtained. And this is
the irrevisability condition.
Now, intuitive certainties or self
-
justif iers aside,
if irrevisability is necessary for certainty, and if only
deductive justifications can be conclusive, then it would
seem that a proposition can be philosophically certain only
if it is entailed by its evidence. If it is not entailed by
its evidence, it is possible to conceive circumstances in
which, this evidence notwithstanding, it would be reasonable
to regard the proposition as false. And this is the skeptic's
gambit when he spins tales of contravention of natural law,
mysterious causal efficacy, and so on. That such doubts are
impractical is confessed, but irrelevant to Cartesian,
theoretical certainty.
22
If there are theoretical certainties, we can see how,
supposing knowledge to be something like justified, true
belief, there is something different from and epistemically
preferable to knowledge. Irrevisability provides an important
gain for knowledge with certainty. A man may justifiably
believe what is true (and the relation between his evidence
and belief be non-accidental -- or whatever fourth condition
is needed to complete the analysis of knowledge) at a given
time and so know that truth at that time, but then later, due
to changes in his evidence base, lose his justification and
so his claim to knowledge. Consequently, this ordinary kind
of knowledge cannot make the sciences 'secure and lasting.'
But for certainties, no future event could possibly dispel
their justification; they fulfill the Cartesian ideal of per-
manency. Hence, even as a practical matter, knowledge with
certainty is more desirable than ordinary knowledge.
It may be objected that if a man's evidence for a pro-
position at a time is really sufficient, then the introduction
of no amount of additional evidence bearing on the proposition
could result in his loss of warrant. Given the meaning many
contemporary epistemologists place on 'sufficient,' this is
plainly false. On the other hand, some philosophers have
proposed as a fourth condition of knowledge an 'indefeasibility'
requirement which is reminiscent of Cartesian irrevisability.^'^
Defeasible justification is justification insufficient
for knowing. The problem is providing a non-trivial analysis
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of defeasibility in terms of which we can define a suitable
notion of indefeasibility. We cannot say that the justifi-
cation of p by e is defeasible if, and only if, e justifies
some falsehood f, since an irrelevant part of e might justify
f without defeating p - e may mislead about f but reliably
support p. so we want to say that the justification of p
by e IS defeasible if, and only if, e justifies some falsehood
f which is relevant to the justification of p. One attempt
to capture this relevance condition states that the justifi-
cation of p by e is defeasible if, and only if, there is some
true proposition g, such that e&g does not justify p. An
inference is not defeated merely by the presence of false
premises, but rather by the fact that if these false assump-
tions are replaced with their true negations, the conclusion
no longer follows. On this account, a justit-ation can be
defeated by any statement that can be added to a given person's
knowledge, that is, by any true statement, and not only by
s tatsmeirts actually known by "the person,
Lehrer and Paxson have shown that this account is too
strong. Suppose S sees the familiar Tom Grabit stealing a
book from the library. But suppose further that, unbeknownst
to S, Tom's mother has sworn that on the day in question, Tom
was out of town, but that Tom's identical twin brother, John,
was in the library. Suppose Tom's mother is a compulsive
liar, John is a fiction of her demented mind, and Tom did
o o
take the book. According to the account under examination.
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since adding the mother's sworn testimony to the original
evidence results in an inadeWely justified belief. S's
justification for believing that Tom stole the book is de-
feasible, so that S does not know that Tom stole the book.
But S does know that Tom stole the book.
Curiously, in a later article Lehrer proposes an account
of indefeasibility which is equivalent to the one just refuted.
He claims that if S is justified in believing p on the basis
of e, the justification is indefeasible if, and only if, for
any false proposition f, S is completely justified in believing
p on the basis of the conjunction of e and the assumption that
f IS false -- s would be completely justified in believing p
on the basis of e even if he assumed any further true proposi-
tion. Hilpinen traces other abortive attempts at revision.
But what the issue boils down to for our purposes is whether
knowledge is ’extendable,' whether, if S knows that p on the
basis of e, then, for any true proposition g, S would be com-
pletely justified in believing that p even if he knew that g.
If knowledge is extendable
,
then the above extendability
thesis is a condition of adequacy for the explication of de-
feasibility (and so indefeasibility). Lehrer' s analysis
satisfied the extendability thesis but was shown to be too
strong. Now Hilpinen argues as follows: Since the extenda-
bility thesis does not entail Lehrer' s analysis -- it requires
only that no true proposition would make p unjustified if S
”” we should try to formulate an explication of
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indefeasibility which is weaker than Lehrer's yet satisfies
extendability. Such a formulation is this; If s is completely
justified in believing that p on the basis of e, the justi-
fication is indefeasible if, and only if, for any true pro-
position g, s would be completely justified in believing that
P even if he were completely justified in believing that g.^1
Hilpinen goes on to’ claim that his definition is not equi-
valent to Lehrer’s, that the extendability thesis does not
entail Lehrer’s analysis, and that the extendability thesis
does entail his own analysis.
The extendability thesis says that justification would
be preserved even if the man acquired new knowledge. Hilpinen’
s
indefeasibility condition says that justification would be
preserved even if the man acquired new, justified true beliefs.
Lehrer’s indefeasibility condition says that justification would
be preserved even if (for the sake of argument) some additional
truth were assumed. Hilpinen is right in arguing that his
analysis is not equivalent to Lehrer’s, and that extendability
does entail his analysis. But he is wrong to say that exten-
dability does not entail Lehrer’s analysis. If I would still
be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of specified
evidence, even if I were to come to know other propositions,
then I would still be justified in believing that proposition
on that original evidence, even if I were merely to assume some
further truths. ’No true proposition makes p unjustified’
entails ’No known proposition makes p unjustified,’ but not
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conversely. To conclude from this that extendability does
not entail Lehrer's analysis is to confuse two categorical
assertions with their corresponding subjunctive conditionals.
For notice that if we improperly render the subjunctive for-
mulations of extendability and Hilpinen's thesis as categorical
claims, since ’No known proposition makes p unjustified* fails
to entail 'no justified true proposition makes p unjustified,'
we cannot say that extendability entails Hilpinen's condition
e ither.
The upshot is this. The extendability thesis entails
both Lehrer's and Hilpinen's versions of the indefeasibility
requirement. Lehrer's condition was shown to be unnecessary
for knowledge (in the ordinary sense). And, by the way, since
the Grabit counterexample succeeds in refuting Hilpinen's
analysis as well, Hilpinen's condition is unnecessary for
knowledge. Since the extendability thesis entails propositions
whose truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge, the
truth of the extendability thesis is not a necessary condition
of knowledge. And the ultimate upshot is this. Although
ordinary knowledge need not be extendable, knowledge with
certainty must be extendable, since certainty implies irre-
visability, and irrevisability implies extendability. Con-
sequently, we have sustained the legitimacy of the ordinary
knowledge --knowledge with certainty distinction. Knowledge
with certainty is irrevisable.
Very many philosophers would say that if certainty implies
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immunity from subsequent revision, then nothing (synthetic)
IS certain for anybody. Instance Scheffler's remark that
certainty 'imports the notion of fixity, a freedom from
error and consequent revision, which cannot be defended for
it is nowhere to be found. '^3 Peirce may be interpreted
as holding the following view.^^ There are three senses of
knowledge.' Relative to the body of presently available
information and our current conceptual framework, knowledge
is the opinion we are fully authorized in asserting, which
we do not and cannot really doubt on the available evidence.
(Compare Rorty's definition that 'S believes incorrigibly
that p at t if and only if (i) s believes that p at t, and
(ii) There are no accepted procedures by applying which it
would be rational to come to believe that not-p, given S's
belief that p at t,' and his various recent endorsements of
historicism.^3) q^II this 'knowledge]^.' Relative to the
complete body of information and the final conceptual frame-
work, knowledge is the final and irreversible compulsory
belief destined to be agreed upon by the community of scien-
tific inquirers. Call this ' knowledge^ .
' Knowledge^ is the
opinion which is absolutely certain, which 'completely corres-
ponds' with reality. Since we cannot be absolutely certain
that we have attained to the final opinion on any given matter,
we must assume that whatever we are authorized in asserting
is subject to future possible impeachment. We cannot profess
knowledge 2 s-i'though we know^ that such knowledge must obtain
28
oner or later. Final, irreversible opinion is different
from absolute certainty. Knowled^j can never be had. but
only approached indefinitely as one would a mathematical limit.
I choose these two philosophers as examples because
both, though one in confusion and the other in recognition
Of distinctness, use the notion of immunity from error as
well as that of immunity from revision. And Descartes himself
seems occasionally to slip into this confusion, as when he
says.
-More especially did I reflect in each matter that came
before me as to anything which could make it subject to sus-
picion or doubt, and give occasion for mistake Others,
such as Lewis and Malcolm, urge that what is essential to
certainties is that they cannot be mistaken; but here again,
as Firth persuasively argues, they seem to mean • unfalsif iable ,
•
not 'unmistakable.'^*^
Still, one might argue that Cartesian certainty requires
the impossibility of being mistaken. Now this may mean either
that it IS impossible for a person both to certainly know some-
thing yet be mistaken about it, that knowing with certainty
entails not being mistaken, or that knowing with certainty
entails the impossibility of being mistaken. The first read-
ing is equivalent to the claim that if a man both knows with
certainty and believes a proposition, then that proposition
is true, or, given that certain knowledge entails belief, that
certain knowledge entails true belief. But this does nothing
to distinguish knowing from knowing with certainty. The
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second reading is equivalent to the claim that if a person
knows a proposition with certainty, the proposition- s truth
is entailed by the fact that he believes it.
After all, doubt is possible if error is possible.
Error is false belief. So error is possible whenever believing
does not entail truth. Hence, since a certain or indubitable
proposition is one About which the possibility of error is
excluded, a proposition is certain only if believing it logi-
cally implies its truth.
And there is no non-logical way of excluding the possi-
bility Of error. Checking against error cannot eliminate the
possibility of error, since, as Hume noted, every act of
checking can itself be in error. Each new test has its
own presumptions. Further, there are conceivably possibilities
of error of which I am ignorant and so cannot check against.
So if a judgment is logically bound to succeed, its truth
must follows from the circumstance of its being made.
On the unmistakability requirement, there is no possible
world in which the allegedly certain proposition is believed
yet false. It does not imply that there is no possible world
in which the proposition is false. As adequacy condition (2)
tells us, certainties need not be necessary truths. Note
further that unmistakability is not a sufficient condition
of certainty. All necessary truths satisfy the unmistakability
condition. But adequacy condition (3) states that not all
necessary truths need be certainties.
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As I shall argue shortly, I do not think that unmistaka-
bility is a necessary condition of Cartesian certainty either.
But the anti-skeptical demand that truth be entailed by believing
(or variations on this theme, such as truth being entailed by
doubting, or understanding) is ^rirna facie logically coherent,
and should not be merely laughed out of court. For example,
Danto has belabored i:he scope ambiguity and consequent scope
fallacy in the move from 'necessarily, if s knows, then he is
not in error,' to 'if s knows, then necessarily he is not in
error,' and accordingly cavalierly relieved us of the onus of
isolating a class of Cartesian indubitables
. His only argu-
me^ is argument by comparison. If I am healthy, I cannot be
sick. Yet I am human, and can be sick. But the issue is
whether the proposed analogues are relevantly similar. To
infer the necessity of the consequent from the necessity of
the consequence is fallacious, but what reason do we have for
thinking this the sole attempted justification for the Car-
tesian enterprise?
Some other philosophers who have engaged in the Cartesian
enterprise seem to have understood philosophical certainty
as requiring some sort of maximal warrant or minimal dubi-
tability. Russell held that a proposition is certain only
if it is as indubitable as any other proposition, so that if
one proposition is for some reason more dubitable than another,
the first is not certain. Chisholm has employed such
a notion when he defines the 'evident' (which he uses in a
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preferred analysis of knowledge) as 'that which it is more
reasonable to believe than withhold and which is such that
there is nothing else more reasonable to believe. *32
The notion of minimal dubitability or maximal warrant
may be explicated in various non-equivalent ways, depending
on the classes of comparison to which one appeals. 53 That is,
various definitions 'of maximal warrant can be formulated by
changing the range of the three variables of persons, pro-
positions, and times, which must be included in virtue of
adequacy condition (1), por example, we might say that a
man S is maximally warranted in believing a proposition p
at a time t if, and only if. (a) p has at least as much warrant
for S at t as p ever has for anyone who asserts p; or, some-
what stronger, (b) it is unimaginable that p would have more
warrant for someone asserting it than it has for S at t; or,
still stronger, (c) it is unimaginable that any proposition
would have more warrant for anyone than p has for S at t.
On analyses (a) and (b), maximal warrant fails to coin-
cide with minimal dubitability, as understood by Russell and
others. (a) and (b) are too weak. They are satisfied if p
has no (imaginable) warrant for anyone at any time. On the
other hand, it may seem that (c) is too strong. For example.
Unger uses the slightly stronger notion that a proposition
is certain for a man only if it is impossible for there to
be anything of which he is more certain to try to prove that
nothing is certain. To determine the status of (c), as well
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as the previously discussed unmistakability condition, we
must determine the entail.ent-relations between these two
notions and that of irrevisability. Restating the condi-
tions as explicitly as possibles
it^t^'Tff P maximally warranted for S
3' ’ ®uoh that p' is more warranted for
( Unmistakability
) p is unmistakable for S at txt IS impossible that S believes p at fand'p L^filse.
(Irrevisability) p is irrevisable for S at t i-f-F
such^that°S^i's^®
that thep exists a f later thin t
tha^ not!p ai
"" withholding p or believing
If each of these conditions were held only to be necessary
conditions of certainty, then all that is required is that
they be mutually compatible, which apparently they are. There
need be no entailment-relations between them. But. if any
one is held to be sufficient for certainty, then it must en-
tail the others (if they truly be necessary).
As regards the necessary conditions of certainty, I have
argued only in favor of irrevisability. I now affirm the
sufficiency of irrevisability for certainty. Irrevisability
satisfies the six conditions of adequacy for the explication
of philosophical certainty. It is the only extensively docu-
mented account discoverable in Descartes. It is strong enough
to entail extendability
, strong (Lehrer's) indefeasibility,
and any other requirement of 'conclusiveness’ of justification.
Yet it is not so strong as to require utterly exhaustive or
complete, undiminishable evidence, which seems to be a fiction.
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irrevisability is necessary and sufficient for certainty.
In our initial discussion of irrevisability
, we claimed that
a sufficient reason for irrevisability was maximal warrant.
Maximal warrant does entail irrevisability, and so is a suf-
ficient condition Of certainty. The proof is as follows.
Suppose that p is maximally warranted. The proposition not-p
is distinct from the proposition p. if p is maximally warranted,
then it is unimaginable that there exists a p-
, f , and s- such
that p- is more warranted for S' at f. If p were revisable.
If p could be warrantedly withheld or disbelieved by s in
light of future evidence, then the evidence for not-p is
stronger than or equal to the evidence for p. But then p
would not be maximally warranted. Hence, revisability entails
not maximally warranted. Hence, maximal warrant entails
irrevisability.
It may be counterargued that all maximal warrant says
is that it is unimaginable that there exists some proposition
distinct from p which is more warranted than p for S at some
given time t. Now the irrevisability condition would be false
if (A) there exists a proposition distinct from p which is
more warranted than p for S at some later time f
. It is
possible that both maximal warrant and (A) are true. There-
fore, maximal warrant does not entail irrevisability.
The dispute rests on the reading of 'unimaginable.' If
it means 'unimaginable for S at t,' then the conjunction of
maximal warrant and (A) is possible, simply because S can
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forget his original evidence and later be rationally persuaded
to accept not-p. On the other hand, if
-unimaginable, means
un infiaginstbX© for* srivonp • 4-v> • •r anyone, m the impartial sense used by
Philosophers, then the derivation of irrevisability from maxi-
mal warrant succeeds, since the
-objective- sense is intended,
maximal warrant entails irrevisability.
Unmistakability does not entail irrevisability. All
necessary truths are unmistakable. Some necessary truths
are revisable. One can well Imagine a persuasive argument
coming along warranting suspension of judgment on a necessary
truth. Therefore, some revisable truths are unmistakable.
Therefore, unmistakability does not entail irrevisability.
One might insist,
-But of course revisability entails
mistakability. How could any future evidence generate warrant
for withholding or believing the negation of a proposition
whose truth is entailed by the fact that it is believed?-
This objection confuses the obtaining of the entailment be-
tween belief and truth and the knowledge that the entailment
obtains. If one knew that belief guaranteed truth, presumably
one could not reasonably disbelieve that proposition. But such
knowledge is not implied by the unmistakability condition.
Irrevisability does not entail maximal warrant. For
suppose that no evidence over and above that which supports
p for S at t could conceivably overturn p, that is, suppose
p is irrevisable for S at t. Then perhaps one could argue
that p has maximally good evidence (of the relevant sort of
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evidence) bearing on U - although I argued in
.y original
iscussron of irrevisability that even this need not be true.
But in any event, other propositions of other kinds, for which
other kinds of evidence are relevant, could conceivably have
still
.ore impressive credentials. Constant rational accep-
tance of p is compatible with greener pastures in any entirely
different ball park.-
One might try to prove that irrevisability entails un-
mistakability as follows: Suppose that irrevisability does
not entail unmistakability. Then three condition must hold:
(i) S believes th,at d a-t- -i-
» (ii) p IS false, and (iii) (at t'
)
It IS logically impossible to warrantedly believe not-p or
p. But (ii) and (m) are inconsistent. Therefore,
irrevisability entails unmistakability.
The question is whether it can be unwarrantable to believe
a truth or withhold a falsehood, more precisely, whether there
could never be a time during which believing the truth or with-
holding the false is warranted. The argument rests on the
assumption that for any proposition whatsoever, it Is possible
to warrantedly withhold it if it is false, and possible to
warrantedly believe it if it is true. This assumption is false.
It falsely rules out the possibility of unconf irraable truths.
Generalizing, since truth conditions, justification conditions,
and belief conditions are not invariable, irrevisability does
not entail unmistakability. For suppose mistakability
,
that is,
the possibility of false belief. Revisability does not follow.
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since just because you can be mistaken, it does not follow
you can be warranted in thinking so or withholding on
the matter.
At first blush it would seem that unmistakabllity entails
maximal warrant, if believing a proposition entails its truth,
of what concern is the possible intrusion of evidential slip-
page? let. in one sense of
-belief at least, propositions
seem to satsify the unmistakability condition without satis-
fying the maximal warrant condition. Consider the proposition
•I am believing.- if i believe that I am believing, then it
follows that I am believing. But circumstances could be ima-
gined in which
-I am thinking- (understood in the broad. Car-
tesian sense of I am conscious-) is more warranted and safer
to say than
-I am believing.- Suppose all this reporting is
going on in a psychoanalyst- s office, where eventually the
analyst elicits the patient-s realization that at the time
of utterance, he was not believing anything at all. but re-
fusing to commit himself to any of the alternatives. The
claim to believe was revisable. hence not maximally warranted,
though Its truth is entailed by the fact that it is believed.
A little further thought, however, will save us from
being hoodwinked by this spurious counterexample. An unmis-
takable proposition is one about which it is impossible to be
mistaken. So if the patient was mistaken about believing,
then his claim to believe was not logically guaranteed.
-Be-
lieve.- in its two occurrences above, was being used equivocally,
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There is a good proof that unmistakability does not en-
tail Maximal warrant. All necessary truths are unmistakable
some necessary truths are such that their warrant is weaker
than the warrant for some other proposition. Even the fact
that some necessary truths are more warranted than others
show this. Therefore, some non-maximally warranted
propositions are unmistakable. Therefore, unmistakability does
not entail maximal warrant.
The status of the final entailment from maximal warrant
to unmistakability is of no concern to us. Certainty is ir-
revisability. Maximal warrant is sufficient, but not necessary
for certainty. Unmistakability is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for certainty. It is irrelevant to our concerns whether.
Whenever maximal warrant guarantees certainty, it also guaran-
tees unmistakability. Presumably, since justification and
truth conditions are distinct, the entailment does not hold.
To foreclose a source of future misunderstanding, let
me explicitly note that various probabilistic, behavioral,
introspective, and other accounts of certainty are unsuited
to the anti-skeptical project of this dissertation. Proba-
bility calculi in which certainty is identified with proba-
bility value of 1, and only tautological truths are assigned
the value 1, do not provide us with an acceptable notion of
Cartesian certainty. On such accounts, a man can never be
certain of any logically contingent proposition. Since it
is logically contingent that objective particulars exist, we
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could never be certain, in this sense, that objective par-
ticulars exist. But this account of certainty violates
adequacy condition (2).
Neither purely behavioral nor purely psychological or
introspective analyses of certaintvO' x y are appropriate to our
epistemic concerns. To say that someone is certain about a
proposition just in
-case he is indisposed to inquire whether
that proposition is true, or just in case he is indisposed
to seek out or consider further information that bears on
that proposition, or just in case he takes no precautions
against the possibility that the proposition is false, or
just in case he is free from doubt about the proposition,
is to give a defective account of certainty as it is used
by the epistemological solipsist. Aside from the internal
difficulties of these views - the man’s indispositions may
be the result of apathy, his unwariness and freedom from
doubt the result of ignorance, and so on - they violate
adequacy condition (4).
And we should reject identifying Cartesian certainty
with knowing that one knows. If the principle (KK) that
whenever a man knows a proposition, he knows that he knows
It, IS true, then knowledge would entail certainty, and con-
dition of adequacy (6) would be violated. But, it may be
argued, (KK) is false, so that explicating certainty as
second-order knowledge is not precluded by condition (6).
After all, if a man knows a proposition, he understands it.
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•S knows that he knows that p* must satisfv n + +up iiiusx y a truth condition
xn excess of the truth conditions for 'S knows that p- alone.
TO know that he knows p. s .ust understand
-s knows that p-
,to know p, he must understand p, Put need not understand
's
knows that p.- A man might not know what
-knows that- means,
yet know a good deal; one need not have the concept of know-
ledge in order to know things. 5? since the truth conditions
for first-order knowledge are weaker than those for second-
order knowledge, first-order knowledge
-claims do not entail
the corresponding second-order claims. Therefore. (KK) is false.
Further, if a proposition q is compatible with all a
man knows, then if he knows that p. q is compatible with p.
But it does not follow that q is compatible with the man's
knowing p. so it is possible for q to be used to overthrow
the claim to knowledge, m the case of the timorous student
who IS uneasy about the acquisitions that are genuinely his.
though he knows that p. he does not have adequate evidence
for his claim to know, and so does not know that he knows. 58
But even if (KK) is false, the second-order knowledge
account of certainty is too weak. Many times when a man S
knows a proposition p. another person T knows that S knows
that p. Since S is not always in an epistemically inferior
position to T with respect to p - s does not suffer 'logically
privileged non-access' -- S sometimes knows that he knows p.
More, a little thought will reveal how infrequently S suffers
privileged non-access. Hence, very many cases of ordinary
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knowledge are cases of philosophical certainty, if the second-
order knowledge account of certainty were right. Therefore,
unless all sorts of mundane propositions are Cartesian cer-
tainties. It IS false that if someone knows that he knows
that p, he is certain that
Having discussed the notion of certainty as it occurs in
the epistemological
-solipsist thesis, I should conclude this
section by noting that the correlative notion of possibility
in the skeptical claim that it is possible that no objec-
tive particulars exist, is a weak sense of epistemic possibility.
A proposition is weakly episteraically possible for a man S at
a time t if, and only if, it is compatible with everything
that is certain for him at t. Hence, a proposition is weakly
epistemically impossible for 3 at t if, and only if, it is
incompatible with something certain for S at t. But if a
proposition is epistemically impossible for 3 at t, then, and
only then, is its negation epistemically certain for S at t.
Therefore, a proposition is epistemically certain for 3 at t
just in case its denial is incompatible with something which
is certain for 3 at t. And this is equivalent to saying
that p is epistemically certain for 3 at t provided that p
IS entailed by premises which are epistemically certain for
S at t (or is identical with such a premise). Therefore,
the way to refute epistemological solipsism is to logically
deduce its denial from philosophical certainties inevitably
acknowledged as such by the epistemological solipsist.
6o
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III
Since we are trying to refute the epistemological
solipsist, we must either understand by •objective particular-
What he does, so that our argument is not simply an ignoratio
Slenchi, or we must show that the meaning he wishes to im-
pute to • objective particular- is incoherent, replace it by
a suitable, coherent notion, and then proceed to establish
the existence of objective particulars in the legitimate
sense. If this legitimate sense can be shown to be the only
legitimate sense, then it seems that we have met the skeptical
Challenge. If there are alternative, coherent conceptions
of objective particulars, then in establishing the existence
of objective particulars in one sense we have not thereby
established their existence in all the legitimate senses,
and so have not unequivocally refuted the skeptic, unless
something-s being an objective particular in the proffered
sense entails that it is an objective particular in all the
alternative senses.
I mention the second, circuitous strategy because the
reader may wonder whether, if I take seriously the idea that
the uniquely promising anti-skeptical method is Kantian
transcendental argumentation, the straightforward strategy
is available to me. Kant seems to have argued, roughly, as
follows. The Copernican revolutionary or transcendental
idealist thesis shows that the only object of which we can
meaningfully speak is the object apprehensible by conscious-
ness. Appreciation of the transcendental or epistemological
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turn enables us to understand that «e cannot get beyond our
representations and compare them with an 'independently real-
object. The distinction between subject and object must lie
within consciousness and must be seen as the result of a
process of objectification. This process, the activity of
judgment, consists essentially in the conceptualization of
the contents of the- mind in terms of certain universal and
necessary rules. Objectivity can only be understood (con-
sistently) in terms of the necessary synthetic unity or
combinatory coherence of the representations or mental con-
tents themselves. Only by this mental activity can a person
become aware of a unified objective world distinct from his
representations. The truth of judgments about objects must
be verified in terms immanent to consciousness.
Kant's view seems to imply that it is misguided to pose
the problem of knowledge as the task of bridging the epis-
temological gap between representations and the non-represen
tational independent reality one purports to represent, and
that the problem is properly conceived only in terms of es-
tablishing lawlike features among representations. And this
requires reinterpreting what is meant by *real objective
particular.’ So Kant's is a resolution by redefinition of
’objective particular.'
It may be countered that only the problem of empirical
verification of objectivity beliefs, which is not even the
skeptical worry of the dissertation, demands any sort of
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reaennUion.
.ut not neaetiniUon ot
.o.,ecttve pantieulan..
truth IS a relation of oorresponaence between what is said
or What xs thought and so.e state of affairs or fact, then
presumably one verifies objectivity beliefs by comparing
ones representations with that which one purports to repre-
sent. to see if they fit. Kant rejects this comparative method
of verification. But no redefinition of 'objective particular'
IS called fori the standard definition already refuses to
countenance anything but objects of possible consciousness
as objective particulars, objects whose existence is. never-
theless. independent of all actual mental acts. By 'object
of possible consciousness' all is meant is 'object which
thinking beings, were there any. could become aware of.'
not object which exists only if some thinking being can
become aware of it.' Kant is not a phenomenalistic idealist.
He does not hold that objective particulars exist only if
thinkers exist, it is not as if objects exist if one person
survives a nuclear holocaust, but perish as soon as he dies.
He does hold, however, that if thinkers exercising their
capacity for thought exist, then objects exist.
To reject the comparative method of verification is not to
grant that we always only directly perceive sense data (Lockean
ideas. Humean perceptions. Kantian representations), and that
objective particulars must therefore be collections of. or
constructions out of. sense data. Additional, controversial
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considerations, such as arguments from perceptual relativityU^e-gap.
.alluoination, and so on. are needed to estalliseven that the ob1ect=. n-p h ^
and so t
" perception are person-private
- no mtersubjeotive. it is the appearance
-reality gap
xns ance of the hnown-not Icnown gap. that is essential
e s eptioal thesis. The introduction of sense data isnot needed for skepticism. There is still th
^.. .
®Pa e gap between
rngs as they seem and things as they are. Therefore. Kanfs
response to Cartesian or Humean epistemological solipsism
need not involve an idealistic redefinition of
-obieotive
particular,
*
joinder, it may be insisted that any credible Kant
exegesis requires that transcendental idealism imply the
collapse of the knowing--beinff dic:+ir..% + 'S oeing distinction, and the consequent
preclusion of meaningful talk about things as they are in
themselves. But again, this insistence rests on confusion
concerning the nature of objective particulars. Being a
reality which could exist even if nobody could become con-
scious of It, is not a necessary condition of objective
particularity. In fact. I suggest it contradicts the ana-
lysis Which faithfully depicts the skeptic's concern. The
unknowability of things as they are in themselves is not
the unknowability of objective particulars.
even if I am mistaken about thi s strain in Kant's
thought. I contend that there is to be found in Kant an
argument designed to defeat the skeptic in his own playground.
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Where ^the.e is no attempt at hollow victory hy low redefini-
tron. And so I simply will stipulate that it is that argu-
ment rnnocent of the fallacy of irrelevance that I intend to
pursue
,
I have spoken of the ordinary notion of an ohjective
particular in terms of which the skeptical thesis is formu-
lated. strictly speaking, historically, no such notion
exists. External world skepticism has centered on the exis-
tence Of physical objects. But although all physical objects
are objective particulars, the converse is untrue. Some
kinds Of events. Quinean process-things or space-time worms,
and the like, may be objective particulars also.^2 ^
Ana^isis of Ma^t^ Russell even identifies physical objects
with groups of events arranged about a center, arguing that
the only permanences science needs are the four-dimensional
space-time continuum and perhaps the conservation of energy,
but that in neither case must the permanence be supposed sub-
stantival .63 And in Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
Kant himself, after defining
-physical body- as
-matter between
determinate boundaries (with figure)- and characterizing
matter as
-the movable in space,- goes on to further specify
that matter is a repulsive force resisting penetration, to-
gether with an attractive force for bodies situated elsewhere.
He holds that extension, which is itself a force, is a
consequence of the repulsive forces of each point in space
filled with matter. And he elaborates his theory quite ele-
gantly.^'^ Even in the first Critique Kant argues that it is
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mere prejudice to assume that matter must exist in parcels
differing only in araount.^5
Essential to epistemological solipsism is the problem of
Objectivity. But that objects be Aristotelian parcels of
enformed matter is inessential. As far as our forthcoming
analysis is concerned, objects may be loci of concentrated
force fields, or any one of a number of other things. Trans-
cendental arguments encroach minimally on scientific theory and
discovery. No substantive propositions of physios follow from
their conclusions. As we shall see. transcendental proposi-
tions are not axiomatic and need have no. non-trlvial deductive
consequences, imply no empirical claims. They only assert
the satisfaction of a general predicative function; in the
present case, that function specified by the analysis of
objective particularity.
Although not all objective particulars are physical
objects, an account of physical objects naturally approxi-
mates an account of objective particulars. Candidates for
physical objects, as ordinarily understood, must satisfy
various conditions. First, they must be spatiotemporally
extended. Temporal extension rules out the momentarily
present, particular entity which instantly arises and in-
stantly perishes. The discrete, transitory atomic entity,
the Humean impression, cannot be a physical object, since
physical objects are at least relatively stable continuants.
Spatial extension rules out mental acts or representings
,
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Since no
.entaX events are spatiaU. extenaea (even i,. Xn
a en.vative sense, they are spatially locatahle ) . no actsOf consciousness are physical objects.
second, physical objects are mind-independent. Sense
ata. Which on some views are spatiotemporally extended, are
not counted as physical objects because they are mind-depen-
they exist only if someone is conscious. But something
- a physical Object only if u,
ts independent of anyone-s perception of it at that time.
It IS possible that such an object existed before anyone
perceived it, and that it will continue to exist even if
everyone ceases to perceive it. it might exist at a time at
which nobody was conscious.
Physical objects, as ordinarily understood, must be
perceivable by the senses. It seems as if something of which
can know only that it causes our experiences could fulfill
the two, aforementioned conditions. But our latest condition
rules out entities to which we can have no sensuous, cognitive
access.
Finally, something is a physical object only if it is
possible for more than one person, suitably placed, to per-
ceive the numerically identical object. This publicity
requirement rules out the kind of entity that has been
called
-sensibilium.' Sensibilia are sense data capable of
existing unsensed. 66 a species of sense datum, sensibilia
are person-private, and hence, not physical objects.
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By recalling Moore’s distinctions between objects
•presented in space.’ ’to be met with in space,’ and ’external
to our minds.’ we recognize that the foregoing provides an
inadequate test for physical objects. Shadows, for example,
are spatioteraporally extended and publicly perceivable, yet.
ordinarily, they are not regarded as physical objects. But,
shelving the dubious point that shadows must be shadows of
something, the existence of, the the possession of knowledge
about, shadows, are fully germane to the truth of metaphy-
sical and epistemological solipsism, respectively. Shadows
are respectable members of the class of objective particulars.
Further, objects external to our minds need not be
objects to be met with in space. The images of animals
exemplify this sort of object. But by acknowledging the
truth of the converse-entailment, and abstracting from the
peculiarities of the Aristotelian conception embodied above,
we can arrive at a more useful and refined account of ob-
jective particulars.
Hampshire, Chappell, Woods» and others have
examined the distinction between identification as a member
of a class and identification as some particular member of
I
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a Class. In its first use. to identify (as) is to classify
or describe sortally; in its second use, to identify (iden-
refer) is to pick or single out from other things
of a class, as names and definite descriptions are typically
used to do. Principles of classification, for sorting objects
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into kinds, and princinlpc? n-p ’jciples of individuation, for distinguish-
ing Objects Of a given hind, are appealed to in the two species
Of Identification. As 'individuation- and
'classification'
have been defined, individuatability implies classif iability
.
But on definitions lacking reference to class Membership, the
implication is more controversial, and is tantamount to the
thesis that there cannot be unconceptualised or unsynthesized
intuitions, or, as Sellars puts it, there cannot be a this
Which is not a this-such ^9n. so far I have only affirmed that
objective particulars must be individuatable
.
But Objective particulars must not only be individuatingly
identifiable, they must also be re identifiable
.
that is, iden-
tifiable as the numerically same thing in different perceptual
situations at different times. Now if reidentifiability implies
identifiability in both its senses, then, whether or not indi-
viduatability implies classifiability, all objective particulars,
since re identifiable, are classifiable as well as individuatable. 7°
And although questions of reidentity, 'Is this X the same X
which...?' seem to presuppose classifiability, the issue re-
mains controversial, and can at present, I think, be left
unresolved
.
Two other properties essential to objective particulars
are existential and attributive independence. Something is
existentially independent if, and only if, its existence at
any given time is independent of anyone’s perception of it
at that time. Something is attributive ly independent if, and
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only if. it can have properties other than those it seems
to have to the perceiver.
Concerning existential independence. I must make a con-
fession Which may. although I think ought not. disillusion
the reader as to the prospects of this dissertation. As I
understand this conditiom ^
+
» it requires independence from the
conscious activities of finite, sensible creatures like us.
Supposing God to have the power to create and sustain objects
by thinking about them — objects perceivable by the rest of
in the usual way. obeying the laws of physics, and so on -
I would not want to disallow that such objects are objective
particulars. Current scientific theory about the ultimate
constituents and likely origins of matter is in no way cir-
cumscriptive Of the nature of objects. Descartes himself,
who paradigmatioally posed the very skeptical challenge with
which we are concerned, maintained an atomic theory of time
Which required God's recurrent sustenance of his creation.
It seems perverse to admit that the Lockean inert, senseless,
matter which God once for all created by an act of thought
(will) IS an objective particular, but that the same sort of
thing which is constantly preserved by his thinking is not.
Most important, the view that for all I know to the contrary,
my mental states constitute the universe, that for all I know,
the world is my dream, would be refuted by the known existence
of objects of the kind just envisaged
,
Summing up, a particular is an objective particular if.
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and only if, it (i) identifiable, (ii) reidentifiable
.
Uii) existentially independent, and (iv) attributively in-
dependent. Since reidentifiability entails identif lability -
you could not Pick something out as persisting if you could
P It out at all — condition (i) is redundant and may
be deleted, striving for elegance of definition, one might
try to show that reidentifiability entails both existential
and attributive independence as well, so that an objective
particular is a reidentif iable particular.
One strategy for showing that reidentifiability entails
existential independence proceeds as follows: The notion of
an
-existential- or mind
-dependent datum- is properly defined
in terms of a perceptual situation at a time. Since it can
be shown that specifically identical perceptual situations
cannot recur, identification in different perceptual situations
at different times must be identification of different exis-
tential- or mind-dependent data, so that what is mind-dependent
cannot be what remains numerically the same over time.
A natural challenge to this strategy, and the entailment
from (ii) to (iii), is to argue that there are existentially
dependent entities, such as pains, which are nevertheless
re identifiable. Pains do not exist when nobody is conscious,
yet I can refer to my self-same pain in cases of discontinuous
perception. And it is not only generic sameness that I can
attribute to the pain I had last night and the one I am having
this morning.
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I think such counterexamples are spurious. Numerical
reidentity-olaims about pains rest upon identification of
their physical sources, which sources may persist. For sup-
pose that I complained about a shoulder pain on Monday, and
a physician diagnosed its cause as bursaitis. He treats me
medicinally, I go home, sleep, and awake Tuesday, my shoulder
still hurting. I return to the doctor and complain. •! still
have the same pain in my shoulder.' Would I not unhesitatingly
retract the claim of numerical identity if the doctor truly
told me that the bursaitis had cleared, and that my current
discomfort was caused by a recently sustained bruise?
So I believe that Hume was right in arguing that con-
tinued existence implies independent existence
.
'^'2 But again,
the issue remains controversial, and need not be resolved.
Proceeding cautiously, we can retain (iii) as a non-redundant
condition of objective particularity. Then even if pains are
reidentifiable. their candidacy as objective particulars is
ruled out by their existential dependence.
Similarly for attributive independence. If all and only
mind
-dependent data have all those characteristics which they
seem to have to their owners, then if re identif lability entails
existential independence, reidentif lability entails attributive
independence. There seem to be direct routes from reidentifia-
bility to attributive independence, but they rest on premises
as controversial as the conclusion they are intended to establish.
With prudence over elegance, let us retain condition (iv).
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IV
I want to make explicit the ground rules and procedural
assumptions which will guide our search for a successful anti-
skeptical, transcendental method in subsequent chapters of
this dissertation. First, since we wish to establish that
we can know for certain that objective particulars exist,
it is insufficient to demonstrate that we do not. or even
cannot, know that we do not know with certainty of the exis-
tence Of objective particulars. Joad has argued that if a
man can only know the content of his own consciousness, he
cannot know anything other than his own consciousness, and
so cannot know any arguments for solipsism. if there are any
arguments for solipsism, we cannot, if solipsism is true,
know them.
Even if Joad
• s argument were sound, it would be inade-
quate to our purpose. It is not enough to argue that the
skeptical thesis has not been, or even cannot be, established,
since it does not follow from the fact that some proposition
is unprovable that it is false. Universal, empirical genera-
lizations attest to this. So even if epistemological solipsism
cannot be proved and we know it, we cannot conclude that
it is false.
Not only must we try to develop a method which can be
used to prove the anti-skeptical thesis, but we should try
to join the battle on the skeptic’s own terrain, granting
those assumptions which reputedly generate the skeptical
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conclusion. Thiq mpan<= -p,v,^4.IS e ns, first, accepting the egocentric
predicament as the original position from which we must
Philosophize, we need not ennoble the position with claims
of self
-evidence, as when Stace repeatedly tells us that
It is evident that, however we may wish otherwise, we can-
not. if we are honest, escape the conclusion that the initial
position Of every mind must be solipsistic . and
-that I am,
to start with, only aware of m^ omi thoughts and experiences,
appears to be self-evident. • 74 we need only stipulate that,
for dialectical purposes, we accept it.
If we add that, second, all inferences from the hard,
introspective data must be deductive, or, perhaps more
guardedly, all inferences must guarantee preservation of
certainty, and, third, that all our premises must be philo-
sophical certainties, since ’everything which bears any
manner of resemblance to an hypothesis is to be treated as
contraband; it is not to be put up for sale even at the
lowest price, but forthwith confiscated, immediately upon
detection, *75 we have already imposed significant restric-
tions on the range of epistemological approaches. We
must repudiate naive realism, which insists that there
is no need to appeal to experiences as evidence for the
existence of objective particulars, and so no transition
from subjective to objective to justify. We cannot assume
that empirical knowledge is a community phenomenon necessarily
based on data available to all, that the secure data for
55
76
analysis are publicly observable, and then proceed to argue
that subjective experiences are insufficient to constitute
the foundations of empirical knowledge, both because the
of public things cannot be adequately characterized
in exclusively phenomenal terms, and because Hume and Des-
cartes were wrong to believe that a man cannot possibly be
mistaken about the character of his subjective experiences.
Similarly, we cannot follow scientific realists such
as Sellars, holding that subjective impressions are postu-
lated after reflecting on certain features of our view of
public reality, such as the need to explain aberrant percep-
tion. We cannot argue that if subjective appearances are
to be postulated, they must have outer, public criteria,
since otherwise they could not be encompassed in an inter-
subjective language needed for the scientific enterprise.
The viability of pursuing a rationalist course such as
Plato's depends largely on what we take the extension of
appearance' to be. Plato embraced the unbridgeability of
the appearance-reality gap, while assuming direct cognizability
of the non-sensuous, independently real. If Plato were argu-
ing that we cannot know reality via sense-perception
.just
—
~
ause we cannot know appearances, meaning that any argument
from the nature of subjective states must fail, then obviously
he would be violating one of our concessions. If he were
contending that no argument from premises about how the world
sterns could establish how it is, that arguments from the
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£°2tent Of consciousness to objectivity must fail, then none
Of the procedural assumptions need be revoked. Egocentrism
demands that we argue from our thoughts and/or perceptions.
Argument from the nature of our thoughts is consonant with
thxs demand, if px^to is rejecting representationalism al-
together. substituting a faculty for intuitively apprehending
the real, then again there has been an infraction of the rules.
Whether the licit argument from the nature of our thoughts
can succeed, and whether this is a pM argumentation in
the rationalist tradition, remains to be seen. Here I only
strike the precautionary note that a later rationalist such
as Leibniz seems to have argued as to how the external world
must be. if there is a world, that there is a world is es-
tablished by sense
-percept ion.
Just as we have dismissed realism, which denies the
representational nature of consciousness, for its disregard
of the egocentric predicament, so we must dismiss phenomenal-
ism. subjective-objective reductionism. for its disregard of
the egocentric pre^eament
. Reductionism tries to show that
objective particulars are really experiences, or, in its lin-
guistic version, that objectivity statements are analytically
equivalent to conjunctions of hypotheticals expressive of
personal experience. In either case, the quandary over
objectivity dissolves.
We must also rule out the Aristotelian view that when
our senses are functioning properly, under proper conditions^
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we acquire true information, and that, when necessary, our
intellect can correct our sense reports and therefore, gain
reliable knowledge about the external world, since skeptics
Challenge the reliability of our natural faculties under thebest of conditions, denying Aristotle's criteria for deciding
when our faculties are operating properly, response by appeal
to The Philosopher would be question-begging. As documented
by Popkin. Pierre Chanet. Father Yves de Paris, and Jean
Bagot. and. to a lesser extent. Mersenne. Herbert of Cherbury.
and Charles Sorel. used this tack to bypass the skeptical
problems raised by Montaigne and Charron. ?7
For similar reasons, we must renounce the following,
contemporary line of argument.78 ^s regards any particular
belief, any genuine, cognitive doubt requires that there be
formulable grounds for removing that doubt, so that only
determinate, resolvable doubts are genuine. Determinate
doubt is resolved in accordance with accepted standards of
justification! hence, the correlative notion of certainty
is understood in terms of currently accepted norms govern-
ing the resolution of determinate doubts. Therefore, the
more pervasive doubts of the epistemological solipsist are
bogus. Since our skeptic's doubts are non-radical and deter-
minate. and since the primary target of his attack is the
standards of justification themselves, this argument begs
the question.
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Again, similarly, «e must forswear allegiance to any
P gm 1C perspective which either rejects the foundational
picture Of knowledge or loosens beyond recognition the stric-
tures traditionally imposed on that foundation. Por example,
instead of trying to resolve skeptical doubts, tried
to rescue knowledge by showing that its practical verifiability
and usefulness do not depend on any unshakeable grounds. He
invites the 'reasonable* skeptic to abandon doubt, and join
in the quest for the most convincing, most useful presentation
and organization of the information of which we are all ob-
viously aware .79
skeptical attack is developed in
terms of the dogmatist's strong demands on genuine knowledge.
mitigating those demands simply pulls the rug from underneath
the contestants.
It IS important to appreciate that the preceding dis-
cussion embodies methodological as_sumptions by which a solu-
tion to the problem of epistemological solipsism is intended
to abide. It is not as if we exclude the possibility of dis-
covering that, for example, all reasons considered, we do some-
times directly perceive objective particulars. Far from it.
It is just that we should strive to do as honest and sympa-
thetic a job as possible. But since others may think that
what I call 'sympathy' is another name for mania, I shall
not attempt to apply the same stringent requirements to the
alternative solutions I criticize.
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To recapitulate, anyone who assumes the egocentric pre-
atcament ana accepts the view that all
.ustinea ^owleage-
claiins are either self- inc;+i
-rir*
.
.
or deductive consequences ofjustified premises, is susceotihia +P ble to epistemological skepticism
regarding the external world it
c
“— that •ohjective parti-lar t. a concept whose applicability cannot be empirically
aeaucea by reference- to the content oi inaiviaual perceptions
or sets Of them, consequently, it is a concept whose employ-
ment assumes what no experience oouia establish. This threat
confronts rationalist and empiricist alikp nipiri e. Descartes sought
to overcome it bv annppippeal to the veracity of Goa, Hume concluaea
that It couia not be overcome, ana Pascal agreea that as long
as there are aogmatists. the skeptics are right. Respecting
the boundaries of the ciroip p-r
' f our ideas and supposing the
rigorous view of rational justification to be correct-but
minaful Of Pascal’s warning, ana appreciative that proof of
Objective knowleage is the next best thing to proof of ob-
jective knowleage with certainty-our project is to examine
the role of transcendental argumentation in the refutation
of epistemological solipsism.
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CHAPTER II
STRAWSONIAN TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS
P.F. Strawson is an influential advocate and alleged
practitioner of Kantian transcendental method, m pursuit
Of a satisfactory refutation of the skeptical thesis, in
this Chapter I examine Strawson's writings. In chapter III
1 Shan try to supplement Strawsonian argumentation with
other anti-skeptical resources. We shall discover that
there are several closely related and easily confused con-
clusions for Which one might argue, m carefully distin-
guishing these conclusions and exposing the inadequacies of
the arguments designed to establish them, we shall make great
progress towards a positive theorv n-pP o-LOiv xn y of the successful anti-
skeptical method.
At the same time, however, we will generate worries,
since some of the arguments to be attacked may seem faith-
fully Kantian. The reader may doubt that an historically
philosophically viable alternative survives. Chapter IV
attempts to allay those doubts.
In The B ounds of Sense Strawson argues for the 'objec-
tivity thesis' that all experiencers must use concepts of
objective particulars. 1 An objective particular is a reiden-
tifiable particular, that is, a particular identifiable as
the same thing in different perceptual situations at different
fig
times. The argument for the objectivity thesis, the objec-
reasoning
- a sound instance of a transcendental argument.
Yet Strawson never fully explicates the nature of such rea-
mg. I shall give a general account of his transcendental
method. Clarify it by considering a defective criticism of
Richard Rorty.s. outline the objectivity argument, and then
criticize both the argument and the method in general.
But first, to better understand the objectivity thesis
four points about Strawson's use of
'identification- should’
be noted. First, recall that
'identification' here ™eans
individuation.' not
'classification.' Second, referring
(or 'introducing a term in a substantive style') is not
something that expressions do. but something that an expres-
sion can be used to do, referring is a characteristic of a
use Of an expression.2 Third. Strawson distinguishes the
making of an identifying reference from identifying. A
speaker may identifyingly refer to a particular without
identifying it, identification occurs only if the speaker
successfully communicates the identity of the referent to
his audience. More precisely, a speaker identifies a parti-
cular to a hearer if, and only if, the speaker uses an
appropriate referring expression (such as most proper names,
pronouns and definite descriptions) to refer to the particular,
and the hearer picks out the particular as what the speaker
referred to. Consequently, publicity is built into the notion
W*
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condition Of the hearer's success in identifying the parti-
cular is his sensibly discriminating it. knowing it is the
one referred to by the speaker. Per Strawson, all eases of
particular-identification are ultimately linkable to cases
where the particular is sensibly present.
Strawson wants to prove that any creature capable of
experience must be able to use concepts of particulars which
are identifiable, in the sense just characterised, as the
same in different perceptual situations at different times.
He thinks this can be proved by the legitimate method of
metaphysical reasoning. For him. the proper task of meta-
physical reasoning is the articulation of those principles
analytically implied by any coherent conception of experience
we can form. The truth of these principles is deducible from
any actual or hypothetical description of an experience, so
long as the description is coherent.
The notion of coherence here is a technical one. Syn-
tactic well-formedness and internal consistency are necessary
but not sufficient conditions of coherence. A description
is coherent just in case, in addition to being syntactically
correct and free from contradiction, it is formulable within
a language that is coherent. A language is coherent (or
self-sustaining) just in case it does not presuppose, is
not parasitic upon, terms in some other language not available
to the user in question. The terms of one language L are
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un-
parasitic upon the terms of another language L* if. and only
If, the meanings of the terms of L cannot he understood
less the meanings of the terms of L- are understood. And.
for Strawson, the meaning of a term is understood hy a person
(or. equivalently for him. a oonoept is possessed hy a person,
only If the person could use the term in forming judgments
about some real or imagined entity.? pi„ally. fcr those like
Strawson who take thp wi ++trovir,+ •x K e Wittgensteinian variant of the linguistic
turn, a person is able to form judgments about a kind of en-
tity provided that he is able to experience that kind of en-
tity, hence, there is no non- judgmental experience.
There is an important unolarity about the relation of
parasitism or presupposition between languages. Do only some
Of the terms of L lack meaning for its user when not supple-
mented by the resources of L'? This condition would be too
weak, some proper subset of the language, with incomprehen-
sible terms expurgated, would then be self-sustaining. Hence,
such a subset could be used to form judgments. Hence, such
a language-user could have experience. But Strawson intends
the incoherence of a language to be the test of its user's
inability to have experience. Therefore, he must insist that
the meaning of no term of L can be understood unless the
meanings of the terms of L' are understood, if L is parasitic
upon L*
.
But do the terms of L depend on some or all of the terms
of L’? I think we must say only some. To take the relevant
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case, suppose „e are anxious to show that subjectivity con-
cepts require objectivity concepts, that a purely phenomenal
language of the sort the solipsist boasts enjoying presupposes
a language with terms designating objective particulars. It
ia not that we are precluded from understanding the meaning
Of. say. the subjective, sensory expression
-redlike- unless
we have use of. say. the term
.house.. To deny this would
be to disallow differences among people. s vocabularies.
Consequently, only some of the terms of L. are needed to
support L. Which some? If we specify some particular set.
then vocabularies cannot vary with respect to that set. But
this is what is required by the Strawsonian method, since if
we liberally allow any set. we shall be unable to establish
conclusions concerning the necessity or indispensability of
some selected concept. Let us temporarily leave unspecified
the constitution of the set by using the vague notion of a
•suitable set.. We can then say that one language L is
parasitic upon another language L. if. and only if. none of
the terms of L could be understood unless some suitable set
of terms of L* were understood.
This is still not quite right, if languages like natural
languages are possible substituends for L'
, since fully
intertranslatable languages have the same conceptual resources
but different words. We do not want dependeify on particular
terms but on the concepts those terms express — the ability
to use the German word 'rot' is as good as the ability to
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use the English word Ted.. Consequently, we should araend
our definition to read. A language L is parasitic upon a
class Of languages K if. and only if. none of the terms of
L could be understood unless some suitable set of terms of
some L- which is a member of K were understood. Then a lan-
guage L is self-sustaining or coherent if, and only if. it
is not parasitic upon any class of languages K. each member
Of which is different from L. The last qualification is
necessary since, according to the definition of 'parasitic,-
every language is parasitic upon itself and may. depending
on how we fill out the notion of sufficient set, be parasitic
upon some or all of its parts.
For convenience, we may also explicitly relativize co-
herence to acts Of description, or any other linguistic ac-
tivity. by saying that L is parasitic upon L' relative to
linguistic activity A if, and only if. A is impossible in
L but possible in L+L'. Such an L is incoherent relative
to that A. An L is absolutely incoherent if, and only if,
it is adequate for no linguistic activity. For descriptions,
then, a description D is coherent or self-sustaining if, and
only If, the L in which D is formulated is coherent relative
to D, that is, L is not parasitic upon some L' relative to D.
Strawson thinks the truths of scientific metaphysics
are deducible from any coherent description of a form of
experience. And he thinks that experience minimally entails
recognition of particular items by means of general concepts)
?4
something is an experience only if it is a recognition of
r-rticular items as being of such and such a general kind ^
But to have a concept is to be able to use a term. Hence,
to assess a purported description of a possible form of
xperience is to evaluate a language which might be used by
someone having such an experience. A form of experience is
possible provided that some language corresponding to it is
coherent or self-sustaining, as just defined.
II
Rorty criticizes Strawson's method by arguing that 'it
is a mistake to think that we can begin by imagining an ex-
perience which we might think possible and then go on to
show by transcendental argumentation that it is not possible
If it is not possible, it is not imaginable either.'^
This criticism is defective on two counts. First. Strawson
is not arguing that an experience is possible if. and only
if, we can coherently describe it. He holds that any possible
form of experience is coherently describable. He does not
hold that every coherently describable form of experience
is possible. That we have the conceptual resources to de-
scribe a particular form of experience does not imply that
the subject of such experiences could exist. The question
IS whether the man's language is comprehensible to himself)
whether the language of the purported experiencer is coherent
and not whether ours is. So we can begin by considering a
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candidate fo™ of experience and then go on to show that
it IS impossible since incoherent.
Second, Rortys argument is unsound. We can suppose
that a preposition is possible, deduce that it is impossible
and conclude that it is impossible. There is no difference
in rejecting this form of argument and rejecting uses of
i:£dnctio ad absurd- with non-modal suppositions, the modal
case is just an instance of the general method. One might
think,
-how could we suppose something to be possible if it
can be proved to be impossible?' But compare, 'how can you
suppose something to be true when you can show that it is
false?' The second task might seem easier in that we must
only suppose that the proposition fails to be true of the
actual world — at least we have access to a host of possible
worlds of which it is true — whereas the first method asks
us to suppose something true of no possible world, to con-
sider a possible world of which something true of no possible
world is true. But the ordinary, non-modal reducti
o
has the
same status, since what we are ultimately doing is considering
an impossible set of propositions, a set of propositions
jointly true of no possible world. That is, an ordinary
reductio shows that some conjunction is inconsistent, not
merely that it is false. So even in the ordinary case we
start out with an impossible supposition.
It might be thought that the connection between possi-
bility and imaginability resuscitates at least the correctness,
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It ,h.
....
hing IS not possible, it is not imaginable either.®
Since Strawson consistently talks of coherently concelveb..
states of affairs, presumably Rortv i c.j-y K y s using
’imaginable' as
interchangeable with
’ conceivable .•
9
But the inference from conceivability
, construed psy-
chologically, to possibility, seems unwarranted. Impossi-
bilities can be and are conceived. Kneale shows that if the
inference were valid, certain mathematical problems could be
solved by mere appeal to the attitudes of mathematicians
.
Certain mathematical propositions have not been established
nor refuted. Take Goldbach’s conjecture that every even
integer greater than two is the sum of two distinct primes.
The truth Of this proposition is an open question. So mathe-
maticians find it conceivable that it is true. Therefore,
by the principle that anything conceivable is possible, the
conjecture is possible. But the conjecture, being a mathema-
tical proposition, is true if possible, since false necessary
propositions are necessarily false. Therefore. Goldbach's
conjecture is true. All the premises justifying this un-
acceptable result, except the principle that imaginability
entails possibility, are known to be true. Hence, we should
reject the principle.
Ill
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With the general theory in
.i„d, i think we can repre-
sent the overall structure of Strawson's oh^ectivity argu-
ment as follows. Any describable experiencer ™ust use con-
septs (a 'recognitional component' in Judgment ). ^The use
Of concepts entails the ability to use the concept '.y ex-
perience' or 'see.s to .e' - consciousness requires poten-
tial self-consciousness. But the ability to use the concept
•my experience' entails the ability to use objectivity con-
cepts. Hence, all experiencers which we can describe must
be able to use objectivity concepts. (We can now say that
a suitable set of terms includes terms expressing the con-
cept my experience' and some concepts of objective parti-
culars.) Experience is judgment, which is what is reported
by assertion. A concept is the ability to use an expression
in making assertions. If experience of Xs is possible, then
assertions about Xs are possible. Now if one's language is
inadequate for the expression of a certain kind of assertion,
richer language is needed, then the language is incohe-
rent with respect to that kind of assertion. Hence, if a
kind of assertion is not expressible in a coherent language,
then the putative form of experience reported by such asser-
tions is really unexperiencable
. Hence, to argue that all
describable experiencers must be able to use objectivity
concepts is to argue that no describable language-user could
assert anything unless he could make assertions about objec-
tive particulars.
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If making any assertion at all requires the ability
o .aKe assertions about objective particulars, then any
s eptrcal philosopher who denied the indispensability ofthought about Objects would refute hi.self the ™o„ent he
entered the debatp a 4.-r_ior^, anyone denying the pos-
sxbrlity Of talcing sense of the concept of an object would
e refuted. Even if such a skeptic refrained from Judging
the fact that I am now asserting th-things would prove him wrong
Formulated linguistically, the objectivity argument is
an argument against the possibility of a private language.
A language is private if. and only if. u is a language that
only Its speaker (logically) can understand . IZsut if we show
that all languages must contain terms purporting to desig-
objective entities, then publicly observable phenomena
are not conceptually independent of the use of such terms.
And if publicly observable phenomena are evidentially rele-
vant to the use of such terms, then, since a term is under-
standable provided that it is empirically applicable, it
must be possible for persons other than the speaker to un-
derstand such ‘terms.
Again, the concept of an object is the concept of some-
thing that can be other than it seems to someone. But if
all experiencers must be able to use such concepts and so
have the appropriate words in their linguistic repertoire,
then none of them could use a language in which what seemed
to them was logically all that counted. But if something
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-hl»
„v.
lor those others to understand ^a the language as well, in
Which case the language is not a private language.
The argument as stated is not quite right. If two
things count for understanding a language, where
• count-
-neans
-is necessary.- and a man satisfies exactly one of
them, then the man fails to understand the language. Con-
sequently, if What seems to the speaker counts, then if the
speaker has privileged access to this, no matter what else
counts, something in his language is private. If the ob-
jectivity thesis is true, then some of the terms of every
language must be non-private. It does not follow, however,
that some proper subset of the language is not private.
Hence, if part of a language is itself a language, then
there must be private languages.
Strawson has a ready reply to this attempt at turning
the tables. He will say that he never wished to argue that
no language, that is. no set of terms and formation rules,
can be private. He wants to establish that no coherent or
self-sustaining language can be private. The private subset
of the language envisioned above is incomprehensible in
isolation, although when embedded within the language per-
mitting talk about objects it makes sense. It is a conse-
quence of the objectivity thesis that no non-parasitic
private language is possible.
That my account of the overall structure of the objectivity
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argument correctly instantiates a e,ore generally employed
method Of Strawson's, can perhaps ^ost clearly be seen by
comparing the structure of his argument against Quine in
•Singular Terms, Ontology and Identity. • 13There he argues
against the possibility of a language containing no demon-
strative, token-reflexive, or egocentric elements, a lan-
guage in which no individuative, identifying references to
'ngs are made, by arguing that such a language would be
in which no reference to any particulars at all could
be made.l Distinguishing the set of sentences containing
singular terms and the set of sentences not containing
singular terms, he objects, in a preliminary way. that
•there is simply no guarantee whatsoever that a descrir,tdo„
of the general logical character of the second set of sen-
tences. which is an appropriate description so long as that
set of sentences is considered in the context of a language
which also contains the nrst set, remains an appropriate
description when the set of sentences in question is deprived
of this context. 'i5on the contrary, he intends to establish
that 'it is impossible in principle that the language of the
paraphrases should be interpreted as Quine and the rest of
us interpret it, unless it is seen as a paraphrase
-language
,
i.e. unless language also contains singular terms. '^^And
later he rhetorically asks "how the words ’treating an os-
tensively learned word as a predicate true of the shown object’
can be regarded as anything but an empty description in the
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case Of a language which contains no devices for making
a^E-strative refer^ to objects.
..l^Concerning Quine's
notion Of a language containing reference to particulars
carried hy the variables of Quantification, but no reference
by (the non-existent) singular ter.s, Strawson concludes
that 'this description I have argued to be inadmissible -IS
compare all this to one of Strawson's closing remarks
concerning the objectivity argument in The of s^.
be ?ImpteS b?%^riinal^ob jecf f ^
describes, and henfe can perfectirweiwo”
What more LSd be LoSefbili+if A-p 4.- ^®q^ired to demonstrate the oos=!i-
whoi^of its ?emtotar^ttenr%^’'^;^®’ ^"'^°«Shout the
t^rt^fc^n^ptii^ IS
form sucrrpIHLf Whtt ht
•Mnxi -WN • 4-
picxure, /vha as to he shown is tha +
The strategies of both arguments conform to the account of
Strawson's method I have offered.
As implied in the above quotation, the objectivity
thesis and the thesis of the impossibility of a pure sense-
datum experience are logically equivalent. A pure sense-
datum experience is an experience of a man who, lacking
object concepts, is unable to distinguish the order and
arrangement of objects and the order and arrangement of his
experiences of objects, is. in the terminology of Individuals.
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a sollpsistic consciousness. 2°But since the expression
pure sense-datum experience- may be used in various ways.
let us introduce the univocal term,
-purely inner e •experience,'
call any experience requiring the use of concepts but
not the ability to use objectivity concepts a
-purely inner
experience
.
'
Rorty identifies a pure sense-datum experience with the
kind of experience which can be described solely by use of
adjectival expressions or sensory concepts, requiring no
substantives. By
-substantive- Rorty sometimes means some-
thing like
-term designating a re identifiable particular-
not merely singular term which purports to refer.- So
understood, items such as sense data, which can be objects
Of reference but lack criteria of reidentification, cannot
be the designate of substantives. Hence, sc understood, it
would seem that the kind of experience requiring no substan-
tives would be a purely inner experience.
But a language without substantives in this sense need
not be an exclusively adjectival language. Substantives
and adjectives do not exhaust the elements of syntax. The
sense datum theorist can make use of non-sensory relational
predicates, adverbs, and indexical expressions such as
-here,-
now,- and
-this.- And sense data are legitimately the kind
of egocentric particular picked out by the man-s use of
-this.
Rorty himself employs the weaker notion of - substantive
-
when arguing that an experience using only concepts of sensory
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qualities is impossible. To use a concept is to be able to
make a judgment, which involves having a thought expressible
by a complete sentence. But if one's resources consist ex-
clusively of names for sensory qualities, one will not be
able to construct a sentence. Substantives as well as adjec-
tives are needed to form a judgment, since to understand a
predicative expression and so possess the corresponding con-
cept. one must know to what sort of thing the predicate is
ascribable
.
We can discount two problematic features of Rorty's
argument. First, there is the curious suggestion that ad-
jectives are names of qualities. But the supposition of a
Platonic, relational or 'Fido'-Fido theory of meaning is
so antipathetical to Rorty's Wittgensteinian-Deweyan—Hei-
deggerian philosophical temper, that I dismiss the suggestion
as the result of unfortunate phraseology. 23second
.
he does
seem, to suppose that all the qualities designated by adjec-
tives are sensory, as revealed in his move from the inadequacy
of a language consisting only of terms for sensory concepts
to the inadequacy of a language consisting only of adjectives.
But this supposition is gratuitous! very many adjectives
designate non-sensory qualities. To exclude these from the
language is to be restrictive without reason.
The main difficulty with Rorty's argument, however, is
that in the sense in which its conclusion might be true, the
concept of a sense-datum or afterimage, the concept of an
84
en xty „.ose being aepenbs upon being peroeivea. ie a suit-a y-tanoe Of a substantival concept. Consequently, tbe
oonclusaon is not equivalent to tbe objectivity thesis, it
- a very wea. conclusion which the sKeptio need not avoia
orty recognises that adaitional argumentation is requirea'
- set to the objectivity thesis, ana later maintains that
even a language with both substantives and adjectives is
impossible unless the speaker can interpret the substantives
as names of objects. The best route to this conclusion is
Strawson's argument, which, having clarified his overall
strategy, we are now in a position to examine.
IV
Strawson's argument begins with the fundamental thesis
that experience is recognition of particular items as being
Of such and such a general kind - the conceptualizability
thesis. He identifies this with the Kantian claim that
experience requires both concepts and intuitions. But. the
argument proceeds, these acts of subsuming individuals under
general concepts would not be possible unless they belonged
to a single consciousness (unity of consciousness). And
the diverse recognitional acts could not belong to a single
consciousness unless it was possible for the agent to be con-
scious of the identity of that to which he ascribes these
various acts, unless the agent was potentially aware of him-
self as having experience. But this possibility of self-
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ascription of experiences (transcendental self-consciousness)
n.plies the possibility of empirical knowledge of objects,
conceived of as distinct from any particular states of aware-
ness Of them. Which in turn implies the possibility of ob-jectively valid judgments. This last possibility implies
the existence of a
-rule-governed connectedness of perceptions
Which IS reflected in our employment of empirical concepts
Of Objects conceived of as possessing an order and arrange-
-nt Of their own. distinct from the order and arrangement
of the subject's experiences of awareness of them. • 25There-
fore. experience is possible only if our perceptions are
connected according to rules, and objectivity concepts pro-
vide (or better, are) such rules.
Before evaluating the argument. I think we can simplify
It. First, the unity of consciousness lemma which intervenes
between the conceptualizability premise and the thesis of
transcendental self-consciousness is. for Strawson, super-
fluous. In one place he explicitly says that the unity of
consciousness statement only expresses a coherent thought
When Interpreted as the transcendental self-consciousness
statement. 2<^He provides no explanation for this obscure
remark, but we may try the following support. Items do not
belong to consciousness like stones in a heap, consciousness
is active, and an activity requires an agent. Consequently,
if diverse classificatory acts
-belong- to a single con-
sciousness, there is an agent performing some activity with
respect to them, and the ar>t^vi +® cti ty in question is that ofbeing aware. And since, to repeat er,
’ requires an agentir the agent is aware of his acfc. ho •IS ts he is aware of himself as
performing those acts.
I confess that this reasoning is strained, in fact, the
final conditional claim is almost certainly false. Further
it proves too much. ' Neither Strawson nor Kant holds that a
man has an experience only when he is actively aware of him-
self as having that experience. It is enough that he be
potentially self-aware. But I do not want to tarry here,
since I do not believe we can fully understand what Strawson
IS up to until we examine the inference from conceptualizabii
to this requirement for the possibility of self-ascription
xperiences. In the meantime, let us uncritically follow
the argument's author and delete the lemma concerning the
unity of consciousness.
The second simplification results from the realization
that, intrasystematically, the possibility of experience of
objects, the possibility of objectively valid judgments, and
the possession of objectivity concepts for organizing per-
ceptions. are intended as expressions of the same thesis.
To experience something as X is just to judge it to be an
X, which involves the concept of X. Hence, to experience
objects is just to make objectively valid judgments, which
involves using objectivity concepts. Hence, to be able to
experience objects is just to be able to make objectively
8?
valid judgments
concepts, since
to use it.
which involves the
the possession of a
possession of objectivity
concept is the ability
The Simplified Objectivity argument begins with the
conceptualizability thesis, infers the truth of ftranscendental
-consc.ousness, and concludes with the objectivity thesis.
thrs as the crux of the matter is reflected in Strawson-sinal recapitulation of the cha-ntPi- «a 4-uxn C ap er:
’Anything we could
understand by a possible experience must be. potentially
the experience of a self-conscious subject and must therefore
have the internal connectedness, carried by concepts of the
objective. Which is necessary to constitute it a single
course of experience of an objective world. *27
The Objectivity argument must show that transcendental
self-consciousness, and so our very conception of experience,
muires fulfillment of the objectivity condition. That ob-
jectivity concepts suffice for these things is irrelevant
to the controversy. Yet Strawson sometimes talks as if all
he has Shown is the adequacy of the objectivity condition.
For example, he says that transcendental self-consciousness
means 'that experience must be such as to provide room for
the thought of experience itself. The point of the objec-
tivity-condition is that it provides room for this thought. -28
Even in his lately quoted recapitulation it is not clear
whether the required internal connectedness, carried by con-
cepts of the objective, is exclusively carried by such concepts.
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ese statements notwithstanding, we must understand the
argument as designed to estahiish the neoessit,. and not
.
the su„ioienc„ o. oh,eeti.it. concepts tor the pos-s.^Urt. ot an. torm experience we can ma.e inteiiigihie to
ourselves, with this understanding, let us evaluate the
argument.
The sole premise, the conceptualizabilit. thesis, states
at experience is recognition of particular items as being
Of such and such a general kind. This is tantamount to the
Claim that experiential judgment is subsumption of individuals
under general concepts, that sentences used to make empirical
statements have general terms or descriptive predicates
pr©d ics.'tsd of* (©i'thp'p nf'Pi v»ino4- * tnei er affirmativel. or negativel.) the deno-
tata of singular terms or referential expressions. It is
assume from the start that all experiencers possess parti-
oularit. concepts, that all language users are able to use
singular terms. What must be argued is that particularity
requires objectivity, that individual concepts presuppose
objectivity concepts, that we can use singular terms purport-
edly to refer to identif iables only if we can use them to
intend to refer to re identif iables
.
Consequently, the notion of experience used in the pre-
mise cannot be the loaded one of experience of objects. If
it were, the premise would be question-begging. Unfortunately,
both Kant and Strawson are suspect on this count, and Kant
at least sometimes is guilty as charged. In the objectivity
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argument, however, Strawcsn^ •aw on is innocent. He follows Kantin explicating
'experience- as
'empirical w, ,
.
ne knowledge,' butnot in using
'experience' as elliptical for •
Objects.' ’experience of
The crucial featnv^ r^-p +u
i 3
® °°noeptualicability premise
s that experience requires a 'recogniti cr=is^ ^ onal component' or
e use of concepts,- where the recoenitinn igi^itional component isfurther identified with the general or descriptive e
. ^ on ^^ part ofa judgment. 29lhis component compares (or better^ ^ D , can compare,
there may be uniquely instantiated predicates) the
particular designated by the referential part of the judgment
with other particulars. The strategy is to show that the
use of concepts entails the usability of the concept 'seems'
t° mej or
-my experience.- which entails the usability of the
concept IS or 'object.' Let us examine these moves in turn.
Is it true that any experiencer must be able to use
the concept
-seems to me- or
-my experience'. Does the exis-
tence of a recognitional component in experience require the
possibility Of referring different experiences to one identical
subject, the potential acknowledgement of the experience as
one's own. Must experience provide room for the concept of
itself as experience?
The fact that there are entities whose being depends
upon being perceived provides Strawson with a path from con-
ceptualizability to transcendental self-consciousness. He
argues that in such oases, the item recognized does not exist
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independently of the act of recognition. But experience
q s the ability to discriminate between the reoogni-
tional component and the item recognized, since the item
reoognized is the object of awareness, the recognitional
component is the awareness itself. Hence, experience re-
quires the ability to discriminate between the awareness
and the object of awareness. Therefore, experience requires
the ability to be aware that we are aware. We can experience
mind-dependent entities for which there is no act-object
distinction by being aware of our act of awareness, this
self-awareness is the recognitional component in such ex-
periences
. 30si„<,e
^ as I suppose the argument might conclude,
in all cases of experience there occur such subjective states,
all experience requires the ability to be aware that we are
aware, all consciousness requires potential self-conscious-
ness. Alternatively, it might be continued that to experi-
ence an object requires objectivity concepts, which are con-
cepts of things which can be other than they seem, and so
which imply the ability to use subjective concepts, hence,
in such cases it is unproblematic that we can be aware that
we are aware. And since the anomalous cases were handled
above, all instances of experience require potential self-
awareness
.
There are some illicit transitions infecting this line
of reasoning which are symptomatic of a more pervasive fail-
ing of the objectivity argument. Throughout, we have allowed.
sake of argument, that experience requires concepts
and language, and now we are to be shown that it requires
the thought Of itself as experience, fhe original precise
argument stated that experience requires that there
be a recognitional component. The foregoing, however, un-
warrantedly assumes that experience requires that we can
^ recognitional component. At least this strong,
claim is needed to show that experience must provide room fo,
the concept ’experience,' which is Strawson’s restatement
of the thesis of transcendental self-consciousness.
But even this stronger premise is inadequate, indeed
irrelevant, to establishing the desired conclusion by an
argument of the sort under consideration. In the original
premise the recognitional component was identified with a
concept or ability to use a general term. Now, without any
justification whatsoever, the recognitional component is
Identified with the subjective portion of experience, the
act of awareness.3lBy transitivity of identity, the concept
Of something is identified with the awareness of it. But
this Identification is not only gratuitous, it begs part of
the question as well. The premise talks of descriptive pre-
dicates and general concepts, the conclusion of second-order
awareness. Simply to assume that concepts are awarenesses
is to assume an important part of the conclusion.
It is interesting to note an hominem argument that
can be used against Strawson's move here from 'items can
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enter consciousness only if they are somehow classifiable-
to
-Items can enter consciousness only if they are classi-
fiable as
-experiences- (only if „e can be aware that we
are expert^ them). In IMividj^ he argues that a
condition Of a non-solipsistic consciousness (one which can
draw
'the-my-experience-the-oboect-of-my-experience-
dis-
tinction) is possession of the concept of a re identifiable
particular. He then considers and rejects an argument for
the truth of the converse, explaining that it seems as if no
distinction between a personal and impersonal pronoun is
needed, as if a personal pronoun is superfluous to the pur-
pose of describing one-s experiences of persisting objects. ^2
The impersonal
-it is thought- may be substituted for the
•I think.- But here seems to be a form of experience which
need not be aware of itself as having experience. Impersonal
description suffices. Here is a case in which the argument-s
premise is true but the lemma requiring the possession of
the concept
-my experience- is false. Therefore, on Straw-
son’s own showing, the inference is invalid.
If my diagnosis is correct, the weight of Strawson’s
premise increases as follows. The project begins optimisti-
cally. The use of concepts, the making of judgments, is
alleged to be essential to experience. It is then contended
that someone lacking the concept
-my experience- lacks the
means for making judgments, using concepts, and thus lacks
experience. The project is challenged: For example,
-How do
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you know whether a man io •
" experience but just notsaying? Perhaps there are ineffablp «i t e experiences. Etc •
The Strawsonian rejoins that be is eoneernea with aesoKbable
or
.uagable experience, with forms of experience which canbe coherently described. The renlv ^
+
P y IS to condemn as absurd
e suggestion that one could not have desoribable experience
unless he understood what experience was.
.0 foreclose this
reply, the Strawsonian decides to restrict his attention to
forms Of experience which are aware of themselves as having
experience, to self-conscious experiencers. But if this is
the starting-point, we have started at the end. Strawson
Identifies desoribable and self-conscious experience, but
this is a mistake.
A direct move to the objectivity thesis is invalidated
by the same difficulties noted above. The need for a reoog-
nitional component, asserted by the premise, is supposed to
rule out the possibility that all judgments are about sense
data or entities whose ^ is gercipi
.
and so establish
that some judgments are about objects, and hence that objec-
tivity concepts are required. But sense-data judgments can
have reoognitional components and so satisfy the demands of
the premise. Predicates such as Tedlike* are suitable in-
stances Of descriptive predicates. It is only the surrepti-
tious identification of the reoognitional component with the
act Of subjective awareness that makes the argument seem
plausible. If • reoognitional component* is given this latter
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sense, it obviously follows that tt« ^^
•'ind Of objects which
does not allow of the subjective awareness-independent ob-ject distinction cannot be the only objects of experience
But this is not the sense of the precise. Subjective judg-
™ents have a general component and a particular, referential
component, and this is all that is needed for experiential
judgments. Subjective judgments do lack the ground for
distinguishing the subjective awareness of an object and the
independent object itself, but this is not a requirement of
experience. So a purely inner experiencer. one with the use
Of concepts but not the ability to use objectivity concepts.
IS not ruled out by Strawson's sole premise.
It may be that the existence of a general component
(with comparative function) in judgments of experience re-
quires the distinction between an experiencer and his ex-
periences. Comparing is a species of relating, items are
relatable only in a unified framework, and so, in the present
case, a single experiencer must be distinguishable from the
diverse experiences which are interrelated. But the experi-
encer—experiences distinction is not the same distinction
as that between the portion of experience contributed by
the experiencer and the portion contributed by the indepen-
dent object. And as I have argued, only if it must be possible
to distinguish within experience a part of experience due to
the subject and a part due to the independent object does it
follow that a purely inner experience is impossible. The
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aocep.a.Xe
aoes no.
nsxstent with his theory of metaphysical reasoning.
-wson may respond as follows: I admit that the experienoer-
experience distinction is different from ..
ness inrt /,
subjective aware-
ess-rndependent object distinction. But the first distinc-
equate to describing the existence of the first distinction
niust includ© fcer'Tn<5 1 1 •
But th +
Perienoe' and 'subject of experience.'
ese terms would be unavailable if the speaker could
not. within experience, distinguish what was due to the object
and What was due to himself. The language describing the
distinction is parasitic upon a language describing
the second. The language lacking the resources for making
the second distinction is incoherent, consequently, the
putative form of experience associated with it is impossible.
The objectivity thesis is deducible from any coherent de-
scription of a possible experience, since the sense datum
language is incoherent, it is of no concern that it fails
to entail the objectivity thesis.
Sven if sound, all this argument would show is that the
purely inner experienoer is unable to describe, as we might,
that his judgments contain general and particular components,
or that he only experienced subjective states and not objec-
tive particulars. 33 The argument does not establish that such
a man could not actually judge which experiences he was having
at any one time, which ability is sufficient for experience.
96
The ability to describe or classifv nr, tj-assi y one’s experiences is
enough, hy the argument's o»n starting-point,3\,e
need not
able to classify them as
'experiences.. So at best
Strawson's objectivity argument shows that inner experiencers
are unable to do the philosophy of*P xx n f their own situation.
In suiHj we have bA^nn ee given no reason to believe that
there could not be a lanffnai^Angu ge (i) not employing objectivity
concepts, (ii) usable by itself, but (iii) describable only
by means of a richer language with objectivity concepts. It
has not been shown that any subject of experience we can make
xntelltgrble to ourselves must be a user of objectivity con-
cepts. though it is true that to make it so intelligible to
ourselves we must use such concepts. But that is trivial,
since we are drawing the object-subject distinction in de-
scribing the experience. Therefore, the possibility of ex-
perience has not been shown to entail the ability to use
objectivity concepts.
V
The limitations of the objectivity argument can be gen
eralized to Strawson's entire method of metaphysical reason
ing. Transcendental arguments are typically construed as
arguments showing the deductive consequences of the possi-
bility of experience (or. for some, the presuppositions of
the possibility of experience, where presupposition is a
different relation from that of deductive consequence).
97
Strawsonian transcendental arguments articulate the analytic
implrcations of any experience we are able to describe, the
invariant features of our conception of experience. But if
something is entailed by the fact that we can conceive of a
possible experience but not by the nature of possible exper-
ience Itself, there is no reason to suppose it is true in
all worlds in which there is experience.
This Strawsonian method of articulating the subjective
conditions of thought so far as we can describe it, that is,
the conditions of our description of thought, is the method’
characterized as 'descriptive metaphysics' in Individnale
The main argumentation of Individuals is an instance of
this method which I have tried to elucidate, except there
objectivity is assumed and spatiality is deduced. The ques-
tion is this: What are the conditions of the possibility of
identifying thought about objective particulars? Could a
non-spatial scheme provide for objective particulars, so
that material bodies need not be the basic particulars of
any scheme capable of making identifications and reidenti-
f ications?
Strawson argues that directly locatable particulars
which are or possess material bodies are. from the point of
view of identification, the ’basic’ particulars of our con-
ceptual scheme. A class of particulars is ’basic’ if, and
only if, it is possible to make identifying references to
to particulars of other classes (those classes of particulars
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to which we do in faot + -ic identifyingly refer) only if „e make
™. .1...
sess material bodies, and only this class, satisfies the
criterion of basicness. Therefore +Vw=>in i , these are the basic
particulars of our conceptual scheme.
so far. the overall method of argumentation parallels
the method of parasitism. The talk of identification of a
type Of particular without dependence on particulars of
other types corresponds exactly to the talk of recognizing
a type of particular within a non-parasitic or coherent lan-
guage. But I want to study and develop some details of the
argument, both to better appreciate the stengths and weak-
nesses of the method, and to discover whether any of its
inslianccs are correct,
Relativizing the notion of identifioational basicness.
let us say that Xs are identifyingly prior to Ys for a person
S if. and only if. s could not identify things of kind Y
without reference to things of kind X. but not conversely.
And Xs are re identifyingly prior to Ys for S if. and only if.
the reidentification criteria for things of kind Y turn in
part on the identities of Xs. but the reidentification
criteria for Xs do not turn on the identities of particulars
of kind Y. Mirroring in simplified form our discussion of
self-sustaining languages, let us say that X is conceptually
prior to Y for S. just in case S could not grasp the concept
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Y (us© "th© wcprl 'v* or some synonym or translation) without
grasprng the concept X. Put not conversely. Finally, let us
say that Xs are epistemologically prior to Vs for s. provihea
at If S drd not know that things of kind X existed, he
could not know that things of kind Y existed, hut if 3 did
not know that things of kind Y ©xist©de , h© might still know
that things of kind X ©xist©d.
Strawson seems to argue that identif icational priority
-Plies conceptual priority, and then, at first hlush. that
identifxcational priority implies some sort of ontological
priority, m support of his claim that material bodies alone
satisfy the criterion of identificational basicness (that
material bodies are identificationally prior to all other
kinds Of particulars), he argues that if some sorts of par-
ticulars, Y, are in some general way asymmetrically dependent
on the identification of particulars of another sort, X. then
it would be a general characteristic of our conceptual scheme
that^ the ability to talk about Ys at all is dependent on the
ability to talk about Xs, but not conv©rs©ly. ^^If xs ar©
identif icationally prior to Ys
.
then Xs ar© conceptually
prior to Ys. He then adduces considerations such as the
following; The admission into our discourse of the range of
particulars, births, conceived as we conceive them, does re-
quire the admission into our discourse of the range of par-
ticulars, animals, conceived as we conceive them, but not
conversely. Hence, 'animal' is conceptually prior to 'birth.'
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Therefore, animals are identificationally prior to births
Therefore, animals are. in some sense, ontologioally prior
to births. 3’?'
This argument fallaciously affirms the consequent. The
easiest emendation would be to change the major premise to
its converse - conceptual priority implies identif icational
priority. But this seems to conflict with Strawson’s stated
enterprise of seeking the conditions of the possibility of
identification (and re identif ication) of objective particulars.
It seems as if truths about procedures of identification
should serve as premises of the argument. On the other hand.
I noted that the argument of Individuals assumes the truth
Of the objectivity thesis. This is tantamount to assuming
that concepts of objective particulars are conceptually basic
(no other concepts are conceptually prior to object concepts).
The argument of Ind ividuals could then be most sympathetically
viewed as an effort to establish the inferences from the
conceptual basicness of objectivity concepts to the concep-
tual basicness specifically of physical object concepts to
the Identificational basicness of physical objects.
What of Strawson's apparent imputation of ontological
force to the claim of identificational basioness? Both
Bergmann and Leclerc have interpreted Strawson as mistakenly
supposing that the hierarchy of communicating is the hierarchy
of being. 3°Evidence that Strawson moves from talk about Ian-
guage to talk about the world includes his opening remark
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that one way ot saying
-we thinh ot the wcnXa as containing
Objective particulars, is
-our ontology comprises objective
particulars,, his claim.
.That it should be possible to
identify particulars of a eiven^ ^ seems a necessary con-
dition Of the inclusion of that type in our ontology.,- and his
inferences from identiflability-dependence of types to truths
about ontological types, '^“and his argument in the final
chapter that appearing as a logical subject is not a sure
mark of being an individual.
Usually, philosophers regard the ontologically basic
entities, or substances, either to be those which are simple
and can only be named, but not analyzed, ortfeose which exist
independently. On the first test, material objects are not.
on Strawson. s own showing, ontologically basic. For him.
all names of looatable particulars with which we are not
presently acquainted are complex, reference to all such items
requires the backing of some set of descriptions, since the
perceptually absent members of the class of material bodies
are non-simple, it would be entirely gratuitous to assign
privileged ontological status to the perceptually present
members of that class.
It is difficult to provide an analysis of the locution
•exists independently, as used in the second test of onto-
logical basicness. The most natural candidate confers on-
tological basicness on all and only those things which exist
in all worlds in which anything exists. (Relativizing, Xs
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..UK, ..
not exist unless Xs did, but not conversely.) if, however
it is. as so.e have claimed, a necessary truth that scethLg
exists, then it would be a necessary truth that the ontolo-
Sioally basic entities existed. Ontologically basic entities
would exist in all possible worlds. But then, one
.ight con-
clude. the distinction between ontology and logic would be
obliterated {given that in a possible worlds semantics, lo-
gical truth is also defined as truth in all possible worlds).
But why should we blame the account of basicness for
this, perhaps overbold, conclusion? The troublemaker is
the renunciation of empty worlds. After all, if particulars
and universals most generioally exhaust the ontological cate-
gories. all particulars are either subjective or objective,
and independent argument showed that objective particulars
were ontologically basic, then, if we further accept the
thesis that something or other must exist, we should not balk
at the conclusion that objective particulars exist necessarily.
It is not as if we wish to preserve the possibility that
subjective particulars could exist in the absence of objec-
tive particulars — it is the goal of the dissertation to
rule out this possibility. So if all particulars are either
subjective or objective, and every possible world contains
at least one particular, then objective particulars must
exist.
Unfortunately, the preceding argument suffers from an
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unsupported shift fro.
-something
.ust exist- to
-see par-
ticular must exist.- it does not preclude an exclusive
world Of abstract entities, m fact, since abstract entities
reputedly exist in all possible worlds, objective particulars
could not. according to the preferred definition of
-onto-
logical basicness.- be the only ontologically basic entities,
so the account of basicness does contribute to the trouble.
No one thinks Platonic realism compromises the autonomy of
metaphysics
,
e source of difficulty is the generality of the account
Of basicness. Ontological basicness was to be a consequence
of identificational basicness. But identif icational dependen-
cies obtained between classes of particulars only. Non-par-
ticulars do not exhibit a dependence on particulars as non-
basic particulars do with respect to basic particulars.'" So
any thesis concerning ontological priority ascribable to
Strawson must be restricted to types of particulars
Whatever
-exists independently- means, it has something
to do with the way the world is. Now suppose it is true that,
relative to our conceptual scheme, the class of material bodies,
and only that class, satisfies the criterion of identiflca-
tional basicness. Can we infer from the fact that the iden-
tiflability of Ys depends on reference to Xs. that such iden-
tifiability also depends on the existence of Xs? And does
Strawson believe we can? Or is Strawson more conservatively
concerned to establish an implicative relation between iden-
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tificational priority (basicness) and priority (basicness)
Of ontic commitment? Or is the introduction of ontic com-
..itment a spurious complication? These are the conspicuous
questions at this juncture.
After all, the evidence that Strawson moves from claims
about language to claims about the world is shamefully weak.
It IS true that in the cited passages he talks about the
constitution of, and conditions for inclusion in, our onto-
logy. But elsewhere he identifies an ontology with a conceptual
scheme, and in still another place he explicitly disavows
claims to primary existence, sole reality, or reduoibility
(while suggesting that identificational basicness may underlie
these more powerful claims
And why do we think he is arguing from identif icational
priority to (the unexplained) priority of ontic commitment?
Well, Strawson said that, relative to our conceptual scheme,
we can talk about births only if we can talk about animals,
but not conversely. Supposing that the inference from con-
ceptual to identificational dependence is warranted, it fol-
lows that we can identify births only by reference to animals,
but, even though being an animal entails being born, we can
identify animals without reference to births. Strawson says,
•We can paraphrase one entailment ('This is an animal* entails
•There is some birth which is the birth of this* paraphrased
as *This is an animal* entails *This was born*) so as to
eliminate what logicians might call quantification over births;
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but we cannot paraphrase the other (-This is a hirth- entails
•There is an animal of which this is the birth-) so as to
eliminate quantification over animals. -^3
construing
-we can eliminate quantification over births-
we are not compelled to hypostatize births' or 'we need
not be ontically committed to births.- we generalise, arguing
that, since we can eliminate quantification over all but the
identuicationally basic entities, we need not reify anything
identifioationally dependent. In particular, we attribute
to Strawson the conclusion that we need not be ontically com-
mitted to anything but material bodies (and persons). But
the notion of priority of ontic commitment here is trivially
equivalent to the notion of identif icational priority, so
that any arguments from the one to the other would be otiose.
On the Russell-Quine view, commitment is carried by the quan-
tified variables (function-satisfiers, for Russell) of the
canonical language because this happens to be the referential
apparatus of the language. And so the general point would
be that we need not countenance the existence of anything we
need not refer to. One can say what needs saying by picking
out other referents. But identificational dependents are
just those things we need not refer to. Therefore, to say
that the variables of the canonical language must range over
Xs is just to say in a particular, theory-laden way, that
Xs are identifioationally basic.
So compromise talk of ontic commitment is vacuous. The
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issue again boils down to whether we can infer from the fact
that the identifiability of fs depends on reference to Xsthat such identifiability also depends on the existence oi
The inference is invalid unless we add the premise that
we can refer to Xs only if xs exist. The truth of this pre-
cise IS a controversial question, in chapter III i shall urge
Its falsity. And Strawson's own theory of reference is too
complex to pursue here. But let these two points suffice.
If Strawson accepts the premise, then Bergmann's and Leclerc's
interpretation of his enterprise is correct. And although
IS massive fa^ie evidence for acceptance
— claims
that a necessary condition of speaker-hearer identifying re-
T ^ V%/-% ^ ^ _ . .
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** j It:
ference to a particular is the existence of that particular,
that expressions functioning in the referring role presuppose
the empirical fact of existence
.^^and so on'^^.. ^
my unargued, but arguable belief that he rejects the premise.
happy to remain on the level of identif icational and concep-
tual dependencies.
Finally, if we could argue from conceptual priority
to epistemological priority, an important link to the anti-
skeptical conclusion would be established. Then, if the
objectivity thesis c ould be proved, we could directly infer
the impossibility of knowing subjective states but not ob-
jective particulars. The best argument I can think of fails.
Knowledge requires judgment and judgment requires the use
of concepts. Hence, if you could not use various concepts
10 ?
unless you could use X-concepts, you could not make the
various, corresponding judgments or knowledge
-claims unless
you could make judgments about Xs. and so could not know
that the various things in question existed unless you knew
that Xs existed. The final inference is fallacious, what
follows is only that you could not know that the various
in question existed unless you could make judgments
about Xs. Knowledge is not required.
VI
in the last section I have tried to show that instances
Of the method of parasitism, or descriptive metaphysical vari-
ations on that method, to be found in Individuals
, are defec-
tive. Of course it does not follow that the method itself
is faulty. Are there in Individuals arguments in favor of
the method? In chapter 2 Strawson considers whether the
conditions of a non-solipsistic consciousness can be satisfied
in a purely auditory universe
.'*'^By replacing occurrences of
auditory particular- with the schematic •E-particular.' I
we can here find a candidate for a general argument in
support of parasitism.
The argument goes as follows, (1) Necessarily, if a man
S's E-experience (experience of Es) is such that he can make
sense of the distinction between himself and his states, and
something other, then S's experienced world contains reiden-
tifiable E-particulars, since the existence of Es is then
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ogxoally independent of the existence of one-s states on
ILtV°
'' logically possible
Should exist Whethen on not they wene being obsenved.
) It would not ™ake sense to say thene logically could be
rexdentxfiable panticulans in a punely E-wonld (a wonld with
on y Es nn it) unless cnitenia of neidentif ication can beframed in punely E-ten.s (exclusively in ten.s of E-expnes-
sions). Hence. (3) the conditions of an act-object con-
scxousness can be satisfied in an E-wonld only if «e can
descnibe in punely K-ten.s cnitenia fon neidentif ication of
E-part;iculars
•
Premise (1) is not an instance of any tnue, genenal
prxncxple such as: Hecessanily, if s can within expenience
-ke sense of the x-Y distinction, then the existence of
Ys xs logically independent of the existence of Xs. so that
fon S's scheme it is logically possible that Ys exist whethen
or not accompanied by Xs. The classical distinction between
^ rationis and ^^ ^3 useful here. Pen example, we
can mentally abstnact at least some pnoperties fnom the in-
dividual things Which instantiate them, but such pnopenties
cannot exist sepanately.'^SThis panticulan instance aside,
it centainly seems to be generally false that just because
a distinction is meaningful to a man. the relata of the
dxstinction can exist apart. The contradictony view is
much like the conceivability-possibility entailment I cri-
ticized in section II of this chapter.
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It may be urged that tho x.
^
premise which would
e justified by such a strong general principle is unneeded,
rnce parasitism arguments are intended to establish truths
a ou how we must thinlc. perhaps what we desire here is the
aim that if the X-Y distinction makes sense to S. then S
must think Of the world as containing Ys that can exist in-dependently Of xs. But even this is too strong,
.he person-
states Of a person distinction makes sense to Strawson, but
Strawson rejects a view of the world in which states can
exist independently of persons. Hence. Strawson need not
think Of the world as containing mental states that can exist
independently of persons, even though he can make sense of
the person—states of a person distinction.
What about a weakened conditional premise the consequent
Of which states merely that S must be aWe to think of the
world as containing Ys that can exist independently of Xs?
We might provide a reading for the antecedent,
-the X—
Y
distinction makes sense to S.- so as to render the conditional
tautologous. But if .makes sense> simply means
-is under-
stood.- the premise is problematic. Again, given Strawson's
own theory of persons, it is false. Strawson finds it in-
conceivable that mental states are independently reidenti-
fiable. In chapter 3 of Individuals he argues that particular
states of consciousness cannot be identifyingly referred to
except as the states of some identified person, m fact,
one of the main contentions of the book is that the minimum
no
conditions of independent identifiaMlity for a type ofparticular is that its members be neither private nor un-Observable.
StiU more decisively, in our conceptual scheme, states
canLTrT"'""
independently. Therefore, theyoa be independently identifiable. But conceptual priority
entificational priority. Therefore, we cannot
think Of the world as containing states of consciousness
existing at a time at which no person exists, if the first
premise of Strawson- s argument were true, it would follow
that we cannot make sense of the distinction between a person
and his mental statp«si te . But we can. Therefore, the first
premise of the argument is false.
If we reject the idea that (1) is justified by appeal
to a more general principle, and if „e give a stronger reading
antecedent, it seems that we can escape the above
criticism. Let us read (1) as stating that, necessarily.
If S can, solely cn the basis of his experience of Es, un-
derstand the subject-object distinction, then the Es S ex-
periences are re identifiable (and so existentially indepen-
). The above criticism startswith the supposition that
S understands the person-state of a person distinction.
But it fails to delineate the genesis of this ability. So
if. for example, s has use for the distinction even though
he has experienced only persons, all that follows is that
persons are reidentifiable particulars, which is as Strawson
Ill
wishes it.
argued that the sense-datum theorist, who experi-
enoes only sense data, can understand the differenoe between
se and what he is at any given moment being presented
-th (though not the dirterenee between that part of experi-
ence determined by him and that part determined by the in-dependent Object), ret sense data are not reidentif iable
,
they lack existential independence. I can adduce no con-
siderations additional to those offered earlier, so let us
proceed to examine premise (2).
Premise (2) states that it would not make sense to say
there could be reidentifiable particulars in a purely E-world
unless criteria of reidentification can be framed in purely
E-terms. For whom would it not make sense - us or the E-
experiencer? Clearly not for us. For example, it would
Make sense for us to say there could be objective particulars
in a pure sense-datum world even though the (our) criteria
for reidentifying objective particulars cannot be framed in
a pure sense-datura language. We formulate the criteria in
our conceptually richer language.
The insight is supposed to be that if there are reiden-
tifiables in a world with only Es. so Es must be them, then
the criteria for reidentifying these items must be formulated
with exclusive use of expressions about Es. What is supposed
to be impossible is that a purely E-experienoer, an Inhabitant
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of a world in which all things are conceived to be Es, sen-
sibly say there could be reidentifiable
. hence existentially
independent. E-particulars, by anneal tn a 4+ •y pp o a criterion formu-
lated in some language some of the terms of which purport
to designate particulars which are not E-particulars.
If we lose sight of other features of Strawson's theory,
this premise might appear controversial, it might be con-
strued as saying that a man who thinks that Es are all there
is cannot, by appeal to a test formulated partially or wholly
non E terms, judge whether he is observing a different E
from tte one he observed previously, or observing the same
E again. But suppose someone thinks that sensible macro-
entities are the only things that exist, yet allows that
tomic micro-entities are convenient constructs. Such a
person might meaningfully formulate a principle of macro-
entity identity over time in terms of these theoretical
constructs. If so, the premise seems to be falsified.
On a better interpretation, premise (2) is trivially
true. If a man conceives everything to be an E, then all
his individual concepts are E-concepts and, for Strawson,
all the referential terms of his language are E-terms. It
follows that such a man could not meaningfully formulate a
principle by use of a sentence including non-E terms. Such
terms are empty vocables or concatenations of letters for him.
So, (1) necessarily, if S is a purely E-experiencer who
understands the subject-object distinction, then Es are for
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hi™ reidentlf iable
, and (2) if s can reidentify these Es,
then the principle by which he does so «ust be forn,ulable
within his own. pure E-language. By transitivity of i„pU-
cation one may conclude that (3') if s is a purely E-expari-
encer who understands the subject-ob ject distinction, then
S C3.n f orrHuXo.'t© r»f*criteria of reidentity of Es in his own lan-
guage. Strawson concludes that (3) if S is a purely E-exper-
iencer who understands the subject-object distinction, then
we can describe criteria for reidentifying Es in exclusively
E-terms, if (3.). then (3). since, according to Strawson,
if someone can formulate a criterion, we can describe it.
Analogous to his earlier affirmed thesis that all possible
forms of experience are coherently desoribable and so de-
scribable by us. we now have the principle that all formulable
criteria of reidentity are desoribable by us.
One might object that conceptually and epistemologically
privileged beings cannot be ruled out a priori , and there is
no reason to believe that we could describe the relevant
linguistic (conceptual) activity of such beings. In fact,
given the restricted abilities of creatures conceptually
inferior to us, we have good reason to disbelieve we could
describe such activity. To undermine this criticism, we
could restrict the range of B-experiencers to exclude con-
ceptually superior beings, noting that such a qualified
Strawsonian argument is interesting enough.
It is doubtful that the point of the criticism is really
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undermined. If we take seriously the essential role of
conceptual schemes in interpreting reality, then we will
allow the possibility of our inability to describe the
criteria of reidentity of even conceptually primitive people.
If. on the other hand,
-conceptual inferiority- simply means
•having some proper subset of the conceptual resources of
the standard (us),- then the criticism is parried.
In sum, premise (2) and the inference from (3-) to (3)
n.ay be exonerated, but premise (1) remains guilty. But even
if (1) were true, it would be unsuitable support for the kind
of anti-skeptical parasitism arguments we have been consider-
ing. Its antecedent is satisfied provided that someone both
experiences only Es ^ makes sense of the sub ject—object
distinction. But if someone understands the subject—object
distinction, he has the concept of an object. But Strawson-
s
anti-skeptical arguments are supposed to prove that object
concepts are indispensable. Those arguments tried to show
that certain kinds of pure experiencers are impossible since
the description of such experiencers is incoherent, since
the description requires the ability to use concepts (words)
other than those accessible to the pure experienoer himself.
For example, experience of just sense data was argued to be
impossible on the grounds that the description of such an
experience required objectivity concepts, but that, ex hvno-
the^, the sense-data experiencer lacked those concepts. On
the contrary, the present argument assumes that all the pure
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tPoVr"'
in
.avoP o. tPe anti-a.eptioal paraattio „e-hod tu ns out to be an igno^atio elenchi.
VII
in this section- I shall evaluate Strawson's well-hnown
it::: r -- - - ---
andV ^ -If-nePuting denial.raw
„ost general and powerful conclusions in criticiseOi Strawson's method. The skeptic asserts that we can never
now for certain that the various
-distincf existences which
mmediately apprehend are numerically identical, that ob-jects persist through time. Roughly. Strawson argues that
since existents must be comoared enmrxov.-P , comparison requires relation
the existents must be brought within the same frame of re-
ference). and such relation requires the existence of some
relatively stable objects maintaining their identity over
time, the skeptic's assertion guarantees the truth of what
he professes to deny. ^9
so far as I can see. the anti-skeptical argument of
individuals just amounts to saying that the skeptic cannot
both agree and disagree with us, cannot accept our conceptual
scheme which allows for reidentification of objects and then
always doubt or deny particular-identity claims about objects.
This is where descriptive metaphysics rears its head. We ^
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have, says Strawson, the idea of a e,4 tSingle spatiotemporal
y ra of material objects. A condition of having this
-heme is the unquestioning acceptance of particular identity
n at least some cases of non-continuous observation.
Strawson claims that the skeptic
‘pretends to accept
a conceptual scheme, but at the same time quietly rejects
one Of the conditions of its employment.
‘50He says that the
skeptic^s doubts are unreal 4-usince they amount to the rejection
Of the Whole scheme within which such doubts makes sense.
This is so because a unified framework of identification
encompassing distinct observation situations is required in
order even to sensibly raise the question of particular
identity over time, which in turn requires the existence of
•satisfiable and commonly satisfied- criteria for the iden-
tity of at least some items in various ‘subsystems- (that
is. frameworks of present, continuous observation), since
he holds that the fundamental topological properties of a
framework must have their analogue in the features of the
reidentifiable particulars, he concludes that the skeptic
cannot legitimately doubt or deny the existence of these
analogue particulars, which are material bodies.
First, the final stage of this argument is untenable.
It requires that the salient topological properties of a
framework have their analogue in the reidentifiable parti--
culars housed by this framework. But the locational relations
between the particulars, and not the dimensions of the
117
P r iculars themselves, ate to he oottelatea
„ith the numhet
dimensions of the frame«orK in which they are locatea .51
SO. for example, the establishment of a three-aimenslonal
framewor. Ooes not entail the existence of three-aimensional
reidentifiable particulars. Perhaps more strikingly, the
assumption of a four-dimensional spatiotemporal framework
does not commit one to the existence of space-time worms
supersession of three-dimensional material bodies.
Second, and more generally. Strawson fails to realise
that the skeptic need not deny the actuality of our practices.
The Skeptical question is one of justification. And so you
cannot refute the skeptic about some proposition p by arguing
that if not-p. then not possibly h. where h describes various
(perhaps habitual) practices we share. The question is whether
we ever justifiably engage in h.
In particular. Strawson tells us that the skeptic pre-
tends to accept a scheme which he really quietly rejects.
But the skeptic's activities are neither surreptitious nor
illicit. In rejecting the scheme in which objective parti-
culars exist, the skeptic is not denying that it can be used
Upon entering the debate and formulating his philosophical
views, he himself may openly use such a scheme. But he is
using concepts which he thinks may be unnecessary for de-
scribable experience, and which he thinks are employed with-
out rational credentials. His view is not that we cannot
use objectivity concepts. We often do. But their designate
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cannot be shown to be better than fictions.
we can gain perspective by comparing three levels of
argument. We can articulate the subjective conditions of
experience, thought, or judgment, that is. show which con-
cepts are indispensable for^
to be possible.
Ibis has some anti-skeptical bite v,^ D . It shows that the re-
ferents of the concepts in question are not merely useful
fictions. But, for all such an argument shows, they may
still be fictions, even if indispensable ones. Natural
beliefs, indispensable elements in our mental makeup, need
net be rationally defensible. We may call this procedure
a •metaphysical deduction- of such concepts, Kant thought
this task was accomplished by his Metaphysical Deduction
of the Categories. A transcendental deduction is needed
to show, as Kant puts it.
-that subjective conditions of
thought have objective validity. - 52 that is. that the con-
cepts everyone must use in order tn • .4a o make judgments are right-
fully or justifiably so used.
Strawson- s method, articulating the subjective condi-
tions Of thought so far as we can describe it. that is. the
conditions of our description of thought (the descriptive
Metaphysical method), is the weakest enterprise of all. and
misguided as a response to epistemological solipsism, straw-
sonian transcendental arguments, parasitism arguments, are
regressive or analytical like Kant-s argument of the Prole -
gomena. They assume the general structure of our conceptual
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0 en,e and .eg questions of Justification. This misdirected
on the aue^ f^ and neglect of the cuestio Juris
n-a.es Stra^son-s an inappropriate response to the sceptical
thesis.
But »e have not only discovered the method's unsuita-
bility. Evaluation of the objectivity argument showed that
the sorts Of results which the method possibly could issue
in are completely trivial. That any self
-conscious experi-
or se lf
-describing language-user, must be a user of
the concept *my experience,' or 'my language-use' (from which
we try to elicit objectivity concepts), is absolutely trivial.
The conceptual needs of the self
-reflective epistemologist
are not the same as those of the minimally inquisitive ex-
periencer, yet the latter is a conscious, judging agent
nonetheless. Metaphilosophy is not the weapon to compel
the solipsist’s surrender.
And in this metaphilosophical task, descriptive meta-
physics is no better off than revisionary metaphysics. For
the structure of human thinking is either prereflective or
not. If it IS, then the descriptive metaphysician, in re-
vealing and describing this structure, must also be helping
to create it. If it is not, thinking must start with cate-
gorial presuppositions, must operate on a level which is
already philosophical. In neither case can it be immune to
attack on the level of revisionary metaphysics.
And it does not follow from the fact that the structure
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Of human thinking is prereflective. that the categorial
structure is specincally determinea in advance, any more
an it follows from the fact that I ordinarily talk about
he world by uaing spatial, temporal, causal and mental
concepts, that I am committed to any particular analysis of
these concepts. 53so specific conclusions about our view of
the world, based on the mere sturiv n-p iudy of language in use, is
also unwarranted.
Finally, not only is the Strawsonian method unsuitable
to our project and its potential results uninformative, it
is questionable whether it can establish any conclusions
concerning the possibility of e:,perience
. Even if concept
C is parasitic upon concept C«. it does not follow that ex-
periencing Cs presupposes the ability to experience C>s, al-
though to experience Cs as Cs requires the grasp of c- (or
the ability to use
-C'* or some other word synonymous with,
or a translation of. it). Cs may be experienced under some
other coextensional but not cointensional description not
requiring the grasp of C. So. for example, even if experi-
encing my subjective states as
-states* requires the ability
to use objectivity concepts, those states may be experienced
under another description, such as
-redlike and roundlike.-
which does not entail the ability to use objectivity concepts,
I see no redemptive attraction in following Strawson*
s
path. Hampshire, whose method is very much like Strawson-s.
sums up the fundamental strategy by arguing that a language
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Which we cannot imagine being used is not a language, and
that the sort of language we can imagine being used is de-
termined by the language we ourselves use. so that we can
fairly infer from features of our own language to features
Of anything that we shall ever describe as a
-language* (and
so allow as a possible form of experience). 5h„y ability to
envisage alternatives, my capacity for thought-experiment,
is obviously limited by my present conceptual and attitudinal
equipment, and so depends on my present conceptual scheme.
But it cannot be assumed that the structure of the scheme
is non-contingent. And metaphysical possibility should not
has shown.55conceptual apparatus creates expectation, and
expectation creates illusion. Strawsonian transcendental
argumentation seems to me an unsanctionable way of doing
metaphysics.
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CHAPTER III
supplementary anti
-skeptical resources
Strawson.s method could not get ue Ueyond the circle
r Ideas, A fortified anti-skeptical artillery may
fare better. Paradigm case (with and without Moorean vari-
ations). non-vacuous. contrast, and verificationist arguments
ave been fashionable anti-skeptical methods. Stroud has
argued that verificationism is sufficient to refute skep-
ticism, and necessary for transcendental arguments, hence,
transcendental arguments are superfluous.! And Nielsen has
quite recently argued that the conjunction of all three me-
thods refutes epistemological solipsism, and if „ot, neither
can transcendental argument.^ Arguments from self
-refutation
have also captured the fancy of many enemies of the skeptic,
and some of these foes think that transcendental argument
just is argument from self-refutation. Recall, for example.
Strawson- 3 remarks in chapter 1 of Indlvidume 3
in this chapter I shall argue that none of these methods
successfully impugns the skeptical thesis. The proof that
paradigm case, non-vacuous contrast, or verificationist re-
sources are not required by Kantian transcendental method,
and that arguments from self
-refutation are different from
transcendental arguments, comes in chapter IV. where a
theory of transcendental argument, untainted by any of
these suggestions, is provided, and the method is correctly
instantiated.
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I
There is a family of paradig,„ ease arguments. There
exist As because here is X and x is a standardXS case of an A
i
Ts are not Bs because certain paradigmatic predicates of Bs
o not apply to Ys in standard usage, Zs are not to be iden-
fied With Cs because here is a paradigm 2 which lacks a
necessary condition for being a paradigm Traditional
versions of the argument proceeded as follows. Some person
asserts ‘There is at least one F thing.- where substituends
for
-F- are certain descriptive predicates. The person un-
derstands the sentence he utters, and since understanding
a complex designator requires understanding its constituents,
he understands its constituents, in particular, he understands
F. But
-F- is only definable ostensively. Therefore, there
raust have existed at least one P thing.
There are two ways the argument might proceed from here.
It might continue that since
-objective particular- is a
descriptive expression of the appropriate kind, and since
the person understands what it means, it follows that some
Objective particulars have existed. Typically, though, the
stratagem has been to force translation of the skeptical
issue into the concrete. It has been argued, for example,
that there exist trees and houses (or hands!), from which
it has been inferred that, since trees and houses are exem-
plars of objective particulars, objective particulars exist.
5
A notable instance of appeal to standard examples is
Moore
-s.^ Moore holds up his hands and says to his audience.
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While gesturing «ith one nana.
-Here is one hand., and. ges-
turing «ith the other.
-Here is another hand." „e concludes
fros, this that two human hands exist at that time and that
therefore, there at that time exist objective particulars.’
Moore anticipates the dissatisfaction of philosophers con-
cerning the first premise, but claims they have no good reason
for their dissatisfaction, since although the first premise
is unprovable (since he cannot prove he is not at the rele-
vant time dreaming, for example), it is nevertheless Known
for certain.
First we must raise some questions about the generalised
version of the argument. Must a man understand all the con-
stituents of an understood, complex designator? Someone may
understand the French sentence
-Je ne sais pas’ but under-
stand no French words, and so none of the constituents of
the sentence. And the same kind of situation can arise
within one’s own language. One may understand some idio-
matic or technical expression without understanding all. or
even any. of the words making it up. And more generally,
it is arguable that whole declarative sentences, or the
statements which token them at a given time, are the funda-
mental units of communication, and that one can (and must)
understand assertions before understanding (being able to
define) isolated words. But even if this objection is correct.
I do not think It does serious damage to the thrust of the
argument. The paradigmist can reformulate the argument so
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as to avoid it. For «Yanir.i« «example, Moore need not have used the
sentence, *Here is a hand • ^
‘hand- and using anindicative gesture would have suff^f^ad +fice to convey the same
information.
The claim that certain descriptive phrases are only
definable ostensively recalls to mind the more general. Humean
concept empiricist thesis that all ideas are copies of im-
pressions, that all empirical concepts are derived from
instances of the things characterised. So stated, as Hume
himself realized, the principle is clearly false, you do
not give meaning to the description
.the New Jerusalem, by
pointing to its purported referent. The claim is rather
that all Simple ideas, which comprise such complex ideas,
are acquired through experience of instances. The ideas of
gold. ruby. etc. are derived from experience, but the imagi-
native Idea Of the New Jerusalem is derived only indirectly
through combination of simple constituents.
But even in its restricted form, this thesis seems to
identify the meaning of a descriptive expression with its
reference. But Frege has shown such a referential or de-
notative theory of meaning to be untenable.® Not all coex-
tensional descriptive expressions are synonymous, and so
the meaning of an expression is not its reference.
It may be rejoined that to assume the meaning is never
the reference is question-begging, and that Fregean consider-
ations are inapplicable to predicates designating sensible
1.31
qualities, or to any general ter.ns for that matter. But
rather than plunging into Platonistic semantics, a better
response is that
-only definable ostensively here means
•must be learned by reference to cases,- the issue is one
of concept-acquisition, not meaningfulness. When Malcolm
says that there are words in ordinary language whose use
implies that they have a denotation, he does not mean that
those terms mean what they denote, but that they could never
have been learned (and so used) unless examples in which
they apply and do not apply were exhibited.
9
But even if we are prepared to accept a restricted
concept empiricist thesis such that all simple, sensible
qualities are derived from experience, the move to objective
particulars such as trees, houses, and hands is problematic.
There is a difference between the compresence of redness
and rectangularity and.... and the red. rectangular house
over there. Unless objective particulars are identified
with collocations of sensible prcferties. it remains unclear
whether the paradigmisfs
-objective particular- la a legi-
timate instantiation of the thesis.
Now we have arrived at the real issue. Some expressions
can be learned through descriptions, some must be learned
by reference to cases. Malcolm (and the other anti-skeptical
paradigmists) maintains that
-objective particulars- (-mater-
ial things-) and
-it is certain that- are members of the
latter class — expressions comprehensible only by showing.
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by exhibiting instances of their application Tt ,
tor everyone to say What is wrong Sine
“
facts h..e •* .
"istaken about the
ahl!t th"
;
"
rect lang
language is cor-uage. So ’whenever a. rshUr.P^^^osopher claims that anordinary expression is self
-contradictory he has e
the meaning of that ordinary expression. .10
First, we Should notice that Malcolm-s specific attackloaves the problematic idealist unscathed. Our skeptic doesno hold that. Since nothing inconsistent is to be found i„
nature, xt is a necessary truth that objective particulars
0 not exist. „e merely professes a universal incapacity toprove that they do. fo say that for all i know, there aL
j Ots. IS to say that it does not follow from what I
icnow
"thai; there are obieotn t+ • j.j c s. It is not to say that it doesfollow from what I know that «iino there are no objects, so that
I know there are none.
Also, his criticism bears only on philosophers who hold
there are no instances to which the descriptive expressions
in question apply, and only to those who intend ordinary use
The problematic idealist escapes on both counts. He does
not defend the radical skeptical contention that no statements
are certain, he rejects such a view. He just claims that we
can never know for certain ...4I that objective particulars exist.
the philosophical, theoretical sense of 'oertainty' he
uses is not intended to coincide with the ordinary, practical
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sense. Hence, the skeptic could grant with equanimity that
the ordinary concept of certainty is explicable only osten-
sively.
But the skeptic need not grant even this. As both Flew
and Urmson have argued, the paradigm case argument applies
to descriptive language only, and not to evaluative language.
•certain* is a term of epistemic appraisal, it is not a purely
olassificatory expression. Therefore, the existence of cer-
tainties cannot be established by appeal to standard cases.
What about
-objective particular*? is is true that a
person could not acquire the concept of objective particu-
larity or the intelligent use of the expression
-objective
particular* unless there existed actual instances of objec-
tive particulars, or. perhaps more, that acquisition was
eausally dependent on those instances? since the combination
Of two or more (mutually consistent) descriptions is itself
a description, and compound, fictitious descriptions are
readily constructible. it is false that all descriptive
phrases describe actual entities, and generally, one can
learn the meaning of phrases designating non-existent things.
Is
-objective particular* Cmaterial thing*) one of those
expressions whose meaning must be explained by exhibition
Of actual instances?
Passmore *s remark that
-material thing* is a philosopher*
s
phrase which plays no part in ordinary language (and so is
not within the purview of the paradigmist) seems off target.'^
13'*
Even if this is right,
-tree • .h„ .
p„„„, „
•” "«
1. p .n, 1,it could be established that anv of
...
^ these terms have denota-
it could be inferY*pr] +vio+ -u .Objective particulars exist.
er hand, it seens undeniable that words such as
•tree, and
-house, can be learned descriptively, and need
not be learned ostensively. So perhaps the-paradig.ist.s
only hope is to worh directly on
.objective particular..
But as Chisholm was the first to point out. not only
can the acquisition of various philosophical words such as
•Imaginary.,
.possible, and
.nonexistent, (for which we could
not produce instances of true application) be explained by
appeal to methods of contrast (learn
.certain, by contrast
with
.doubt.) and limit (learn
.perfect circle, by exhibiting
a sequence of shapes approaching circularity as a limit),
but the method of illusion may be used too. That is. words
can be taught by false or deceptive examples. We can learn
how to use
.certain, and
.material thing, (.objective par-
ticular.) by observing situations which we mistakenly take
to have characteristics they do not in fact have.l3por the
learning of terms, an apparent example is as good as a real
one. Therefore, paradigm case arguments cannot demonstrate
the reality of objective particulars.
Flew says with favor, »As that famous Broadway philo-
sopher Mr. Damon Runyon might have saidt *If this is not a
so and so it will at least do until a so and so comes along.
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By no. „e 3ho„X.
.eaXi.e that this is
.isplaceh unherstate-
»ent vxs a vis the sKeptioal issue of this dissertation
Hume does not deny that our mental fictions
.ill do m
the case of every paradigm case argument, the question is
Whether the paradigm features appealed to are supported hy
good reasons for the usage in question being
.hat it is This
^-^tion of justifies is not ans.ered by appeal to cases
Does Moore. s previously presented proof add anything
to the approaches
.e have Just assessed. As an allegedly
rigorous proof. Moore-s argument begs the question. One
could not know the premise to be true without first knowing
the truth of the conclusion. If the premise is to be suf-
ficiently strong for the deduction, it must be tantamount
to the Claim that there here exists exactly one objective
particular which is a hand and here (elsewhere) exists ano-
ther Objective particular which is also a hand. After all.
part Of the demonstration is the waving of the hand, but
what else but an objective particular is perceptually ac-
cessible to various members of the audience, and so on? I
wonder if Moore would think his proof equally successful
if done privately? Then it would be clear that if the pre-
mise stated merely that I am now acquainted with a group of
percepts which in ordinary language is denominated "hand.'
then the conclusion would not follow, while if the premise
Stated more, it would beg the question.
There is another, less rigoristic interpretation of
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- S proof. Offered Py Melsen. which goes as follows,
0 n shepuc and non-shepUo can for„alaie
.alid arg^ents
their respective conclusions. The question then is
Whose premises are „ore acceptable^ clearly it is „ore'
Plausible and reasonable to accept the empirical truisMs ofthe non-sKeptic than the esoteric premises of the sheptic
Therefore, it is ™ore reasonable to accept the co™™on sense
view Of our knowledge of the world than the skeptical view. 15
This version of the argument is question-begging too.
But suppose it actually showed, and not merely assumed, that
it is more reasonable to believe the favored proposition
than some other proposition. From this fact, even if the
propositions are contradictories, it does not even follow
that the favored proposition is reasonable simolidw let
alone that it can be known for certain qnt.erx . So this argument
poses no threat to epistemological solipsism.
II
Introduction of a non-vaouous or significant contrast
principle is intended to support the faltering paradigm case
argument. The final objection to that argument was that
apparent Fs (or the idea of F) are as good as real ones (or
the veridical experience of F) for acquiring the use of or
giving coherent content to the expression *F.* The non-
vaouous contrast principle states that
-F* is meaningfully
applicable to some thing a only if there are possible cases
13 ?
of as which are no+ p 4.^ j. .F. So, to put It crudely, just as all
coins cannot be counterfeit, all ducks cannot be decoys, all
experiences cannot be dreams, so all Ps cannot be apparent.l6
If there are apparent houses, there are real ones, and since
houses are objective particulars, there are objective parti-
oulars. Or. more directly, there are apparent objective par-
ticulars only if there are actual objective particulars. De-
scriptive expressions are meaningful only if there are at
least apparent instances of the things described. The de-
scriptive expression
-objective particular- is meaningful.
Therefore, there are actual objective particulars. Or still
more directly, the expression
-apparent objective particular-
makes sense, therefore, non-apparent. actual objective par-
ticulars exist.
The principle is somewhat obscure. One may wonder
Whether, for example, if -p. is replaced by
-existent at
some time or other;- it follows that there are possible
but non-actual objects. Perhaps this just supports the
claim that existence is not a (descriptive, first-order,
-determining-) predicate. But let us ignore these techni-
calities and suppose the principle is properly formulated.
In its full generality, the non-vacuous contrast prin-
ciple is false. Let
-F- be any predicate which is such that,
when ascribed to a subject, it becomes an instance of a
logical truth, for example,
-lives in Massachusetts or does
not. - Such predicates are meaningfully applicable to the
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appropriate kind of thi nir 4.u
instances
"that kind which 4-iaAlack the property expressed hy the predicate.
avoid this difficulty, let us restrict the prin-
ciple to non-logical, descriptive predicates! that is all
we need to strengthen the paradigm case argument anyway
But the principle is still false. The existence of necessary
truths discredits the principle. For example, let
-F. he
•Sibling, and
-a. he
-hrother. (or
-John's brother,, if
insist on a singular term as replacement for
-a.). There
can he no brothers who are not siblings, yet sibling is a
descriptive predicate. To continue to defend the principle
by ruling out necessary truths would be tantamount to reducing
it to an explication of
.logically contingent.- rendering it
useless.
Most important, even if the principle were true, it
could not establish the conclusion we seek. The most we
could conclude, using the principle, is that it is possible,
for all we know, that objective particulars exist. We could
not conclude that objective particulars do exist, and so
could not conclude that we can know for certain that objec-
tive particulars exist. At best it shows that we cannot know
that objective particulars do not exist. It would show that
skepticism cannot be established, not that anti-skepticism
can be established.
Finally, careful diagnosis of the two recently considered
brands of anti-skepticisra^rfailing in common with parasitism.
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the apparent and the rpaia zn e l, and so on. But they fail to
lunT; To e actual use of any of these. Again, he worries
about justification, not practice.
Ill
A representative version of the verificationist prin-
ciple Of »eaningfulness asserts that a sentence expressing
a non-analytic statement is cognitively meaningful if. and
only if. it expresses a statement that can. at least in
principle, be shown to be true or shown to be false, by
reference to empirical observations. The history of attempts
at satisfactorily formulating a verificationist principle is
notorious
I the list of counterexamples is as long as the
liat Of proffered formulations. Universal statements such
scientific laws, statements about the past and the future,
statements about the experiences of other people, negative
existential statements, as well as singular statements about
objective particulars themselves, provide falsification of
(various forms of) the principle. 17^3 perennially attractive
as the principle may be, no good reasons have been given for
accepting any strong version - any version which requires
the possibility of conclusive verifiability and not merely
degree of evidential support. I cannot in this context hope
to contribute much to the extensive literature on verifi
cationism ^
lation to transcendental arguments and skepticism
in his germinal article on this question. Stroud argues
that a transcendental argument without a verif icationist
premise fails to refute skepticism, while a transcendental
argument with a verificationist premise is superfluous, since
verifioationism alone directly refutes skepticism. 18so whether
or not verificationism is tenable. l must show that transcer
dental arguments do not require appeal to it. For if tran-
scendental arguments require a verificationist premise and
verificationism is untenable, then transcendental arguments
are unsound. And if transcendental arguments require a
verificationist premise and verificationism is tenable, then
given that verificationism by itself suffices to refute skep-
ticism, transcendental arguments are superfluous.
This question takes on added interest if Thomson is
right in arguing that the conjunction of premises constitu-
ting the private language argument amounts to a version of
the principle of strong verifiability. 19Then transcendental
arguments can be sound only if (the) private language argu-
ment (s) are sound. Since I argued in chapter II that the
private language argument is a parasitism argument, and that
parasitism arguments are unsound, it would follow that tran-
scendental arguments cannot be sound.
Stroud's skeptic claims that (i) a particular class of
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propositions makes sense, and (ii) „
any of them are true st ..
that(l) th .
^—n-^entalist Claims(1) e truth of (i) is a
.
I ; IS necessary condition of themeaningfulness of the <sir<ar>-M iskeptical position expressed in (ii)and (2) the falsity of (ii) „
’’
truth of rn , ^
necessary condition of the(i). (2) says that if propositions of a certain ki dare meaningful it must be possible + w,
^ ^
them) , *
na to know if they (some of
r
^ verification-
. The precise statement of this principle as applied tothe skeptical thesis is given as foil
, .
® follows. *lf the notion of
^jective particulars makes sense to us. then we can sometimes
ow certain conditions to be fulfilled, the fulfillment ofWhich logically implies either that objects continue to exist
unperoeived or that they do not. -20
Stroud holds that this principle provides a direct and
conclusive answer to the skentif»P since it follows from the
principle that if the skeptic*s claim that we can never know
that Objects continue to exist unperceived makes sense, it
must be false, since if the proposition that objects conti-
nue to exist unperceived could not be known to be true or
known to be false, it would make no sense. But Stroud
-s
inference is invalid. If the proposition that objects con-
tinue to exist makes sense, then, according to his explicitly
formulated principle, either it or its contradictory can be
conclusively verified. But nothing in the verificationist
principle guarantees that the realist proposition rather
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than its skeptical denial win +
truth . .
"
. And so nothing- in +v.^
conclusively refutesthe skeptical thesis.
If a class Of propositions makes sense only if it isfalse that «e can never know whether any one of them is true,i follows at best that complete suspension of ,ui^ent on
all questions of particular reidentity is illegitimate.
But to deny our knowledge of persistence is. on these grounds,
as respectahle as affirming it. To avoid this criticism.
Stroud-s verificationist must delete the final disjunct of
^3 principle and so maintain that the notion of objective
particulars makes sense to us only if we can sometimes know
^hft-t ccrtsin critisrla »te i entailing the existence of unperoeived
Objects are satisfied. Generally, all meaningful claims
would have to be conclusively verifiable, and not merely
verifiable or falsifiable. But the general principle is
Obviously wrong, it entails that everything understood is
true, everything meaningfully talked about exists. If so,
the claim about objective particulars cannot be justified'
as an instance of (this version of) verif icationism.
Rorty has argued that Stroud is wrong to require that
all transcendental arguments be supplemented by strong veri-
fioationism. He argues that a weakened brand of verification-
ism which makes meaningfulness depend, not on word-world
connections, but on connections between various pieces of
linguistic behavior, is acceptable and sufficient supplemen-
..«.r .».. s,„..„..,
^
•re™„, ,»,, „
think about Objective particulars Rort , .R nicuxars. y claims that we
cannot know in advance whether an altemof•n ternative scheme (lan-guage) Will Pe parasitic upon the conventional one. but that
we must evaluate each alternative separately. Parasitism
arguments were seen to be too weak. They at best establish
relations among our beliefs (conceptual dependencies), and
cannot show anything about what there is or what we know
there is. Consequently, for our purposes. Rorty-s answer
to Stroud is besides the point.
Hacker provides the skeptic with another, though not
very attractive, way of slipping the verificatlonist punch.
He argues that verificationism. even if correct, cannot re-
fute skepticism with respect to a restricted class of pro-
positions, since it remains open to the skeptic to reject
the whole, restricted class as meaningless while retaining
the class of propositions he endorses as meaningful and true, 22
This does appear to be a logical option. Where the rejected
class is the class of objective judgments, this possibility
is equivalent to the possibility of a purely inner experience.
Since we have not yet established the impossibility of a
purely inner experience, we cannot yet rule out Hacker's
escape route from verificationism. On the other hand, if
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verifioationism is correct and if the skeptic e Vr, i
that ft ^ ^
K acknowledges
^
(and so understands it), hut denies the „eaning-
ness Of Objective judgments, then we seem to have a re-
ad absurdum of such a skeptic nf
, .
a o. O course another
skeptic could say, *i doubt tvia+ v*y. that objective judgments aretrue, they may be either false or meaningless.'
I shall show that successful transcendental arguments
0 not rest on any version of strong verifioationism. Bydoing this I meet Stroud's challenge, show that Rorty is
wrong to say that transcendental arguments are at best para-
sxtism arguments, and escape appeal to Hacker's distasteful
suggestion. i engage this task in the final chapter.
IV
Before trying to achieve a general, unified understanding
Of arguments from self-refutation, it will be instructive to
consider two specific, allegedly transcendental, attacks on
epistemological solipsism - Srzednicki's and Bennett's.
Srsednicki's argument provides us with a useful bridge be-
tween the appeals to conditions of language-acquisition dis-
cussed in sections I and II. and the strict arguments from
self-refutation discussed in section VI. Bennett's argument
IS a challenging version of parasitism which tries to go
beyond concept dependencies and escape the circle of our ideas.
Srzednicki's overall strategy is to show that if solipsism
were true, its statement would be unintelligible, hence, the
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"' "*• "*• »««>."« 1. pr.,.„,„ i„
Of h.s article. 3330Upsis™ is the view that (A) I a. the
on y Object in the world, and (B) all appearances of the
existence of other things are Misleading. Pipp^UsM, the
contrary View, denies both (A) and (B). We wish to show
that solipsism is false.
^
suppose that (1) solipsisM is true and provides a de-
P ion of the nature of the world as such. Then (2) i am
Identical with the world. Hence. (3) .j. has refe
Object other than I- lacks reference. Hence. (5) the
concept
-object other than !• cannot be formed by anybody nor(if per imEossible it was formed) could it have application
so (6) it is impossible to state in the terms provided the
possibility that in this world something other than 1. vis.
this world, could exist. Hence ir • s
. if solipsism is true, then
(7) neither solipsism nor pluralism can be stated. The fal-
sity of solipsism is a necessary condition of the possibility
Of any discussion of the problem. But (8) the solipsism-
pluralism controversy can be stated and argued about. There-
fore, (9) solipsism is false.
The argument is at best enthymematic. Minimally. (5)
does not follow from its predecessors. (4) does not imply
(5). We correctly use many non-denoting expressions, and
form and use intelligently many empty, fictitious concepts.
Presumably, the supposition (1) is intended to reveal something
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raises to justify the inference
thfc ^ ,
i . since Srzednioki addresses
task in somewhat desultory fashion. I shall try to sys-
ematxze those considerations which seem to underlie his
arguraent.
A concept is 'borrowed* relative to a wor*ir^rld or segment
f that world or world
-segment, that is. could not he framed
in that world. Borrowed concepts cannot he
-used, or appliedin the horrower.s world, where to say that a concept cannot
be •used* in a world is to say that it could mark no discri-
minations in that world, or. more broadly (and more vaguely-
but this is Srzednicki.s own phrase), that no idea would he
conveyed hy it.25oi,,„
,,,3 understanding of
-concept-usahi-
lity.' we note that although all borrowed concepts may be
unusable, perhaps not all unusable concepts are borrowed,
consider our concept
-thing., construed in its broadest sense.
If everything is a thing, the ascription of thinghood fails
to discriminate among items of the world. Hence, according
to the definition offered, the concept
-thing- would be un-
usable. But we can frame or acquire the concept
-thing- (in
our world). Hence, it is not borrowed.
Using these notions, during the course of his article
Srzednicki seems to affirm the following principles.
14?
ttenoSd%innot"mai'*i i"*have that concept
. 27 maintain that they
coi^si'sJ s;™;';,';* ?;rS3"S'.3,’Sr
the world in which it opeStes!29 in
°f!*^®*^*°rld“htve%oL^idea“^ >
inhabitants
thing ’ that^coL^uLerthfconcft®"that fails to. 30 cep and something
(P6) If someone affirms tha+ ov, «
all the relevant featwet of th»"^ specifies fully
world, then he must affi™ +h»!? Present actualfor giving the account cannot ^e^bwowld?^!®®®®'"^
Recall that the strategy of the proof is to show that
if solipsism were true, the conditions necessary for the
formation and/or employment of the concept
-object other
than I. would not be fulfilled, so that solipsism would be
unintelligible. The mere intelligible statement of the
solipsism-pluralism controversy (or of either position
separately, for that matter) would then constitute a proof
Of the falsity of solipsism.
Given (1), (2) follows by simplification, and (3) and
('^) follow by the semantic definition of reference. And
premise (8) is a matter of fact. The question, then, is
whether ( 5 )-( 7 ). given supportive principles (P1 )-(P6 ). are
derivable from (1). if they are. then we must ask whether
all the members of the set of principles necessary and suf-
ficient for the derivation are true.
I
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(5) the conjunctive claim that the concept
•otject other than !• cannot h» e .be formed by anybody and con-
veys no idea to anybody (in a world correctly described by
solipsism). Kccussing on the second conjunct, how do we
get that the concept
.object other than !• conveys no ideafrom its lack of reference and the fact that solipsism de-
scribes the world. (PI) tells us that a concept must con-
vey an idea. The notion of
-conveying an idea* is so vague
that, in the absence of explication. (Pi) says little more
than that concepts must be concepts. If by
-conveys an idea-
Srzednicki means
-is associated with a mental image.- then
the pricniple is untenable. On other readings it might fare
better. The point is that a careful assessment of (Pi) re-
quires a preliminary determination of the theory of concepts
presupposed. Some of the other principles provide sufficient
clues to this. So tentatively, let us suspend judgment on (PI).
(P2) states that it is impossible to attribute the
possession of unusable concepts to oneself, if an alleged
concept
-conveys no idea- to a man, then that man cannot use
it in making intelligible assertions at all, and so, instan-
tiating, cannot use it in making intelligible assertions
about itself (or himself). But (P2) tells us that certain
things are true, if a certain concept conveys no idea. Since
we wish to establish that a certain concept, the concept
•object other than I,- conveys no idea, and since we have
no independent way of determining the truth value of the claim
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that people in a world in whlnh
nn I' conveysea cannot ascribe to themselves the ability to use thatconcept
-
.ustiiication «e see.
states that a complex of concepts, each of which
conveys an idea, may itself fail to convey an idea. Exami-
nation Of Srsednichi.s remarks in connection with this prin-
cxple helps pin down the meaning he gives to
.conveys an
idea. Srzednicki holds that all impossiblf^ssible or uninstantiable
predicates express the same concept. 32por example,
-round
square, and
.female father- express the same concept. But
he also holds that these predicates differ in sense or mean-
ing. This is explained by the difference in sense of their
applicable constituents. 33rpj^ereforp ^inerero e, concepts and meanings
are dissociated, m particular, terms expressing unusable
concepts may still be perfectly meaningful. An expression
can be meaningful yet
-convey no idea.-
So.
-is meaningful- and
-conveys an idea- are neither
logically nor material equivalent. But this result under-
ines the line of reasoning we have been pursuing. The
argument was to proceed from the borrowedness of
-object
other than I- to its unusability to the impossibility of its
contributing to the statement of a meaningful solipsistic
thesis. But the last link in this chain breaks down — pre-
dicates designating unusable concepts may be meaningful.
(Ph) and (P5 ) cannot save matters. (PA) is a trivial
truth which does no work. (P5 ), that those possessing
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usable concepts must be able to conjure uo in=+v-v^njur p stances and
non-instances o. those concepts, is a
.in. ol non-vacuous
contrast principle for concept-usability (rather than mean-
ngfulness). But if the connection between concepts and
meanings is broken, this principle isPi.xnci i IS useless for showing
that solipsism is meaningless if true.
We can escape all these difficulties by ignoring Srted-
nicki's lead and purging the argument of all reference to
concept-usability. As a parasitism argument the argument
lacks all promise. But if we take the genetic concept of
borrowedness as the crux of the argument, take concept-
formation and not intelligibility as the issue, then the
argument is straightforward and provocative. Because (A) I
am identical with the world, i cannot say (B) all appearances
Of the existence of other things are misleading, since I
could not form a concept used essentially in (B). The con-
cept
-Object other than I- cannot be formed in the solipsistic
universe which, according to the solipsist, is the one, true
universe. Assuming the equivalence between having a concept
and being able to use and understand words, we conclude that
conjunct (B) cannot be stated or understood by anyone if
conjunct (A) is true, since if (A), the concept
-object
other than I- cannot be formed by anybody, and if a concept
cannot be formed by anybody, then (unless it is innate) it
cannot be possessed by anybody, and so nobody could use it
in making judgments.
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(P6) captures this new line of argument. If a descrip-
tion is supposed to be a complete description of everything
(relevant) in the world, then no borrowed concepts, concepts
Which cannot be framed in the world, can be required for
providing this description. Instantiating, when the solip.
sist utters the sounds purporting to express theses (A) and
(B). adding that these completely describe what there is and
What can be known, all these sounds must be words which ex-
press possessed and so acquirable concepts, otherwise the
solipsist is merely making noises. But in a world exhausted
by the solipsist himself the concept of something other than
himself, that is. something other than the world, cannot be
acquired and so is not possessed. Therefore, in the solip-
sistic world, nothing intelligible can be said about any
non-self. Thesis (B) is intended to say something about
some non-self. Therefore, thesis (B) must fail to express
the proposition intended by the solipsist-speaker. But it
IS rightly agreed by all disputants that (B) does express
a proposition about something other than the solipsist-
speaker's self. Therefore, the supposition that (A&B)
completely and correctly describes the world must be false.
The foregoing argument is defective. The world is
identical with the world. So of course it follows that
necessarily, nothing exists which is not the world or some
part of it. But it does not follow, and it is false, that
we cannot frame a concept of something not in the world.
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(P6) says that a ecMplete specification of all the relevant
features of the world cannot use borrowed concepts, what
are the
.relevant- features. Loohing at the account given
they are what really exists and what can and cannot be hno^n.
(A) is the metaphysical thesis that a complete enumeration
Of substances contains but one item - „e. (b, i, ,,, ,^,3 .
temologxcal thesis that if I think there are substances
other than myself. i am wrong. The metaphysical thesis car-
ries the weight Of the argument, since it entails the epis-
temological thesis. But there has been no inconsistency
established between (A) and the fact that the subject men-
tioned in (A) has an extensive repertoire of concepts, in-
cluding the concept
-object other than I.- The fact that
there is but one substance does not rule out a host of
truths about non-substances. To succeed, the argument must
wrongly assume that all objects of thought must exist.
Anyhow, it seems to me that
-object other than I- is
not a borrowed concept in a solipsistic world. Compare
Srzednicki-s pluralistic account of the world. Presumably
it excludes round squares. Yet the concept
-round square-
is not borrowed. It is a complex concept with applicable
and so frameable constituents. Similarly with the solipsistic
account. It excludes the existence of something other than
the solipsist- s conscious self. Yet the concept of something
other than the solipsist- s conscious self need not be borrowed
for the very same reasons as above - it is a complex concept
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„<,
„,„ .. „„
something diverse from mvself t+ <y . It IS acknowledged by the
proponent of the argument that the solipsist can frame the
ncept I. And, simply by inspecting the successive con-
tents of his consciousness and being aware of their succes-
siveness. or the variety of sensory qualities they present,
etc., the solipsist can frame a concept of diversity. There-
fore. the solipsist can meaningfully assert (A4B).3^
Finally, we should note that the kind of argument we
have been considering is even less plausible against a
faithfully formulated version of epistemological solipsism.
After all. the epistemological solipsist position is really
something like, for all I know, ray mental states constitute
the universe, or. I am not justified in believing that things
other than my mental states exist. It is not a metaphysical
thesis. But now it becomes more evident that things other
than I or my mental states are thinkable
. that claims about
these other things are meaningfully expressible. It is just,
it IS claimed, that the existence of such other things is
not knqwable
. So solipsism is conceivable, and is not to
be dismissed as meaningless. Or at least the considerations
adduced by Srzednicki do not show otherwise.
In
l^ntVs Analytic, Bennett’s overall thesis is much
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Uke Strawson's, the most interesting truths ^ *
•synthetic a priori' »
the a •
^Obviously analytic truths about
conditions under which certain distinctions can be madeunder which certain concepts have a signincant use.35
’
The unobviously analytic is simply the complex result or a
”
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Cartesian argument. 38
A man having a purely present tense language in which
e describes each of his inner states as it occurs cannot
describe his states at earlier utimes. He can have grounds
for saying 'I was thus at t' if. and only if. he has grounds
for saying
'l recollect being thus at t.' so there is a one-
one correspondence between what is said about past states
and present recollections. Hence, his concept of the past
is non
-functional; none of his oreqent e•^^.+ u .j-b p s states could intelli-
gibly be described as 'recollections, m contrast, for the
ordinary man several of his present recollections may bear
an evidential relation to a single judgment about his past,
so that his concept of the past is not idle, being at least
useful in summing up data. Hence, since in the solipsist's
scheme the past collapses into the present, he cannot make
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Judgments about his past, he has no oonoept of the past.
The solipsist-
s perceptions cannot he brought under
the concept of the past, his purel, p.i.ate language cannot
ave a past tense. Now it is impossible that a man S knows
that he is so-and-so if being so-and-so excludes self-con-
sciousness,
-Being so-and-so excludes self-consciousness for
s- entails
-s does hot know that he is so-and-so.- But s
is self-conscious only if s can use the concept
-this is
how it is with me,- or. equivalently for Bennett, the concept
•my experience now.- And the ability to use the concept-
•my experience now- requires the ability to use the concept
y experience then.- Therefore, self-consciousness requires
knowledge of the past. Therefore, nobody could know that
anyone, including himself, was having a purely inner experi-
ence. No one could know that S both (a) has only immediate
experience, that is. knowledge of his present only, and
(b) has no knowledge of the past, s could not know (b) of
himself. S could not know (a) of someone other than himself,
since to know this would require knowledge that there was
some objective realm with which both creatures were sensorily
confronted. Therefore, it is not possible that S knows what
his inner experience is like while wondering whether there
IS an objective world. If s knows what his inner experience
is like, he must know something of its past history, and so
inhabit an objective world and know that he does so. This
is the refutation of problematic idealism.
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The first stage of Bennett's argument, which tries to
estahlxsh that an inner experienoer with a purely present
tense language has no concept of the past, rests on the
peculiar principle that no one possesses non-functional con-
cepts. Earlier in KanVs balletic Bennett explicitly en-dorses a similar principle. 39Agreeing with Quine that ques-
tions about truth always involve questions about conceptual
efficiency, that ultimately the true theory is the one which
copes most economically with the facts, he derives the con-
sequence that 'if one has a language L in which to describe
a suboect-matter s. it is legitimate to add a new concept
C to the stock Of concepts in L in proportion as L-with-C
can describe s more simply than can L-without-C.
• instan-
tiating. it is legitimate for the inner experienoer to add
a concept of the past to his repertoire of concepts descri-
bing ooourrent inner states to the extent that this addition
will simplify description of certain phenomena (in this ease
the phenomena of recollection).
Perhaps it is plausible to connect functionality and
efficiency with legitimacy, although this flagrantly vio-
lates a skeptical tenet which was procedurally assumed in
chapter I. But the connection between any of these features
and the de facto having of concepts is extremely tenuous.
And It is just this latter connection that is required for
Bennett's argument, which concludes that the inner experienoer
has no concept of the past from the fact that there is no
non-redundant function such a concept would serve such an
experaencer. But do no elements of a .an-s conceputal schene
upUcate capacities? Are all schemes perfectly parsin.onious
That a concept lacks a distinctive use fails to iniply
that it lacks a use. although it does seem vacuous to say
that a man might possess a concept for which he could have
no use. so it might be thought that Bennett is arguing not
inner experiencer can have no concept of the past,
but that he cannot have our concept of the past, and this
’
because he could have no use for such a concept. But this
cannot be right, if 'could have no use for' means 'must be
useless to.' Bennett clearly feels that acquisition of our
concept of the past would be immensely useful to the inner
experiencer. On the other hand, the inner experiencer with
the purely present tense language cannot have our concept of
the past, but this is so merely in virtue of the defining
characteristics of his position. Hence, if the first stage
of Bennett's argument is designed to show that the solipsist
of the moment lacks our concept of the past, then argument
is uncalled for — it is true by stipulation. But if its
purpose is to prove that such an experiencer can have no
backward-looking concepts at all. then I think it has failed
to achieve that purpose.
Still, suppose the sub-conclusion is true — the solip-
sist has no concept of the past and so cannot make judgments
about the past. And let us grant the general principle that
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®«lf-=onsciousness for s entails that
thar*L"°k-
so-and-so. and the instantiation
ao mg the concept of the past excludes self-conscious-
ness for S- entails that S does not know that he lacks a
concept Of the past. So far, nothing new of interest follows
suppose further, then, that we accept the i»plicandu™
that lacking the concept of the past excludes self-conscious-
ness for S. Then S is self-conscious only if he heas a concept
1 the past, Bennett proceeds tn ao conclude that self-conscious-
ness requires knowl^ of the past.'^O^hi^
„ove is without
Justification. The ability to use concepts „ay he the ability
to make judgments, but it is certainly not to be identified
the ability to make justified, true judgments. Self-
consciousness may require a concept of the past, but it
would suffice to satisfy this requirement that S merely
believe, even believe wrongly, even be able to believe wrongly,
that he has a past,
Yet if we grant that S can know he lacks a concept of
past only if he is self-conscious, then, since the solip-
sist lacks a concept of the past (according to the argument),
and self-consciousness requires a concept of the past, the
solipsist cannot know he lacks a concept of the past. But
If he cannot know he lacks a concept of the past, he cannot
know he cannot make judgments about his past. But if he can-
not know he cannot make judgments about his past, he cannot
know he cannot make justified, true judgments about his past.
1S9
and so cannot know he has no knowledge of the past. This
.-es us half Of Bennetfs conclusion, that S cannot know
(^) Of himself. But this, as with Strawson-s objectivity
ar.ue.ent. is Just to say that a purely inner experiencer
cannot recognize his epistemic status, not that a purely
inner experience is impossible.
in order to shbw that no^. not even us. could know
that anyone was having a purely inner experience. Bennett
further argues that no one could know of someone other than
himself that he had only immediate experience. The key step
here is that if s were able to know that another knows only
his present state. S would have to know that there is an
objective world with which he and the other are sensorily
confronted. But why is this true? If s knows there is
another creature, he knows there is an objective world.
And S knows this world sensorily affects himself because he
sees the other creature. But how does S know the world sen-
sorily affects the other creature? The only available answer
is that the other creature is having inner experience. But
this is illicit grounding for the conclusion that the inner
experiencer* s states are caused by the objective world. It
begs the question.
Bennett claims that his argument shows that a purely
inner experiencer is not a real possibilityi but by ’real
possibility* he means ’can be known to be realized
.
by his own account, all that his argument could establish
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IS that we could not know epistemological skepticism to be
true. This is not the anti-skeptical thesis we want, and
in the absence of some ill-fated, strong verif icationist
principle, there is no way of getting from Bennett's to the
desired result.
One might complain that Bennett has been unnecessarily
sympathetic and I. unnecessarily unsympathetic. Bennett,
using the proposition that lacking a concept of the past
excludes self-consciousness, argued that a purely inner ex-
p rience (or purely private language), though not logically
impossible, cannot be known to be realised. After critici-
sing his argument. 1 protested that, in any event, its con-
clusion is too weak. But if the argument were reconstructed
using the proposition that consciousness (and not just self-
consciousness). or the use of any language at all, required
possession of a concept of the past. then, mutatls mutandis,
we could infer that a purely inner experience is a logical
impossibility. And the critic might remind me that I, a
defender of Kantian transcendental argument, would not wish
to deny that any act of consciousness, any synthesis of the
manifold, requires apprehension, reproduction , and recogni-
tion in a concept.
The reminder rests on misunderstanding — as a pre-
reflective activity, reproduction of the manifold is not
an instance of knowledge of. or belief about, the past.
Nevertheless, we did allow that judging (thinking) requires
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relating items in a unified consciousness (and so requires
distinguishability between haver and items of experience)
It is plausible to think that a unified consciousness re-
quires the ability to look backward and compare what occurred
with what is now occurring. Suppose pursuing this line of
argument succeeded in showing that solipsism of the moment
is logically impossible, and not just
-really impossible.-
would this entail the falsity of the skeptical thesis? Not
by itself. What is also needed is an argument to show that
an experience of past and present mental states alone is
impossible, that a language with a functional past and pre
sent tense roust be non-private.
That the dialectics of the issue have driven me to this
point is disquieting, and understandably i shall decline in
this dissertation from canvassing sentiment for and against
the morass of related questions which comprise the private-
language problem. l here offer only a summary statement of
the problem which directly confrcnts us now, and what I think
is an appropriate reply.
As discussed by Saunders and Henze, Wittgensteinians
have argued that, necessarily, any language all of whose
words refer to experiential data (present or past), none
of which entails or is entailed by the existence of any
publicly observable phenomena, is a language that only
the speaker/user could (logically) understand, but that
such a private, incommunicable language is impossible.
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most celebrated U„e of thought in support ot this viewcontends that language requires obedience to rules, but itis
.^possible to Obey a rule privately, since in such cir-
cumstances. thinking one was obeying a rule would be the
same as obeying it. To determine whether some item is of aparticular kind, whether the kind nam»® K - e properly applies toit. one must appeal to rules specifying the criteria forbeing something of that kind. But a private language is a
ruleless language, hence, even such minimal identifications
are impossible in it, hence, it is not really a possible
language at all. And again, it is a ruleless language be-
cause rule-following implies the possibility of verifying
correct and incorrect moves, but a private experiencer would
have no possible way of checking up on. or adding credibility
to. his introspective claims. And the attempt to check by
appeal to memory also fails, since it is impossible to
independently check for veridicalnes<? o-pcxxuicaxness f the memory impression*
at best you can believe you beli#>v<a +v,o+ aoexieve that a given sensation
is the same kind as you had before. ^3
But my descriptions of my experiences being intelligible
to others is not a necessary condition of their being intel-
ligible to myself. Granted that if a word applies to some-
thing it must apply to it not merely as being this, but as
being something of a certain sort. A phenomenal language
claims to have appropriate terms for specifying objects. It
is not incumbent on the user of such a language to specify
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those objects in some language different from his own to
prove the meaningfulness of his language. As Aune points
out. you do not have to be able to describe semantical rules
in order to understand a language, since ultimately the high-
est level metalanguage must just be understood on its own
if any sublanguage is to be understood.'^
Ayer correctly argues that it is not necessary that
the question whether I keep or break any rules should be
subject to a social check. The check-argument (against one
memory confirming another) is unsuccessful, since the sort
Of difficulty cited arises with any use of language
one never accepted any identification without further check,
one would never identify anything at all. and so no descripl
tive use Of language would be possible. If one can recognise
a word on a page, a sign made by some other person, the per-
son himself, and so on. without further procedures, then why
should one not as immediately recognise one’s own experiences?
And why in that case should it be impossible to describe them
in accordance with rules of one’s own?
Intra-language rules can be used by the inner experiencer
to justify his introspective claims; as Aune argues. ’This
is an A’ can be justified by relating it to B and appealing
to the rule that all Bs are As.'^^And. Aune continues, the
experiencer cannot ’merely think’ he has rules, since thinking
one thing rather than another is a rule-governed activity,
susceptible to inconsistency and error. The inner experiencer’
s
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use Of rules will be shown by the inferences he draws con-
cerning the features of his experiences, if he draws infer-
ences. he is operating with rules, whether he explicitly for-
mulates them or not,^^
Aune sums up the situation as follows:
If a wholly general doubt about semant^r +
0?"?he raised wi^hi^^he frlLSorfOf t system to which it aoplies and an,, ^doubt raised within the framework' of Lmro^he^conoeptual system is similarly self
-stultifyingthat any specification of the kind of ihing^rwSchrn question are supposed to apply must bejustified with reference to what are oonatLnaa
governing their use — it thenfollows that a general doubt about the consistent
tSsii??ad"" f cL^rpossIwy bedoubt must remain absolutely idle
possibility whatever of^gaininempirical support. Since a doubt of this kind is noless idle when directed to phenomenal languages w^must conclude that an external attack on such languagescannot succeed. This, however, seems to b^the approachWittgenstein took in attacking them.fe
®
And this is the approach of the refurbished Bennett-argument.
VI
It has often been urged that solipsism is self
-refuting.
To determine whether this is so. we should have a clear idea
of what self-refutation is. Under the general heading of
self
-refutation,
* philosophers have included ad hominem
.
pragmatic, performative, operational, semantic, and logical
inconsistency. The powers of these arguments range from
showing that a man ought to accept a given proposition if
he wishes to hold a consistent set of beliefs, to showing
that what a man asserts is a logical falsehood. Some of
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these arguments
-- for exatrmT^ +V,mple, the classic attempts to gen-
::“T“' “ ..
undiscussed. As regards the prlma facie r-»i
.
. ^
relevant argument-inds. I Shall argue that none is adequate to our anti-
skeptical task.
The predominant kind of argument from self-refutation
discoverable in contemporary philosophical literature is
argument from performative or pragmatic inconsistency. There
are various ways of formulating the conditions for pragmatic
inconsistency. Passmore proposes that a sentence is prag-
matically self-refuting (or inconsistent) if, and only if.
the sentence is to provide a counterexample to the
proposUion expressed by that sentence.'*9Ayer defines a
-self-
defeating- or
-self-stultifying- proposition as one such that,
if it is asserted, then it is false. 50fiut it is some feature
Of the event of assertion that falsifies the proposition,
the claim is not that the falsity of the proposition is es-
tablished by deductive argument. Hintikka and Nakhnikian
develop Ayer-s account — a sentence is self-defeating if,
and only if, if jt is professed, either to oneself or to some-
one else, then it is false.
Performative or pragmatic inconsistency is a relation
between what a sentence is used to express - the proposition
intended by the statement using the sentence - and some
feature of the event of the statement- s actual assertion.
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_1C inconsistency is not independent of whether or notIt IS asserted, Pra^a + ,*« •agm tio inconsistencies might be true ifthey were not verbally exnressert i, *p essed, but are inevitably (in asense to be clarified) false if th.
^^'bally expressed.
This sort of self
-refutation is called -n-Ls
’pragmatic,*
not as meaning
.practical., but in contradistinction to
syntactic and semantic inconsistency. Pragmatic inconsis-
ency is a relation not between propositions, nor between
propositions and the (non-linguistic
) world, but between
speech acts and propositions (the thoughts the sentences
used in speech acts are intended to convey), it differs
from syntactic (formal, logical) inconsistency in that for-
mal contradiction oer«5i<?+e uP rs sts through every uniform substitution
Of the sentence.s subject term, but a change in subject term
can turn a pragmatic inconsistency into a normal sentence.
The sentence.
’l am not saying anythin^,xn g* is pragmatically
inconsistent, if i aay I am not saying anything, then it is
false that I am not saying anything. But by replacing the
subject term
.J. with one of several others, such as .he.,
the performatively self
-refuting sentence is converted into
a perfectly straightforward report. Hence, pragmatic in-
consistency does not depend exclusively on the form of words
uttered, but also on the speaker of the statement, and how
p aker refers to himself. And unlike some cases of semantic
16 ?
self-reference, there are no referential problems in cases
Of pragmatic self
-reference. 52statements. concrete events,
may refer to themselves as physical events, instances of
grammar, uses of language that makes a claim, and so on.
The pragmatic inconsistency between a proposition and
its utterance is like the discrepancy between a statement
and a state of affairs which falsifies it. 53 ordinarily
, the
only way to verify a syntactically well-formed, semantically
meaningful descriptive statement is to look at the world,
such statements are contingent upon the state of the world.
The important peculiarity of pragmatic inconsistencies is
that although they cannot be rejected on logical grounds
alone, and so in the standard sense are also contingent upon
the state of the world, the facts which falsify them are
inescapable aspects of their utterance. The utterance of a
sentence accompanies the sentence in its concrete uses in
discourse. The facts that falsify a pragmatic inconsistency
are given along with it as it is uttered. Further, the
philosophically interesting characteristics of utterance
are those which are pervasive and uneliminable by paraphrase
or translation. So whereas •! cannot properly construct an
English sentence,' though pragmatically inconsistent, is not
when stated in German, *1 cannot speak* cannot bo restated
to avoid the inconsistency. There is no concrete context
from which the falsifying factor is absent.
So pragmatic inconsistencies are logically contingent,
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they demand to be tested by the facts Bnt •
and immediately fan the test ,
-vitably
U3 all the -I
" inevitably give
evxdence we need to falsify them. Thus the re-ectxons of pragmatic inconsistencies are outstanding can-i^ates for philosophical certainties. They are inevitably
true, yet still refer to facts.
Following Mackie. we may formally generalize e
Of
^ ^ ^ our accountpragmatic self
-refutation. 5\here d owner is a proposition-
iormxng operator on propositions, p is a propositional vari-
able, and E is the existential quantifier, it is a logicallaw that, for any d, d(„ot-(Ep)dp)-,
not-(not-(Ep)dp)
Whenever an item occurs which can be symbolised by d(:ot-(Ep)dp)
.
xs eelf-refuting in the sense that what d operates on.
What the noun-clause not-(Ep)dp represents, must be false.
It is not the proposition symbolised by d(not-(Ep)dp) that
13 self
-refuting, but the operation it describes, its occur-
rence refutes its content (its noun-clause ).« There is no-
thing to prevent the actual occurrence of this operation,
1 can type that I am not typing, so that the proposition
d(not-(Ep)dp) will be true. And what is asserted in the
noun-clause could itself be true, at another time. But as
I perform the operation in question. I give ample evidence
that instances of the operation occur, and that one instance
is occurring now.
I embrace the suggestion that the negations of pragmatic
inconsistencies are certainties. But it seems obvious that
1.69
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not subjective in the sense that their warrant isonly a kind of feeline- n.. av® experience, but in the sense that
y ruths about a subject, his activities, capabilities.
experiences, and so on, can be established by this method
ruths concerning the kinds of entities which constitute
the oboective realm cannot be demonstrated by showing that
the act Of asserting their denials immediately falsifies
their denials, and so verifies their truth, m particular,
we cannot prove that objective particulars exist by assert-ing that no objective particular*^ py^o+ ^cirTiicuiars exist and carefully atten-ding to that event of verbal expression. Such attention is
not sufficient and immediate proof of the proposition in
question) the falsifying feature ec^ * of the skeptical assertion
(in this case, the dogmatic skeptic, but the same applies
to our problematic idealist) is not some fact inevitably
and immediately given with the utterance.
But I must even qualify my welcome by noting again
that the occurrence of the operation refutes its content,
the content (proposition) itself is not irremediably refuted.
For pragmatic inconsistencies, the most that is shown is
that a certain way of presenting a certain view is unsatis-
factory. The view itself is not thereby refuted, and may
well be presented and supported in other ways. Even the
claim that I cannot speak, whose falsification persisted
through translation, can readily be presented in writing.
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n response to the oh.eotion that argument tro„ prag-
-tao inoonsistenc. cannot estahXt.h the truth ot oh,activeOu g^ents. the proponent of argument fro. self-refutation
-y note that for so.e operators. i,
^
enow that.. .1 neme.her that- and
-it can be proved that-
are examples of such truth-entailing operators. For such
a. It IS a logical law that: not-d(not-(Ep)dp)
. 56jn these
oases, each proposition of the form d(not-(Ep)dp) is self-
refuting. Given that d is truth-entailing its fnI'^oixxin , I orm guaran-tees its falsehood. Here mnv bo oay be a way to get from the sub-jective to the objective.
But this form of self-refutation applies to the skeptic
only When he becomes a radical dogmatist. •! know that I
Know nothing, and
.It can be proved that nothing can be
proved, are both self
-refuting in the newly- introduced sense
But
.nothing can be known- and
-nothing can be proved- are
coherent insofar as the proposed test is concerned. And
•I know that I know that objective particulars do not exist-
is also non-deviant. To be self
-refuting in the more strin-
gent sense presented, the skeptical position must be both
radical and dogmatic. Epistemological solipsism is neither.
Therefore, the epistemological solipsist remains unscathed.
In response to the objection that argument from prag-
matic inconsistency can never preclude evasion by re-presen-
tation, advocates of the method of self
-refutation may try
to defend a more powerful principle which issues in inescapable
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results. Passmore argues that what he calls
-absolutely
self-refuting, propositions are thus inescapable, where to
assert such a proposition is equivalent to »=4 -i.vaj.ent asserting both
that proposition and its negation simultaneously. 57since
to assert a proposition and its negation at the same time
IS to assert a contradiction, 1 take it that one asserts
an absolutely self.refuting proposition if. and only if
one asserts a contradiction. Hence, to assert an absolutely
self-refuting proposition is to assert a logical falsehood.
Paradigmatic examples of absolutely self
-refuting
propositions are
-No sentence conveys anything- and
-There
are no true propositions.
- 58The line of reasoning is familiar
If a man asserts that there are no true propositions, since
What he asserts is itself a proposition, it follows that he
also asserts that what he asserts is not true, and hence he
asserts that some propositions are true. Therefore, in
asserting that there are no true propositions, he asserts
both that there are no true propositions and that there are
some true propositions.
This line of reasoning is invalid. Even supposing
that the man-s assertion is included within the scope of
the assertion about all assertions (supposing we cannot ap-
peal to a metalanguage, type or category distinctions, or
any suitable logic), it only follows that what is asserted
IS not true, and so that some propositions are true. It
does not follow that the man asserts that some propositions
1?2
are true, m asserting something ^ all propositions, one
oes not assert all (each) propositions. Consequently, the
thoroughgoing sheptic in question is not guilty of absolute
self-refutation, since although he asserts so™e proposition,
he does not also assert its denial,
Naturally, the problematic idealist is in no danger of
absolute self
-refutation anyhow. But although Passmore de-
fines •absolute self-refutation- as indicated. I think his
discussion and examples show that his formulation is defective
What really aeems to be going on in arguments from absolute
self
-refutation is the attempt to show that the position in
question violates a formal requirement of all discourse, a
characteristic of discourse which persists through all para-
phrase and analysis.eowhat Passmore-s insight comes down to
is that there are some principles which are assumed by all
«ho engage in discourse, and that to deny any of those prin-
ciples. or any other proposition which is entailed by those
principles, must be a mistake, since such propositions are
assumed to be true. Whether such assumptions are matters
of convention, natural propensity, necessity, etc., is, so
far as I can see, left an open question. In reality, then,
absolute inconsistency turns out to be, not a matter of
logical incoherence, but rather more like a species of
performative or pragmatic inconsistency. But arguing from
that sort of inconsistency was shown to be no threat to
the skeptical thesis. The only way to pin such a charge of
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inconsistency on the problematic idealist t
V
la i is to assume thatthe subject term used to express +i, •his thesis explicitly refers
•
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can never know for certain +Via+ Objective particulars exist.-
this. Of course, is a question-begging assumption.
It seems to me that other methods with intimations of
novelty - whether self-professed or not - also reduce to
from pragmatic self-refutation. and so are inadequate
..r
........
3.v.ral beliefs
.. .
.........
.........
..
.....
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language, a collection of sentences used for certain communi-
cative purposes.6lThe fact that skepticism can be stated in
language implies the truth of some of the beliefs attacked
by the Skeptic. The conditions for the use of any sentence
he calls
-contextually implied- beliefs, and the denials of
such conditions he calls
-conceptual absurdities.- if. and
only if. the assumptions contradicted by the use of a sentence
are necessary for the use of any sentence, conceptual ab-
surdity results. The absurdity derives from the fact that
a person uses a sentence to deny that a condition necessary
for the use of any sentence obtains, and the act of using
the sentence naturally demonstrates immediately the contrary
Of what is being denied. So if there is to be a language
shared by the skeptic and his opponent, contextually implied
statements must be true. And so in stating his position the
1?4
skeptic demonstrates the truth of some
.
contextually
implied beliefs which he chanenxroc.
.
llengesi consequently, his posi-
tion IS conceptually absurd.
Kekes. argument is just an instance of a strong form
Of argument from pragmatic self
-refutation, and accordingly
can prove even less than its weaker cohorts. Suppose his
argument persuades us that the skeptic provides the justi-
fication he demands by using language. What justification
are we talking about? At best the argument shows that some
beliefs are justified, thereby refuting the radical skeptic
who holds that rational justification for any belief is im-
possible. a skeptic with whom we are not concerned. And
just which beliefs may be included among language’s contex-
tual implications? The only example of conceptual absurdity
we are offered is the use of the sentence *No language exists.
So. that there is a language is a contextual implication.
So. at least one belief is justified. But we are hard pressed
to discover many more contextual implications, and certainly
the anti-skeptical thesis is not among them.
Other speech act theories are variations on the same
theme. The transcendental phenomenologist* s method of es-
tablishing a proposition by arguing that doubting or denying
the proposition relies on rules incompatible with those
needed in formulating the proposition is akin to the species
of self
-refutation criticized at length in section IV of
this chapter. ^^And even most 'presupposition arguments' are
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really equivalent to arguments fro™ performative inconsis-
tency. For example. Fitch points out that
-presupposition.
Often means some hypothesis that cannot be systematically
denied without in some sense being already assumed.
-The
very denial itself, or some important aspect of it. or some
assumption or method involved in presenting or defending it.
constitutes an exception to the denial.
In sum. although versions of argument from self
-refu-
tation may help provide us with subjective certainties from
Which we may try to argue, and may successfully impugn forms
of radical, dogmatic skepticism, none is sufficient to pre-
vail over problematic idealism. And as we saw previously,
no version of parasitism, verificationism. the appeal to
paradigm cases or the need for non-vacuous contrast enjoys
the long-sought triumph either. Is there a savior in philo-
sophical heaven or earth?
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unAir'TiiH IV
KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS
In this Chapter I want to provide a promising theory
and to place the proe:re«?c? nf +v«r» ^ •ogress of the dissertation vividly before
your mind, i qhain pav,„4-
recapitulate the salient structure
Of argument of the first three chapters.
In the first chapter of this dissertation I explained
the epistemological solipsist thesis that we can never
.now
With certainty that objective particulars exist by distinguish-
ing It from other skeptical theses - showing it to be a
theoretical, non-radical, non-criteriological skepticism
whose refutation entails, but is not entailed by, the refuta-
tion of other versions of epistemological skepticism — and
by explicating the central notions of philosophical certainty
and objective particularity. The discussion of certainty may
be summarized as follows:
Def initionR
possibir?hit^there existfl^V ‘’utfr'’th ~warranted in withholding p or beUevLg not!p"at tV*^
^
(Maximal warrant) p is maximally warranted for S at t itr ftIS unimaginable that there exists a n> » t. f a ^that p. is more warranted
^
f^^-oh
P exhaustively warranted for S at t
exhaustive or complete, and the current evidence is positive.
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tlll^ -
S^fknowUdge-''is extendable
tret irrm eree ft
believing that'^p^^on^the^baais Jf I
=°';'Pletely Justified in
defeasible iff for any tru^ DroLe?+^ lustif ioation is in-justified ifPbelieving that r^vee h ®’ ® completelyjustified in believing thtt g.
^ ^ *®''® completely
(Lehrer's indefeasibilltvl Te c i-believing that p on the basie^of ^ J^Plctely justified indefeasible iff s wnnia Justification is in-
that p on th^bLire? e evM Relievinghe assumed any further true propeiuro^ g. ^t-gument)
ffiilillelsilf ^ ^ SXElicati^ Of philosophical
(A) ts not an intri^^ property of propositions,
position or se^-f1--i?i^-?^ra^?ire;
times.
Certainties need not be necessary truths.
Necessary truths need not be certainties,
appraisal.^®
^ standard-setting concept of epistemic
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E) Certainties need not be inferentially justifiable.
(P) Knowledge does not imply certainty.
Argued claims
(1) Irrevisability is necessary and sufficient for certainty.
(2) Maximal warrant entails irrevisability.
(3) Unmistakability does not entail irrevisability.
entail maximal warrant (norexhaustive warrant). ^
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not entail unmistakabiiity
does not entail
.axi.al
„arran;.
Maximal warrant does not entail unmistakabiiity.
(8) Extendability entails Hilpinen*s indefeasibility
(9) Extendability entails Lebrer-s indefeasibility
’
(10) Hilpinen.s indefeasibility entails Lebrer-s indefeasibility.
1 Lebrer.s indefeasibiUty does not entail Hilpinen's.
i3°nor:n?riL°l'^^:^™f^„^'^oj-^tifl^ entaus. but
.
proposition makes p unjustified.
•NO j"-tified"?rie“p?oposIu
(14) Knowledge does not entail Hilpinen's indefeasibility.
(15) Knowledge does not entail Lebrer's indefeasibility.
(16) Irrevisability entails extendability.
Therefore
,
(1?) Knowledge is not extendable.
(18) Knowledge with certainty is extendable.
Tbe upsbot Of tbe discussion is this. Tbe extendability
entails tbe indefeasibility requirement. But tbe in-
defeasibility requirement was shown to be unnecessary for
knowledge (in tbe ordinary sense). Since tbe extendability
thesis entails a proposition whose truth is not a necessary
condition Of knowledge, the truth of the extendability thesis
is not a necessary condition of knowledge. But although ordi-
nary knowledge need not be extendable, knowledge with certainty
extendable, since certainty implies irrevisability. and
irrevisability implies extendability. Consequently, we have
18 (|.
sustained the legitimoy of the ordinary knowledge-knowledge
with certainty distinction.
in the section on objective particulars, it was argued
Objective particulars must be reidentif iable
, that is,
identifiable as the same thing in +^ different perceptual situa-
tions at different times. Conioined with o • +-u j a existential and
attributive independence, reidentif iahi i i
•
la x i l bil ty is sufficient for
objective particulari tir t+bxcui ty. it was suggested huto not conclusively
argued, that reidentiflability entails existential and attribu-
ependence, so that all and only reidentif iable parti-
culars are objective. Cautiously, all three conditions were
retained in the analysis.
In the final section of the first chapter I adopted some
procedural assumptions in deference to the skeptic. I accepted
the egocentric predicament, allowed that the premises of my
anti-skeptical argument must be philosophical certainties,
and granted that all inferences from certainties must guarantee
preservation of certainty (given that the inferences are known).
These methodological assumptions required repudiation of naive
realism, subjective-objective reductionism (phenomenalism),
ientific realism, and any pragmatism which rejects foundation-
alism, or loosens beyond recognition the strictures imposed on
the foundation of knowledge. I renounced the views that empi-
rical knowledge is a community phenomenon necessarily based on
data available to all (public), that certainty must be construed
in terras of currently accepted norms governing the resolution
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of determinate doubts anH +v,« a .
funrf
' ristotelian view that properlyctioning senses under proper conditio
T
,
P P ns give reliable know-ledge of the WOrIH T ,
jvnow
• I concluded bv stressiruo- a.
.
^ xre sing the methodolo-
gioal character of my assumptions.
II
second chapter I examined Strawsonian transcen-
dental arguments and their uses. Pursuing the descriptive
-etaphysrcal method of exhibiting the invariant features of
our conception of experience. Strawsonian transcendental ar-
guments attempt to elicit the analytic implications of any
coherent description of experience we can form. A description
If and only if it is not formulable in a language
L Which is incoherent, that is. an L which is parasitic upon
some class of languases K t < c. -j.*g . L is parasitic upon a class of
languages K if and only if none of *J-y II the terms of L could be
understood unless some suitable set of terms of some L- which
is a member of K were understood. L is coherent if and only
not parasitic upon anv K eanh t * n-p v,* u •F y c L' of which is different
from L,
Strawson's thesis is that a form of experience is possible
only If some language corresponding to it is coherent. He
holds that any possible form of experience is coherently de-
scribable, he does not hold that every coherently describable
form Of experience is possible. He proceeds to argue that
all describable experiencers (language-users) must be able to
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use Objectivity concepts (make assertions about objective
particulars). His point is that no coberent language can
e purely pbenomenal or private, not that no language, that
xs. set Of terms and formation rules, can be private.
After Showing that arguments for the impossibility of
exclusively adjectival languages are 4. 4.iftuage irrelevant to Strawson's
conclusion, since a ‘lan^uafi’e wi-t-virm-f- -u j.l guag without substantives designating
re identifiable particular*Q — «« ja sense datum language
— oan
also use non-sensory relational predicates, adverbs, and
indexical expressions. I marshalled a series of criticisms
Of Strawson's objectivity argument, and his method in general
First, his argument illicitly shifts from 'experience requires
that there be a recognitional component' to the supposition
that experience requires that we can distinguish a recognitional
component. Second, even this stronger supposition is inadequate
to Strawson's purposes, since the argument further equivocates
on 'recognitional component.' originally meaning 'the ability
to use a descriptive predicate' or 'general concept.' then
meaning 'act of awareness' or 'subjective portion of experi-
ence.' There is an unjustifiable move from 'items can enter
consciousness only if they are somehow classifiable' to 'items
oan enter consciousness only if we can be aware that we are
experiencing them (only if they are classifiable as 'experiences')
So although the proposition that all forms of experience must
be aware of themselves as having experience is allegedly a lemma
of the objectivity argument, we see that the question of its
18?
truth is begged in the incipient, unsupported moves from
experience, to judgable or describable experience, to self-
conscious experience. And I argued that only if it must be
possible to distinguish within experience a part of experience
due to the subject and a part due to the independent object
does it follow that a purely inner experiencer is impossible.
Next I noted that even if Strawson- s argument were sound,
all it would Show is that the purely inner experiencer is un-
able to describe that his judgments contain general and par-
ticular components, or that he only experienced subjective
states and not objective particulars - in short, unable to
do the philosophy Of his own situation. It would not show
that he could not judge which experiences he was having at
any one time, which ability is sufficient for experience.
Strawson’s argument has not given us a reason to exclude the
possibility Of a language (i) not employing objectivity con-
cepts. (ii) usable by itself, but (iii) describable only by
means of a richer language with objectivity concepts. It has
not been shown that any subject of experience we can make
intelligible to ourselves must be a user of objectivity con-
cepts. though it is true that to make it so intelligible to
ourselves we must use such concepts. But that is trivial,
since we are drawing the object-subject distinction in de-
scribing the experience. Therefore, the possibility of ex-
perience has not been shown to entail the ability to use
objectivity concepts.
I
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lize.T
objectivity argument were then genera-
o Strawson's entire method of metaphysical reasoning.
something is entailed hy the fact that we can conceive of apossible experience hot not hy the nature of possible experi-
worlds in Which there is experience. Further. i generated
serxous doubts about Strawson's appeal to conceivability as
the test Of metaphysical possibility, since no clear, suitable
sense of
'conceivability was discovered in which conceivability
entailed possibility.
The unsuitability of Strawson's method as a weapon against
epistemological solipsism became more obvious when we studied
the transcendental argument of Individuals
. As we saw. this
anti-skeptical argument amounted to asserting that the skeptic
cannot both agree and disagree with us. cannot accept our con-
ceptual scheme which allows for re identification of objects and
then always doubt or deny particular-identity claims about ob-
jects. Strawson says that we do have the idea of a single
spatiotemporal system of material objects, and that this re-
quires unquestioning acceptance of particular identity in at
least some cases of non-oontinuous observation.
The argument Strawson provides for establishing this re
quirement is flawed. It needs the premise that the salient
topological properties of a framework have their analogue in
the reidentifiable particulars housed. But the locational
relations between particulars, not the dimensions of the par-
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ticulars, are to be correlated wi+ht the number of dimensions
Of the framework in which they are located
But more generally. Strawson wholly misconstrues the
skeptic. The skeptic does not claim the unusability of the
ordinary scheme. „e uses it in debate. But he uses concepts
which he thinks may be unnecessary for describable experience
and Which he thinks are employed without rational credentials!
The designata of such concepts cannot be shown to be better
than fictions,
I distinguished three levels of argument here. We can
articulate the subjective conditions of experience, thought,
or judgment, that is. show which concepts are indispensable
for thought or judging to be possible. This has some anti-
skeptical bite, showing that the referents of the concepts in
question are not merely useful fictions. But. for all such
an argument shows, they may still be fictions, even if in-
dispensable ones. Natural beliefs, indispensable elements
in our mental makeup, need not be rationally defensible.
Following Kant. I called this a
-metaphysical deduction- of
such concepts. A transcendental deduction is needed to show
that the concepts everyone must use in order to make judgments
are justifiably used. But Strawsonian transcendental arguments,
parasitism arguments articulating the conditions of our descrip-
tion of thought, are regressive or analytical like Kant-s
argument of the Prolegomena. They assume the general structure
Of our conceptual scheme and beg questions of justification.
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consequently, Strawson's transcendental method is
.is-guided. Further, the sorts of results the method could pos-
conscious experiencer. or self
-describing language-user,
-St be a user of tbe concept '.y experience- or '.y language-
IS absolutely trivial. The conceptual needs of the self-
reflective episte„,ologist are different frc those of the
minimally inquisitive experiencer, yet the latter is a con-
scious, judging agent nonetheless, still further, it is
doubtful whether conclusions about the possibility of experienoP
can be established. Even if c is parasitic upon C*. it does
follow that experiencing Cs presupposes the ability to
experience Cs. Although to experience rs ac. pP l o s Cs requires the
grasp of C' (or the ability to use T'*p c or some other word
synonymous with, or a translation of, it), Cs may be experienced
under some coextensional but not cointensional description
not requiring the grasp of C
.
Largely for the reasons summarized in this section, I
saw no redemptive attraction in following Strawson's path.
Ill
In the third chapter I negatively assessed the merits
Of various, supplementary anti-skeptical resources, including
paradigm case arguments, non-vacuous contrast arguments,
some variations on parasitism arguments, verificationist
arguments, and arguments from self-refutation. As regards
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paradigm case argument
•
expressionObjective particulsT'* r^v. ^ .^.
Objectivity expressions
must be learned by referenop tn r,o
, .
T ce o oases, whether they are com-pre ensible only by showing or exhibiting instances of their
application. Pirst 1 argaeP that even if concept e^piricis.
or simple, sensible predicates is true, such a route to ob-jective particulars seems to work only if objective particulars
are collocations of sensible properties. But then I argued
that paradigm case arguments could never demonstrate the
reality of objective particulars, since for the learning of
terms, an apparent example is as good as a real one. m the
case Of every paradigm case argument, the question is whether
the paradigm features appealed to are supported by good reasons
for the usage in question being what it is. This question of
justification is not answered by appeal to cases.
Support for the faltering paradigm is offered by the non-
vacuous contrast principle that .y is meaningfully applicable
to a only If there are possible oases of as which are not F.
The principle is impugned. But even if true, all it could
establish is that it is possible, for all we know, that objec-
tive particulars exist. We could not conclude that objective
particulars do exist, and so not that we can know with certainty
that they do. At best it shows that we cannot know that ob-
jective particulars do not exist, that skepticism cannot be
established. Like parasitism, paradigm case and non-vacuous
contrast arguments rest their case on the need to make various
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empirical distinctions, but they fail to realize that the
Skeptic need not be (and typically is not, blind to the actual
use Of any of these. He worries about justification, not
practice.
As regards verif icationism. Stroud argued that a tran-
scendental argument without a verif icationist premise fails
to refute skepticism, while a transcendental argument with a
verificationist premise is superfluous, since verif icationism
alone directly refutes skepticism. So whether or not verifi-
oationism is tenable. l must show that transcendental arguments
do not require appeal to it. For if transcendental arguments
require a verificationist premise and verif icationism is un-
tenable, then transcendental arguments are unsound. And if
transcendental arguments require a verif icationist premise
and verificationism is tenable, then, given that verif icationism
y itself suffices to refute skepticism, transcendental argu-
merits are superfluous.
In this chapter I shall meet Stoud-s challenge by showing
that transcendental arguments do not rest on any version of
verificationism. But in chapter III I argued that Stroud's
verificationist cannot refute the skeptic. Stroud's skeptic
claims that (i) a particular class of propositions makes sense,
and (ii) we can never know whether any of them are true.
Stroud's transcendentalist claims that (1) the truth of (i)
is a necessary condition of the meaningfulness of the skeptical
position expressed in (ii), and (2) the falsity of (ii) is a
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necessary condition of the truth of (i) f,)
propositions of a certain f a
">«^ringful it raust be pos-to know 1 f' +V\« / ^
.
-true or false. This13 a version of verif icationism. The precise . .
.
statement of
as ^iven
lo os r: r^ sometimes know certain conditions to beU1 11led. the fulfillment of which logically implies either
Oboects continue to exist unperceived or that they do not.Stroud holds that this principle provides a direct and
conclusive answer to the skeptic since it foilS I l ows from the
P iple that If the skeptic's claim that we can never know
at objects continue to exist unperceived makes sense, it
must be false, since if the proposition that objects continued
0 exist unperoeived could not be known to be true or known
to be false, it would make no sense. But Stroud's inference
IS invalid. If the proposition that objects continue to exist
makes sense, then, according to the principle, either it or
Its contradictory can be conclusively verified. But nothing
in the verificationist principle guarantees that the realist
proposition rather than its skeptical denial will turn out
to be the knowable truth. And so nothing in the principle
conclusively refutes the skeptic.
If a class of propositions makes sense oniy if it is
false that we can never know whether any one of them is true,
follows at best that complete suspension of judgment with
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respect to all the members of that rla
Rnt illegitimate.Bu . instantiating to propositions about particul
on these grounds to
P ar reidentity., deny our Knowledge of persistence is asspeotable as affirming it. To avoid this oriti '
veri f*! r»5i + • • ^ l^icism, Stroud'sficationist must delete the final disjunct of h-
.
is princiolpand so maintain that the notion of obieot, •
sense to us only if w
Particulars makes
entailing th
certain criteria
g e existence of unperceived objects are satisfied
ve^TlT conclusivelytable, and not merely verifiable or falsifiable. But thegeneral principle is obviously wrong, it entails that every-
ng understood is true, everything meaningfully talked about
-Sts. If so. the Claim about objective particulars cannot
e lustified as an instance of (this version of) verificationi.m.
otice that several of the argument-kinds we have con-
sidered are designed to show that if epistemological solipsism
-re true, its statement would be unintelligible, hence, the
falsity Of solipsism is a necessary condition of its meaning-
fulness. Srzednicki>s variation on Strawson was a putative
instance of this strategy. Because (A) I am identical with
the world. I cannot say (B) all appearances of the existence
Of other things are misleading, since I could not form the
concept
-object other than I- in a solipsistic universe.
Assuming the equivalence between having a concept and being
able to use and understand words, we conclude that (B) cannot
be stated or understood by anyone if (A) is true, since if (a).
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:: rr*
oould"^
^ possessed by anybody, and so nobody
thit
jPdgMents. But it is rightly agreed
^
( does express a proposition about something other than
psist speaker's self, so the supposition that (A&B)
completely and correctly describes the world must be false.
In criticism, I argued that 'Necessarily, nothing existsWh.ch is not the world or some part of it' does not entail (thefalsehood that) we eer>nr>4- -r
* ® concept Of something not inthe world, (a) entails (B) Rut nr^ •K ). B no inconsistency has been
established between (A) and the fact that thp k- .subject mentioned
in (A) has an extensive repertoire of concepts, including
•Object other than I.' To succeed, the argument must wrongly
assume that all objects of thought must exist. Further I
argued that 'object other than I' ia not unframeable given the
resources of the solipsistic universe, it is a complex concept
Which frameable constituents. Anyhow, I note that epistemo-
logical solipsism is not a metaphysical thesis (and the meta-
physical thesis (A) does all the work in the above). And so
it becomes more evident that things other than I or my mental
states are thinkable, and that claims about them are meaning-
fully expressible. It is just, the claim is. that their exis-
tence is not knowable (with certainty).
Next I considered Bennett's attempted refutation of epis-
temological solipsism. Based on a theory of concept-utility.
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ennett argued that the solipsist can have no concept of thepast. NOW it is impossible that a man S hnows that he is so-
so Xf bexng so-and-so excludes self
-consciousness,
-Being
so-and-so excludes self-conso iousness for S- entails
-S does
not Know that he is so-and-so.- But s is self-conscious onl,f he can use the concept
-my experience now.-
,nd the abilityto use the concept
-my experience now- requires the ability
to use the concept
-my experience then.- Therefore, he con-
cludes, self
-consciousness requires knowledge of the past
Therefore, nobody could know that anybody, including himself.
was having a purely inner experience. Therefore, it is not
possibl© "thst S know© ?^ K s what his inner experience is like while
wondering whether there is an objective world, since if s knows
What his inner experience is like, he must know something of
its past history, and so inhabit an objective world and know
that he does so.
The initial stage of Bennett- s argument was seen to rest
on the falsehood that no one possesses non-uniquely-functional
concepts. He infers that the inner experiencer has no concept
Of the past from the fact that there is no non-redundant function
such a concept would serve such an experiencer. But lacking
a distinctive use does not imply lacking a use. still, suppose
the solipsist can make no judgments about the past. The move
from
-S is self-conscious only if he has a concept of the
past to 'self
-consciousness requires knowledge of the past-
is unwarranted, it is enough that S believe, even wrongly, or
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even te able to believe wrongly, that he has a past.
Yet if we grant the early stage of the argument, allowingthat s can Know he lacKs a concept of the past only if he is
self-conscious, that the solipsist lacKs a concept of the past,
and that self-consciousness requires a concept of the past, we
can validly infer that the solipsist cannot know he lacks a
concept Of the past.' But then he cannot know he cannot
.ake
judginen'ts sbout; his 'Da.c?'hn p st, and so cannot know he cannot make
justified, true judgments about his oast v,ux p . Hence, he cannot
know he has no knowledge of the past. But suppose we still
further grant that knowledge of the objective world requires
knowledge of the past, so that the solipsist since k-Lj.psis , S he cannot
know he has no knowledge of the past, cannot know he has no
knowledge of the objective world. This just shows that the
epistemological solipsist could not know that epistemological
solipsism was true. As with Strawson, this just shows that
a purely inner experiencer cannot recognize his epistemic
status, not that a purely inner experiencer is impossible.
And again, not knowing the truth of skepticism is different
than knowing the truth of anti-skepticism. So Bennetfs
variation on Strawson was shown to be too weak.
Extending my criticism to an improved version of Bennett's
strategy, I urged that even if solipsism of the moment is im-
possible, it does not follow that a purely inner experiencer
is impossible. To show otherwise is to show that an experience
Of past and present mental states alone is impossible, that a
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language with a functional past and present tense
.ust he
n private. This lead to a discussion of the private lan-
guage argument, the response to which was essentially this.
soriptions of my experiences being intelligible to others
- not a necessary condition of their being intelligible to
myself. The purely inner experienoer claims to have appro-
priate terms for specifying things, it is not incumbent on
him to specify those things in some language different from
his own to prove the meaningfulness of his language. One
need not be able to describe semantic rules to understand a
language, since the highest metalanguage must just be under-
stood on its own if any sublanguage is to be understood.
Further, it is not necessary that the question whether I keep
or break any rules should be subject to a social check. Some
identification or recognition must be accepted without further
check, so the realist is in the same boat as the solipsist.
The solipsist's use of rules will be shown by the inferences
he draws concerning the features of his experiences, if he
infers, he is operating with rules, whether he explicitly
formulates them or not.
In the final section of chapter III various accounts
of performative or pragmatic inconsistency are stated. Prag
matic inconsistency is a relation between what a sentence is
used to express (the proposition intended by the statement
using the sentence) and some feature of the event of the
statement's actual assertion — a relation between a speech
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their utterance, aspects which are ineli^nable byparaphrase cr translation. But i ar.uea that (i) the negations
of such propositions can at best be certaintie, i „
.
s only about a
subject, his activities, car>ahiii + ^le pab l ties, experiences, and so on,
ana not about the objective world. m particular, we cannot
prove that objective particulars exist by asserting otherwise
carefully attending to that event of verbal expression.
And (ii) when the occurrence of the assertive 4. •- operation refutes
content, the content Itself IS not irremediably refuted;
just shown that a certain way of presenting a certain
vie. is unsatisfactory
- the view .ay be presented and supported
in other ways.
I concluded the chapter by arguing that various speech
act theories and presupposition arguments, intended as inter-
pretations of transcendental argument, are variations on the
same theme, and are subject to the same limitations.
IV
In Chapter II I argued at length that parasitism or concept-
dependency arguments to conclusions about conceptual indispen-
sability were ineffectual weapons against epistemological
solip^sism. I also criticized instances of a different strategy —
thafarguing for the priority of one kind of entity to another
from the priority of one kind of entity to another, where the
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priority claimed in the premises differs from the priority
Claimed in the conclusion. m an effort to generalise my
crrticrsm. and rule out another candidate for transcendental
argument, in this section I shall define eight important
aenses of
-priority,, and then argue that no interesting
inference from one sense to another is permissible.
The senses of
-priority- I want to define are ( 1 ) con-
ceptual. (2) identificational. {3) reidentif icational. (4) dox-
astio, ( 5 ) epistemic, (6) ontic commitment, (7) experiential,
and (8) ontological. The definitions are as follows 1
(Dl) X is conceptually prior to y for a person =: iffcould not grasp the concept Y (or intellifi-p^T+i truse the word 'Y* nve ^ ^ ^ luxe ngently
without era^Je ®yP°Py"> °r translation)xn grasping the concept X, but not conversely.
(D2) Xs are identificationally prior to Ys for a person
?e^en^rt“thi°ngs'’*of
(•TO identify; hefe means - to’ iL1vid^a?eT""at'''ls
cLer? particular me;ber of f ’
?VpL;nv"uSer? definite descriptionrare
scribe sLt^?y!?)''°’ classify or de-
f are re identificationally prior to Ys for a person
ki^Y^+ reidentif ication criteria for things'^of
+>.•
OP the identities of Xs, but
the idintitifi‘'of^°"
the
"" identification as numertfaU;
dl!fferent'ul1fr'"' situations at
'
(D4 ) Xs are doxastically prior to Ys for S iff if s did
things of kind X existed, he could
things of kind Y existed, but if
things of kind Y existed, hemight still believe that things of kind X existed.
(D 5 ) Xs are epistemically prior to Ys for S iff if s did
not know that things of kind X existed, “hi" could notknow that things of kind Y existed, but not conversely.
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(D6)
to YS for s
con^eVse^T*"^'^'^ existence^oP^Ysf
(D7) Xs are experientially prior to Ys for ? iff v=experienceable only if Xs are hn+ ^j AS , but not conversely.
(D8) Xs are ontologically prior to Ys iff y<s r*/->exist unless Xs did, but not oonvSely.
Many notions of derived reality, dependence and indepen-
dence, parasitism and self-sustenance or coherence, indispen-
sability, primitiveness, simplicity or unanalysability
, are
definable in terms of the resources just given, m particular,
a basic kind of entity - the kind of entity metaphysicians
and some epistemologists seek - is simply a kind of entity
that is more basic than (prior to), or at least no less basic
than (not 'posterior to), any other kind of entity.
are now in a position to assess the various forms of
inference from one sense of
-priority to another. First, re-
call the simplifying fact that identificational priority and
priority of ontio commitment, as commonly construed, are
equivalent. On the Russell-Quine view, commitment is carried
by the quantified variables (function-satisfiers, for Russell)
of the canonical language because this happens to be the
referential apparatus of the language. And so the general
point would be that we need not countenance the existence of
anything we need not refer to. One can say what needs saying
by picking out other referents. But identificational dependents
are just those things we need not refer to. Therefore, to say
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that the variables of the canonical language must range over
Xs IS oust to say in a particular, theory-laden way, that Xs
are identif icationally basic.
Even after this reduction, the remaining seven senses
Of
-priority allow of forty two pairwise permutations. I
shall focus on some key inference-forms, and after showing
that they are invalid, explain why pursuit of the others is
uninteres t ing,
I have already shown that conceptual priority does not
imply experiential priority. Even if understanding concept Y
requires understanding concept X, it does not follow that ex-
periencing YS presupposes the ability to experience Xs. Al-
though to experience Ys as Ys requires the grasp of x (or the
’lity to use x or some other word synonymous with, or a
translation of, it), Ys may be experienced under some other
ooextensional but not cointensional description not requiring
the grasp of X. In our earlier example, even if experiencing
my subjective states as
-states- requires the ability to use
objectivity concepts, those states may be experienced under
another description, such as
-redlike and roundlike,- which
does not entail the ability to use objectivity concepts.
By similar reasoning, identificational priority does
not imply conceptual priority. Because even if individuatability
does imply classif lability, there is in general nothing to
prevent the use of coextensional but not cointensional
classif icatory concepts in individuation.
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Nor does identifloational priority imply epistemio
«. Sin,.
.
^
must refer to may not exist. But if the Xs *1 do not exist, then
cannot know that they do exist. But then it is possible to
the Ys I am identifying exist without knowing that
Xs exist. Therefore, identif i ra + ilu x t c t onal priority does not
imply epistemio priority.
Doxastic priority does not imply epistemio priority -
that belief in the existenoe of Ys requires belief in the exis-
tence of Xs does not entail that knowledge that Ys exist re-
quires knowledge that Xs exist. From the doxastic priority
Of Xs all that follows is that, if s knows that Ys exist, he
must believe that Xs exist. The doxastic priority of Xs does
not give us the materials for eliciting that S's belief about
Xs is true or justified.
This same line of reasoning shows that conceptual priority
does not imply epistemio priority. The best argument in favor
of the implication fails i Knowledge requires judgment and judg-
ment requires the use of concepts. Hence, if you could not
use various concepts unless you could use X-concepts, you could
not make the various, corresponding judgments or knowledge-
claims unless you could make judgments about Xs, and so could
not know that the various things in question existed unless
you knew that Xs existed. The final inference is fallacious,
what follows is only that you could not know that the various
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things in question (Ysl t
about X . judgmentss. Knowledge ig not required.
And again, by parity of reasoning, conceptual priority
oes not i„piy doxastic priority. Por suppose that grasping
the concept X is required for grasoin^ tap g he concept Y. Then,
supposing that belief rennir.«e,quires the use of concepts, believing
Ys exist requires understanding the concept Y. (Even this
IS unwarranted, as the coextensionality argument shows.) By
transitivity of implication, all we can deduce is that believing
that Ys exist requires understanding the concept X - belief
that Xs exist is not required.
Since belief is "weaker" than knowledge, one may have
anticipated the failure of doxastic priority to imply epistemic
priority. But it may be surDrisins- to o>ij taurprising observe that the con-
verse entailment does not hold either. Even though knowledge
implies belief, from the premise that knowing that Ys exist
requires knowing that Xs exist, we cannot conclude that be-
neving that Ys exist requires believing that Xs exist. Know-
ing p entails knowing q is not equivalent to knowing that p
entails q. The latter -- Kfo entaiic- n't • • c^vp ails q) — conjoined with
the assumption that p is known, entails that q is known.
^
And K(p entails q) obviously entails B(p entails q) - where
B is the belief operator - which if conjoined with Bp, entails
Bq (where we are dealing with minimally rational belief). So
if S knows that p entails q, then p is doxastically prior to
q. But epistemic priority asserts that S’s knowing p entails
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Knowing which does not entail that s Known that p en-taUs q. And there are no other grounds for getting from
epistemic to doxastic priority.
What about inferences to ontological priority? Epistemic
priority does not imply ontological priority. For example, a
person could not Know subatomic particles existed unless he
Knew that macro-objects existed, but the existence of subatomic
particles does not depend on the existence of macro-objects.
Nor does identificational priority imply ontological pri-
ority. we can infer from the fact that the identif iability
Of Ys depends on reference to Xs. that such identif iability
depends on the existence of Xs only if we add the premise that
we can refer to Xs only if Xs exist. But as above, the addi-
tional premise is false.
Finally, the thrust of very many of my arguments in chap-
ters II and III was to show that conceptual priority does not
imply ontological priority.
The above ten entailment-failures are the crucial ones.
I have shown that identificational priority does not imply
conceptual, epistemic. or ontological priority. So. for example.
It IS uninteresting to our enterprise whether conceptual
priority implies identificational priority, since nothing of
interest follows from identificational priority. And other
inference-forms, even if valid, would be useless in establishing
the kind of existential conclusions we are seeking. For example,
it is clear that neither doxastic. epistemic. nor experiential
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priority is implied by ontological priority, but even if they
were, they would be for us impotent forms of reasoning.
In this section I have argued that a central method of
metaphysical reasoning, cross-categorial priority arguments,
i. defective. If the argument is sound, then certain versions
Of transcendental arguments ought to be abandoned. I stress
•oertain versions' because I am not disposed to a conclusion
of despair. Rather. I await consideration of what Kant thought
he was up to. because I think that he was up to none of these
things, but things much better.
V
If a Kantian transcendental argument is to refute skep-
ticism on its own terms, then, trivially, it must minimally
use premises whose truth is acknowledged by the skeptic. So
if the skeptic acknowledges his consciousness of a succession
of diverse perceptions, but. noting the logical gap between
the character of this accepted evidence and the character of
external continuants, refuses to acknowledge knowledge of
objective particulars, a successful refutation may perhaps
begin with the fact of consciousness. But if transcendental
principles are deducible from the fact of consciousness as
well as the fact of empirical knowledge of objective parti-
culars. then they cannot be definitive or criteriological
marks of objective particularity. We are faced with the
following dilemma* If transcendental principles are deducible
20 ?
from the fact of Humean experience then tthey cannot be used
o
-Ke out the Objective particular-subjective state dis-t-otion. if transcendental principles are not deducible
fact Of Humean experience, but only from the fact
not refuted.
Lotting p be the class of subjective propositions, Q
the Class Of corresponding objective propositions, and R the
class Of transcendental propositions, we may extend this
problem by arguing that the overall strategy of transcendental
arguments would seem to have to be one of the following:
(1) P entails Q, which in turn entails R, (2) p entails R,
Which in turn entails Q, (3) q entaiic p u • u •KJJ y ls R, which in turn en-
tails P, (4) Q entails P, which in turn entails R; (5) r
entails P, which in turn entails Q, or (6) r entails Q, which
in turn entails P. Now (5) and (6) may be rejected out of
hand. Transcendental propositions are not proved on them at
all. ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) may also be summarily rejected. Not only
do they assume something which the skeptic denies, but even
the transcendentalist is not prepared to say which set of
particular claims concerning objective particulars is true.
For several reasons, (1) and (2) are also unacceptable.
On both, P entails Q. But if we could show that the truth
of particular objective knowledge-claims is deducible from
corresponding claims about subjective consciousness, then we
would have a method which, far more powerful than transcenden-
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tails. presu..s to b,. could answer another sKeptieal question
Of how, at any given ti.e, we know which perceptions, if any
are veridical, and which illusory. Further, since Q dearly
entails R - if „e know particular claims about objective
particulars to be true, we know that there are objective par-
ticulars -- a method which allowed derivations of Q-proposi-
tions from P-propositions would render a transcendental method
superfluous. Further. (2) must be rejected on the grounds
that, as will be elaborated later, particular empirical state-
-nts are not deducible from transcendental principles. Finally,
to reintroduce one horn of the original dilemma, if (1) is
correct, the subjective state-objective particular distinction
via transcendental principles suffers obliteration.
(l)-( 6 ) oversimplified the alternatives. Perhaps we can
preserve the test of objectivity by holding that Q entails R
but P does not. But if P does not entail R, given that it
does not entail Q, „* have failed to answer the skeptic. To
refute skepticism and preserve obvious truths (such as the
inferrabillty of 's knows that something is ?• from 's knows
that the objective particular, a. is F'), the transcendental
method must countenance the following logical relations
i
P entails R, Q entails R, P does not entail Q, R does not
entail Q, R does not entail P, it is optional to permit that
Q entails P. This handles all of the above objections except
that transcendental principles cannot provide criteria of
objectivity. But is this a worrisome objection?
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I think not. I take it to be a fundamental tenet of
Kantian philosophy that both states of objects and states
Of persons are parts of the same natural order, and that
transcendental conditions of knowledge, therefore, do not
accord privileged status to either type of state. There
could be justified knowledge-claims about neither objective
particulars nor mental states of persons unless transcenden-
principles were true. So I suggest that conformity to
rules Of synthesis, reproduction of the diverse contents of
consciousness according to rules, does not distinguish know-
ledge of the external world from knowledge of our inner
experiences.
A brief excursion into Wolffs interpretation of Kant in
his Kanfs Th^ of Mental Act ivity will help clarify the
objection and my response to it.^ on Wolffs view, all con-
sciousness has synthetic unity, all the changing contents of
consciousness are united as my thoughts. This unity is acquired
as the result of (and presumably only in virtue of) a certain
activity or operation called
-synthesis,' which organizes
our perceptions in rule-governed ways. There exists an order
of representations qua mental contents or immediate objects
of consciousness. This is the subjective time-order and is
part of the mental history of an individual. Synthesizing
these representations, reproducing them according to rules,
produces an order of representations qua representations
(signifying something other than themselves), which is necessary
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and so, sine, nscsssity of oonnoction. ordsr or organization
ts dofinitiv. Of
.Objectivity., objective.
.Connection in
the Object, therefore means
.connection of the contents of
consciousness qua representations.. Therefore, the very
synthetic activity which produces th- unitv of on <uu.. y consciousness
produces the objective realm,
NOW Wolff hoias that conformity to rule-governed ways
Of organizing perceptions, which are the categories (or equi-
valently for him, the categorial principles), provides a way
to distinguish necessary connection or objectivity from sub-
jective association or subjectivity, in terms immanent to
experience. Thus he seems to be supporting the view I am
trying to reject, that transcendental principles provide cri-
teria Of Objectivity. But this is a confusion, the view
Wolff. 3 interpretation supports is different from the view I
want to reject. The source of difference lies in the meaning
Of * objectivity.
’
If
.empirical knowledge, means
.empirical knowledge of
objective particulars., and "objectivity, means "physical
objectivity," then to argue that transcendental principles
provide criteria of objective knowledge is to argue that all
and only (justified) knowledge-claims about objective parti-
culars satsify those principles. But this view is both false
and un-Kantian. For example, consider the conditional cate-
gorial principle of causality that every objective happening
follows from some precedent occurrence in a lawlike manner.
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fiv^ry mental event, as well as every physical event, must
satisfy this principle. On the interpretation under consider-
ation. this would not be so. a + * ^’ judfpnent, a judgment
a out a sense impression, unlike an objective judgment which
makes reference to an objective particular, cannot conform to
cat-gories. and so cannot conform to the catee-orv n-reg y of succession
mg to a rule. But after all. the entire thrust of
Kanfs anti-Cartesian program is to show that the contents
Of consciousness are not better known than the fact that ob-
jective particulars exist. To require satisfaction of an
additional, special condition to move from subjective awareness
to Physical Objectivity flies in the face of this enterprise.
3
Wolffs view, however, does not suffer from this defect.
Since he holds that the synthetic unity which confers objec-
tivity IS the act of judgment or cognition, at bottom he holds
that all judgments conform to categories. Sven organized sub-
jective experiences have objectivity. And this is how it
should be. Suppose I want to talk about my mental contents,
which are themselves representations. To do so I must judge
about them by means of other representations. But this talk
perfectly objective. All judgments are representations of
representations. Whether the subject-representation represents
something mental or physical is irrelevant to the question at
hand. The Kantian view is that all experience, whether part
of systematic doctrine or not. whether purported experience of
the outer or the inner, conforms to the true transcendental
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principles. Wolffs interpretation supports this view.^
Having discovered the objection that transcendental
prrnctples cannot provide criteria of objectivity to be faulty.
reaffirm the need to accept the following logical rela-
tions. subjective propositions entail transcendental propo-
sitions, Objective propositions entail transcendental propo-
sitions, subjective propositions do not entail objective pro-
positions, transcendental propositions do not entail either
subjective or objective propositions.
we Should also repeat that the transcendental proposition
in question here is the proposition that objective particulars
exist, not. in departure from the prevalent goal of Kantian
advocates, that we must be able to use concepts of objective
particulars. We wish to argue that in order to have experience,
objective particulars must exist, but it is not the case that
the experiencer must have or have had knowledge that any spe-
cific objective particulars exist or have existed. A transcen-
dental argument will attempt to show that all experience,
inner or outer, must take place in a world of objective par-
ticulars. It does not show that each experiencer must have
the concept 'objective particular.' which he uses in making
specific, true, justified knowledge-claims about the external
world. The strategy is to show that while the skeptic may
play his game, his activity implies that there are objective
particulars, and. consequently, implies that his position is
mistaken.
VI
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we distinguished the classes of subjective (claims about
one's particular subjective states), objective (claims about
specific Objective particulars), and transcendental proposi-
tions — in the present case, the proposition that objective
particulars exist. Now let the class of
• acknowledged pro-
positions contain exactly those claims in fact accepted by
both skeptic and transcendentalist. Let the class of 'irre-
levant' propositions contain all those propositions rejected
by both skeptic and transcendentalist, and all, if any, re-
jected by the transcendentalist but accepted by the skeptic,
and nothing else. Let the class of 'contested' propositions
contain just those claims in fact rejected by the skeptic
but accepted by the transcendentalist. I use 'reject' as
meaning 'deny or withhold.' and not so that rejecting a pro-
position entails accepting the negation of that proposition,
otherwise, rejected propositions would be contested. And let
claos of privileged' propositions contain all and only
those claims which must be true if anyone is to enter into
discourse or debate.
The class of subjective propositions is identical with
the class of acknowledged propositions. The class of objec-
tive propositions is either a subset of the class of irrele-
vant propositions or a proper subset of the class of contested
propositions, depending on whether or not the transcendentalist
happens to reject the view that we can sometimes know, at a
given time, that our perception is veridical at that time.
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The anti-skeptical transcendental proposition •
^
.
IS a member of
class Of contested propositions.
To refute the skeptic, we cannot assume what he denies,
enoe, no contested proposition may appear as a n • •
'
<=^ pea premise in a
anscendental argument. But is it enough to assume only
what the skeptic accen+c!'? t
,
. ^ ,
p • Is an argument with only acknow-
edged (and, perversely, irrelevant) propositi o
.
’ ti ns as premises
^
ficient to refute skepticism. If we show that something
e okeptic accepts entails something he denies, we show heholds inconsistent beliefss. But unless we enjoy the felici-
tous Situation in which the very position we wish to refute
asserts the truth of what he accepts and the falsity of what
he contests, our argument would merely he ad hominem. and
would not conclusively refute the skeptical thesis itself.
The skeptical position of the Cartesian-Humean idealist
happens to he of the felicitous sort. It states that we know
with certainty the truth of various subjective propositions,
but cannot know with certainty that objective particulars
exist. TO deduce the existence of objective particulars from
our knowledge of our inner states therefore refutes this posi-
tion. It does not. howpvQr* u
, n ever, establish our certain knowledge
Of the external world unless it is true that our claims about
our particular subjective states are certainties. Consequently,
If we wish to establish the certainty of the non-conditional
transcendental proposition that objective particulars exist,
our refutation of Cartesianisra suffices if, and only if, the
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acknowledged premises used are certainties as weil. Now
class of privileged propositions is a subset of the class
certainties. Therefore, if the premises of our argument
privileged, the argument establishes the certainty of the
the
of
are
existential, transcendental principle.
Notice that I said that valid inferences from privileged
P ise sets are sufficient proofs of certainty. I did not
say they were necessary, and if there are certainties which
are not privileged, they are not necessary. There are non-
privileged certainties, such as Descartes’ cogito
. The pro-
position that I am thinking is irrevisable for me whenever I
affirm it. At no iater time can I have reason to doubt (dis-
believe or withhold) the proposition that I am thinking, for
whenever I consider a reason, I am doing some considering, and
since considering is a species of thinking, any such putative
doubt-maker wouid self-destruct. And as regards thinking that
was thinking at an earlier time, that is, remembering, the
proposition to be assessed — that I was thinking then — is
different from the original proposition, and so the dubitability
of the former fails to impugn the acceptance-value of the latter.
Therefore, that I am thinking is a certainty for me. But it
is not a privileged proposition. It is not the case that *I
am thinking’ must be true if anyone is to enter into discourse
or debate.
It does turn out, however, that transcendental proposi-
tions are privileged. So we must stipulate that those pri-
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vileged propositions which are transcendental cannot appear
arsons the premises of a transcendental argument, otherwise
not only would we heg the question, hut if our transcendentll
arguments always included transcendental premises, then, if
a transcendental proposition always requires a deduction, a
VICIOUS regress is generated.
the view I shall pursue, transcendental principles
are principles which purport to be true of the actual world
and can be known to be true in =iio all possible worlds in which
judgment occurs. And so it is natural to suppose that the
transcendental procedure begins from the fact that judgment
or thinking occurs and deduces the truth of the transcendental
principle. But this poses a technical difficulty, given my
definitions. The proposition that judgment occurs (that some-
body or other is judging) is not only a privileged proposition -
it must be true if anyone is to enter into discourse or debate -
but is a transcendental proposition as well, since it purports
to be true of the actual world and can be known to be true in
all possible worlds in which judgment occurs.
In response, we may simply decide to say that it is the
anti-skeptical transcendental proposition which is contested
and so cannot be assumed, and allow that there are other tran-
scendental propositions, such as that judgment occurs, which
the skeptic accepts, and so can be used without begging any
questions. Or we could simply amend our definitions to obviate
the difficulty. But it so happens that there is a way out
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with preservation of rirpc.pn+ u-machinery. Privileged proposi-lons have this peculiar feature that, for those of existential
orm, their existential instantiations are not privileged,
although they may still be certain qn -p
.
. So. for example, while
the proposition that somebody or other ^ •y judging is privileged.
shown, the proposition that I am judging is not privi-
leged but IS still certain, as was shown. So since all tran-
scendental propositions are privileged, the proposition that
I am judging is not transcendental. Yet that proposition will
serve as well as its existential generalization as premise of
our transcendental argument.
5
Two points Should be noted concerning my characterization
Of transcendental principles. First. I claim they are true
in any world in which an^ kind of judgment occurs, I do not
restrict my claim by saying they are true only in worlds in
which non-analytic judgment occurs. All judgment, whether
analytic or synthetic in its logical form, is nevertheless
3.ynthetio activity. Further, not all judgments could be ana-
lytic, since not every judgment could be a rule of descriptive
meaning. If there are rules of descriptive meaning, some
judgments must have descriptive meaning, and hence be non-
analytic. Therefore, there is no possible world in which
there are only analytic judgments.
Second, I claim that transcendental propositions are
true in any world in which any kind of judgment occurs, I do
not say 'any world in which judgment is possible.' To say
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that someone has a capability for judging but never exercises
that capability - unlike someone who has a capability for
eating fifteen pancakes but never exercies that capability -
seems nonsensical to me. it makes sense only in a situation
Where, for example, a baby is born unconscious and remains
comatose for a long while, we might wish to suggest that when
his physical affliction is removed, he will gain consciousness.
But if this is the sense of
-possibility of judging,- then
it is an insufficient starting-point for a transcendental
argument.
so we wish to show that a certain kind of act requires
the existence of a certain kind of object. All consciousness
or judgmental activity takes place in a world of objective
particulars. We do not flout the tradition which says that
nothing will demonstrate necessary existence, that no exis-
tential claims can be necessary, that all necessities are
ultimately conditional, when
-necessity- means
-logical ne-
cessity.- A transcendental argument cannot show principles
to be true in all possible worlds slmpliciter
. But it can
establish a relative, conditional, synthetic necessity —
that a certain concept is instantiated in all possible worlds
in which judgment occurs. If we dispute about the concept,
the concept has reference. If I soliloquize about the concept,
it has reference. Most important, if I talk or think to myself
about anything at all, the concept in question has reference.
The overall structure of a Kantian refutation of epistemo-
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logical solipsis. ia, then, that what the solipsiat aoKnow-
ledges entaila propositions sufficient to support the tran-
scendental propositions he denies, so that what he accepts
entails the transcendental conclusion. To this extent I
agree with BecK-s reading of Kant.^ But Bee. ta.es the starting-
point Of .the refutation to be something merely accepted, but
not certain, what distinguishes our argument from ad homlnem
argument is that all the premises are either analytic or
philosophically certain synthetic propositions.
VII
My partial account of transcendental arguments has rested
on the philosophical demands of the skeptical case. m this
section I want briefly to trace some textual confirmation of
this account.
As is well known, transcendental truths are supposed to
be a priori synthetic truths. The peculiarity of synthetic
propositions, knowable a priori. Is that their truth value
can be determined independently of experience even though
they tell us something about the world. A priori synthetic
truths are truths which can be established conclusively despite
the fact that formal logic and semantics are insufficient and
particular obsorvations are not necessary to do so. Appeal
to particular facts of experience or observational procedures
IS not needed for the verification of propositions knowable
a priori. But for necessary propositions, which tell us how
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the woria b.. ve.incation appeal to observations isnot Eossi^. £, understanhing of the terms, all Know-
ahle necessities are
.nowable
, eiI^. ^ But it does not follow
rora the fact that a proposition is knowahle a priori that it
IS necessary. if
-necessary means
-logically necessary,
-
then to deny this last claim is to affirm the impossibility
Of logically contingent a Eriori knowledge, and so to give' up
"th© Kantian ©nterprig©,
seen another way. if
-necessary- means
-logically neces-
sary.- then, on Kanfs official view at least, synthetic ne-
cessities would be impossible. i„ all analytic propositions,
the concept of the subject contains the concept of the predicate
or the c^plement of the predicate, s contains P if and only
If
-noti-a £)• is a contradiction {if -3 is P- is explicitly
analytic) or is reducible to a contradiction by intersubstitu-
tion Of definitional equivalents (if
-s is P- is implicitly
analytic ).i0 A proposition is synthetic if and only if it is
not analytic. Hence, a synthetic necessity would be a logical
truth Whose contradictory is consistent. But this is impossible.
Since, as we have introduced the notions, the synthetic and
the logically contingent coincide, the impossibility was to
be expected.
Also, as we have introduced the notions, and as Kant rightly
saw, no synthetic proposition is derivable from exclusively
analytic propositions. ^2 follows: A
tautology is a propositional function which is true for all
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.. «.l,.lo „„u„ „ 1.
Stitution. As we said, a proposition is synthetic just in
case it is non-analytio. Now suppose that p entails q andthat p rs a tautology, since p is a tautology, not-p is a
contradiction, if not-p is a contradiction, then, since any-
thing follows fron. a contradiction, not-p entails q. Contra-
posing. not-q entails p. Contraposing our initial assumption,
not-q entails not-p. Therefore, not-q entails p and not-p.
Since Whatever entails a contradiction is a contradiction,
not-q is contradictory. But if not-q is contradictory, q is
a tautology. Therefore, if p entails q and p is a tautology,
q is a tautology. since analytic propositions are tautology-
derivable. but no non-analytio proposition is tautology-deri-
vable, no synthetic propositions are derivable from analytic
propositions alone. But since the denial of epistemological
solipsism is a synthetic proposition, one stricture we can
place on its proof is that at least one of its supportive
premises must be non-analytic
, that is, synthetic.
I raise these terminological questions in an effort to
align orthodox Kantian doctrine with my partial account of it
in sections V and VI. Specifically, I urge that there are
useful and legitimate senses of
-necessary such that neces-
sary propositions in those senses are deducible without com-
mission of modal fallacy from premise-sets some of whose members,
though knowable with certainty, are not necessary in any of
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those senses. A conclusion can only be as certain as its
least certain promise. But the situations are different for
the alethic and variants of non-alethic modalities.
Formally, a necessary conclusion may follow from premises
some of which are non-necessary
— for example, if p, then
necessaruy q, p, therefore, necessarily q. This argument-
form IS valid, and an instance of it may even be sound. But
It appears to be question-begging, since one could not know
the first premise without first knowing the conclusion. More
radically, since a necessary truth follows from anything or
nothing, we may with formal propriety produce arguments none
of whose premises are either necessary or true, or arguments
Whose premise-sets are null. But this is not a satisfactory
way to refute an opponent.
All this is true for strong (S5) modal logic (where the
alternativeness relation is an equivalence relation - tran-
sitive, symmetric, and reflexive - and so) where every possible
world must be taken account of. Synthetic necessity is truth
in all possible worlds in which synthetic activity occurs.
Like epistemic, doxastic and other non-alethic modal notions,
its domain is a proper subset of the set of all possible worlds.
Consequently, if we have available the non-necessary but
certain premise that synthetic activity is occurring (in our
world), we are in a position to deduce synthetic necessities.
If so, we will have deduced necessities from non-necessities,
though certainties from certainties. In these circumstances,
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«e Will have produced an argument which satisfies all of the
procedural assumptions adopted in chapter I. section IV.
With this, we have the form of an answer to the Humean
attack on a Ejlori propositions of philosophy, A proposition
can only he verified by reflecting on concepts or by recourse
to observation. Philosophical principles can be verified in
neither of these ways. Therefore, philosophical principles
are unverif iable
. why should we accept the first premise?
It is analytic only if .going beyond concepts- is synonymous
with
-having recourse to observation.- And if it is not analy-
tic. then, if it is a priori, it is synthetic a priori and
the skeptic turns dogmatist. The Kantian answer is that it
IS not analytically true, it is false. We can verify philo-
sophical principles by appeal to the logically contingent,
but not inductive nor essentially
-introspective fact that
conscious activity is occurring,
In general, then, transcendental method begins with the
act of judgmental consciousness and logically deduces the fact
that certain a pr i ori concepts are instantiated
. In particular,
we are trying to produce such a deduction for the concept
'objective particular.’ The emphasis on the fact of conscious
activity as premise, and existential proposition as conclusion,
are both unusual. Yet consideration of some of Kant's crucial
claims supports my emphasis. As my foremost concern remains
philosophical, I do not intend my exegesis to be decisive
or exhaustive.
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At the opening of the
-Analytic of Concepts- in the
SEiMaue Of Pure ReMon Kant says two very important things.
analysis, or tL°procedu?e^usLl°in°4“i'’'^’^®J^”^
vestigations, that of disLctina
"" P*'"l°®°Phioal in-
ooncepts as may present themLlves!^ anrsrof°rthem more distinct: hut +ha tn’+K rendering
dissection of +ho g, j-therto rarely attempted
TT; n^i.I7?B^l,g^„4^ understanding itself,
a priori by iSokini ?or a°hcepts
as their birthplacf and^bv understanding alone,
this facultt This’iT^o^ analysing the pure use of
philosophy, anything beyond thirtelongfto altreatment of concepts /n philosoph^ln^^e^ra^! (bIo!?!)
absolute understInd?ng':?L\'?ran’
c%°^o L^Lt4d-^g^“fo^e^%-o^cV:r^rr
to assign its^oroupr^ which we are enabled
understanding, and by which we can ^Lm^nf^^ an Tmanner their systematic completeness. (B92) ~
The first passage states that transcendental philosophy at-
tempts to elicit the analytic implications of the use of the
•faculty of the understanding,* that is, the operation of
judging, and does not proceed by articulating the constituent
elements of any conceptual content. That the understanding
is the use of concepts, and that 'the only use which the
understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means
of them* (B93) is unequivocal throughout Kant. Further, in
analyzing the pure use of understanding we consider only what
follows from the occurrence of the act of thinking or judging
in general, and not what additional conditions must obtain if
particular acts of representation are to take place (vis a vis
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their particular representative function).
The second passage reaffirms this truth, adding that
since I a. the Judger who does all fudging, so that there
IS a self
-reflexiveness about my analytical enterprise I
can expect a systematic interconnection between, and a com-
pleteness about, the various implications of the fact of
judgmental consciousness. This interpretation also makes
sense of Kanfs claim that only one proof can be given for
each transcendental principle. (B8I5-8I6) Our starting-
point is always the same, and is the only logically synthetic
prGinis© in thG proof.
Another very important statement to study is Kanfs as-
sertion that a transcendental argument must show
-how subjective
conditions of thought can have ob.jectlve validity
. • (B122)
In the very next sentence ('For appearances can certainly
be given in intuition independently of functions of the under-
standing. • ) Kant appears to countenance the existence of non-
judgmental consciousness which would be possible even if ob-
jective particulars did not exist. But this appearance is
illusory. Inspection will reveal that the sentence functions
dialectically. Kant means to say that it is not obvious that
mere sense consciousness requires thinking — which has its
own requirements in turn, among which is the existence of
objective particulars — but it does. The subsequent argumen-
tat ion boars this out,
Kant's quGstion is how subjoctivo conditions of thought
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can have objective validity, it ie not how subjective judg-
ments can be verified. Again, he is not anxious to provide
criteria for distinguishing truth from falsity in everyday
empirical judgments. I'* The conditions of thought, the concepts
indispensable to all judging, must be shown to be objectively
valid, that is, to be instantiated. It is not the case that
each judgment requires the use of objectivity concepts -
where objectivity is contrasted with subjectivity, not in the
sense in which all judging is objective, the sense of 'object-
employed by Wolff, and used in noteworthy statements such as
that 'the a Erl ori conditions of a possible experience in
general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of
objects of experience.' (B197)^5 What is meant is that no
judging could occur at all unless the concept of an object
were instantiated.
I confess that I am taking an unequivocal stand on an
equivocal issue. Sometimes Kant identifies the objective
validity of a concept with its having sense or meaning, as
in BI95 . We saw that those taking the Wittgensteinian variant
of the linguistic turn subscribe to this interpretation. For
them, to say that the possibility of experience is what gives
objective validity to a concept is to say that concepts are
meaningful only if there are empirical criteria for their
application.
A second textually supported reading identifies 'objective
validity* with 'necessary universality (for everybody),* validity
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which is not restricted to the state of , k-
, .
subject at a parti-
cular time. My judgment is objectively valid if-Lvt-j-y I everyone else
also always connects his perceptions in the same way under the
same circumstances. The
'operational' definition of 'objec-
tive validity employed by transcendental phenomenologists
such as Muck is similar to this universality one.l?
But can this be a definition of 'objective validity',
specifically, can universal interpretation of perceptions be
a necessary condition of objective validity? Objectively
valid judgments can withstand no breach of consensus? This
view is too strong, as is Mahaffy's view that 'objectively
valid' means 'necessary for all cognition of objects,' in
consequence of which, no empirical concepts can have objec-
tive validity, which is flagrantly unKantian.^®
Further, universal interpretation is insufficient for
j ctive validity as well, if we had accepted the doctrine
of transcendental idealism, our indispensable beliefs would
be regarded as true. But we rejected that doctrine in chapter
I. In fact, in chapter II we even rejected the inference
from indispensability to justifiability
.
The remaining textually supported view is that objective
validity is truth (of a principle) or reference (of a concept).
Kant affirms this equivalence at B8l6, where he is explicitly
focussing attention on the nature of transcendental proof.
He aloO seems to employ this sense in the discussion immediately
subsequent to his characterization of transcendental arguments
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as establishing (and/or explaining) the objective validity
Of subjective conditions of thought. (BI22-123, And in the
SEitiaue-s
-General Note on the Syste. of the Principles.-
Kant says that objective validity can be established only by
appeal to out^ intuitions. (B291) Also, in a note to Bxxvi
he contends that the objective validity of a concept is its
real, and not merely its logical, possibility. But if real
possibility is coextensive with existence, as argued in
-Pos-
tulates of Empirical Thought,- then objective validity is
reference
.
The evidence for the favored interpretation is vitiated
If
-truth- means something like
-coherence- for Kant, as many
hold. Yet at B82 he says.
-... truth.
.. is the agreement of
knowledge with its object- ,2° at B197,
-...truth, that is.
agreement with the object- j and at B670,
-...to truth, that
IS, to conformity of our concepts with the object... -21 These
statements of a correspondence theory of truth are not decisive,
however, since if a Wolffian view on which an object is analysed
as a
-that which- is correct, conformity of concept to object
is conformity between concepts.
For well-rehearsed reasons, a coherence view, as expressed
clearly by people such as Neurath, is unacceptable
.
only does coherence fail to differentiate between entrenched
myth and scientific system, but the choice between any in-
dividually coherent but jointly incompatible systems is always
arbitrary. If maximal consistency is truth, then why should
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.n. the conceptual f.a.eworh endorsed in Critl^
.ndrspensahle,23
^ut the best reason to accept the corres-
pondence interpretation is that the sKeptical position is
t plausible on itj hence, a refutation of skepticism em-
Ploying the correspondence interpretation is strongest. More
bluntly, the final authorization of my interpretation is its
consistency with the demands of an adequate anti-skeptical
theory. None of the alternative interpretations suggested
fulfill this minimal requirement.
VIII
In the next four sections 1 want to survey some accounts
of transcendental method, most of which differ in important
ways from those already criticized. I hope to reinforce and
further develop my positive account of transcendental argument
by criticism of these defective alternatives.
The first account to be described has already been rejected
as useless to the anti-skeptical task. Despite its obvious
uselessness, it is widely favored. In fact, the identification
of transcendental method with analytic epistemology is the
preponderant Anglo-American view. For example, according to
Milmed, transcendental principles are deducible from the nature
of empirical knowledge
. They are true of all our empirical
knowledge because they are true of all possible empirical
knowledge, by definition of 'empirical knowledge.' It is a
supplementary
, synthetic premise of a transcendental argument
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that our definition of
.eMpirioal knowledge, is not vacuous,
but has application. The categories cannot be applicable to
all contents of consciousness, it is violation of categorial
principles which characterizes Illusion. dreaMng. and so on.
In his book on Kant, Korner opts for a similar view.^?
Judgment is unification of diverse representations. Objec-
tive, empirical judgment and subjective, empirical judgment
differ in that the objective refers to an object and not
merely to a subjective impression, and the objective, if true,
is true for everybody, regardless of his particular state.
Korner rightly notes that neither the content of. nor the
temporal relations among, the percipient- judger' s perceptions
can be the basis of objective reference and general validity,
since these features are shared by subjective and objective
judgment alike. The resolution is that objectivity is contri-
buted by the objective judgment itself, by the way in which
It further unifies representations already unified in the
empirical concepts of the subjective judgment. These further
concepts are rules governing the connection of the particular
concepts of the subjective judgment, and hence concern the
logical form of judgment. These rules or ways of conferring
objectivity are the categories, and the propositions which
stats their necessity for making empirical knowledge-claims
about objects are categorial principles.
It does not follow from the above that any of the objec-
tive judgments we make are true, that any pure concepts apply
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to anything. Korner's Kant secures objective reference by
appeal to the Copernican revolutionary interpretation of tran-
soenbental iiealis. - objects are „ade to conform to concepts
and not conversely. HintiKka insists on this interpretation
Of Kant in which
-genuine knowledge is maker's knowledge.- and
•reason has insight only into that which it produces after a
plan Of its own.-26.Bossart and others sanction this view also.27
On this view, transcendental idealism entails the collapse
Of the mental content-independent reality gap. and so the
belief-actuality gap. if transcendental idealism is true,
then subjective conditions of thought, concepts indispensable
to thinking, are objectively valid. No transcendental argument
would be needed. But such idealism seems acutely inadequate
to cope with the problem of the role of the given in knowledge.
If my categories of thought literally determine what I observe,
then what I observe provides no independent control over my
thought. 28 Further, it provides a redef inition-cum-resolution
of the skeptical problem rather than a direct solution on the
skeptic
-s own terms; and we agreed to seek a method which at-
tempts to refute skepticism rather than condemn it as misguided.
In addition to Milmed and Korner. Allison.
.Kalin. Meer-
bote. Machina. Crawford. Dryer. Bartley. Sellars and many
others have argued that Kant-s trancendental principles are
analytic implications of the concept of empirical knowledge,
and are not deducible from Humean consciousness. ^9 Allison
argUGs "that "th© principlGs ar© "thG necessary conditions for
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experiencing a public, spatiotemporal world distinguishable
f-. the self and its ideas, we can define
.objectivity, only
in terms of them. Also subscribing to their source in the
human subject, he explains empirical reality by transcendental
Ideality. Crawford characterises the principles as rules for
systematising experience deduced from the nature of scientific
thought. Sellars insists that Kant is not seeking to prove
there is empirical knowledge, but only to articulate the con-
cept of empirical knowledge. Bartley sees Kant.s problem as
providing a tenable theory of learning, granted that knowledge
exists. Meerbote says that Kant intends to explain certain
features of the concept of knowledge rather than prove we have
knowledge, he is asking how knowledge is possible, not whether
we have it. And so on.
I have no doubt that these interpretations are exegeti-
cally sound if based on limited portions of the Kantian texts.
In the Prolegomena Kant is explicit that only objectively
valid consciousness or judgment may be called
.experience,,
that the mere comparison and connection of perceptions in
judgments is insufficient for experience. 3° in the Critinue
M Judgment Kant describes transcendental principles as stating
universal conditions under which things can become objects
of our knowledge. 31 And frequently in the Critique ^ Pure
Reason, where Kant regularly says that transcendental proposi-
tions are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience
(or a possible experience in general), he identifies experience
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with empirical knowledge.
so undoubtedly KanVs an,u.ent 30.eti.es runs: it there
all
particulars about which we have knowledge, theyU have qualities of so.e intensity, they are extended and
ratable in space, the event of the changing of their quali-ties or states presupposes some preceding event upon which itfollows in a lawlike manner, they persist through changes,
they are all part of one spatiotemporal system and so are in-
terrelatable. and however remotely, they interact with one
articulating the structure of knowledge of objects and is not
addressing himself to the epistemological solipsist's challenge.
If he adds to the anteoent. 'and there are objective particulars
about Which he have knowledge.' he has begged the skeptical
f If experience* means something like
•experiential knowledge of relatively permanent, law-governed
Objects.' or 'discursive knowledge of spatiotemporally-ooordi-
nated objects.' Kant fails to answer the skeptic, since I
believe that in the first Critique Kant is sometimes concerned
to refute the skeptical thesis, concerned with the actuality
of transcendental knowledge and not its mere possibility, this
strain of thought is of no use to me. And it is only a strain
Of thought, not to be confused with a more far-reaching method.
IX
A cluster of wrongheaded theoretical requirements is exhibited
234
in the following remarks by Walshs
If a transcendental proof is to •
conclusion, it is not only requlrirtha^ ? ''®cessaryfrom an unshakeable facts we miic;+ -p should start
specify the single condition T ^e able to
make the fact possible! We must^®in°nth°"'^“^°'’®a position to say that onlv if =’ words, be in
true can we have the fa?t^s-^e havrti"quires two other things T?i>^a+
start be in possession or we should from the
sibilitierto bfconsidered ''?ha^i®-® pol-tive set of hypotheses Second exhaus-to rule out all oflhlie hvcn^^I t'® able
out of court, and to show that
except one definitively
self-consistent?32 ^ remaining one is
^
Walsh goes on to characterise his "unshakeable.' premise as one
for which the supporting evidence is 'so abundant that there
is no Eractical likelih^ of our being wrong- about it. 33 it
is not a philosophical certainty, m fact, the transcendental
conclusion itself enjoys the suggested epistemic status as
evidently as any other candidate proposition, so that argument
to such a conclusion would be otiose. But let us shelve this
concern and turn to a more important one.
To show that a certain proposition is true only if another
IS true, all we must do is deduce the latter from the former.
Walsh's talk of uniqueness is entirely misleading. He has
confused the hypothetico-deductive method with deduction. We
are not (and need not be) beginning with some phenomena and
standing conditions and trying to pick the best or only ade-
quate hypothesis from a finite set of alternatives. We could
never have such a complete set since there are an indefinite
number of sufficient conditions for any fact. All that can
be required, and all that a transcendental proof intends to
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.
-rom another, certainly true proposition.
Korner. Kekes. and Ledger Wood are guilty of similar
confusion. Korner sets up his attach on the possihility of
ranscendental deduction as follows: Statements about a regionOf experience presuppose we have the means of differentiating
in that experience between objects and their properties
and relations
- having a method of differentiation. Such a
-thod belongs to a categorial scheme if and only if among the
concepts exhibited by the scheme are some which are constitu-
tive Of. that is tell us what is to count as. an object of
experience, and some which are individuating for those objects,
that IS tells us the criteria by which in general one object
is to be distinguished from another. A scheme is established
(or has application) when it is shown that a method of prior
differentiation belongs to it. when (i) there is a non-empty
attribute P such that
-x is an object of (a region of) experi-
ence- entails and is entailed by
-x is P- (condition of com-
prehensive applicability), and (ii) there is a non-empty attri-
bute Q which IS applicable to every object of the region, and
•x is an Object of the region and x is a Q- entails and is
entailed by
-x is a distinct object of the region.' A tran-
scendental deduction elicits the conceptual scheme presupposed
by our statements about experience
.
If one could validly argue that a certain categorial
scheme is necessary in that no thought or discourse which does
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not fit into this scheme is possiblpe, then one could conclude
that the necessary conditions for the applicability of this
scheme are necessary conditions for all thought. Korner dis-
this strategy. Sometimes he discounts it on the grounds
that an unattainable enumeration of all possible schemes is
required.. But this rests on the confusion of hypothetico-
deductive and transcendental methods. At other times he dis-
counts it on the grounds that a multiplicity of consistent
schemes adequate for the empirical differentiation of reality
are possible, even actually available. He argues that theq ness of the favored scheme cannot be established through
comparison with undifferentiated experience, nor through com-
parison with alternative competitors to see they are lacking.
The first suggestion is incoherent; the description of the
second suggestion shows that uniqueness fails to hold. He
-oncludes that the only legitimate claim involved in the unique-
ness claim is that alternatives to the scheme we are actually
employing are not statable once we have adopted the scheme.
So it seems that we can attach no meaning to the question
whether we have to be in the scheme in the first place, which
IS the question a uniqueness argument would have to answer,
according to Korner. 35
The second horn of Korner* s dilemma, that exposure of
defective alternatives precludes uniqueness of the preferred
alternative, can be escaped. Its intended force is reminiscent
of Rorty s complaint that imaginable schemes cannot be shown
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to be impossible. But reductive strate.^e
+V.-
S gi s are not wedded tothe thing reduced. And argument bv pT •y elimination does not en-dorse the things eliminated.
Further. Korner-s positive claim that alternatives to
e scheme in use are unstatable, if the scheme in use is
uniquely adequate, is too strong. Even Strawson, who held
that every possible form of experience is coherently describable
recognized that not every coherently describable form of ex
perience is possible. Analogously, even if every scheme ade-
quate for empirical differentiation is statable, not every
statable scheme is adequate for empirical differentiation
Hence, it is gratuitous to preclude specifications of inadequate
schemes. And this glance back to Strawson reminds us of another
possibility for which Korner's argument fails to account.
namely that the actual use of other schemes requires the prior
acquisition of the favored scheme.
Finally, on Korner's view, the individuals which are the
ontic commitments of formal theories are ideal rather than
empirical individuals. Consequently, even if adoption of the
favored scheme is required by every formal theory, no existen-
tial. anti-skeptical conclusions are forthcoming. Korner's
type Of transcendental argument will not even explain, let
n- establish, the relation between thought and reality. 3^
in several articles, Kekes repeats Korner's mistakes.
meeting the skeptical challenge
is to'how the anti-skeptical propositions derive from a par-
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tioular conceptual system, and then show that the system is
the only possible one. But. according to Kehes, this Kantian
proof of uniqueness and necessity rests on the mistaken belief
that Aristotelian logic. Euclidean geometry, and Newtonian
mechanics are necessarily true. The discovery of propositional
logic, spherical geometry, and quantum mechanics refutes Kanfs
argument. Perhaps Kant misidentif ied the necessary components,
hut there are some. No, it is impossible to show that any
component of any conceptual system is necessary. It can be
Shown that some components are necessary vis-a-vis a particular
system, but not vis-a-vis any system, since this would require
having the unattainable knowledge of all possible systems. 37
The postulational method of science -- postulating inter-
vening variables to explain the character of the output, given
the input -- is the regressive method in Kant. The logical
structurey of the progressive, transcendental method and this
hypothetical method are inverted. Transcendental propositions
are neither empirical hypotheses nor postulational explanations.
So again, the inability to complete an infinite series is
irrelevant.
Kekes* specific criticism of Kant's "uniqueness” proof
is also incorrect. Recall that our transcendental conclusion
has the general force that there is a predicative function,
specified by the analysis of objective particularity, which
is satisfied, that a certain, abstractly specified, type of
entity must exist (if we are conscious). What values in the
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domain satisfy the function is left „r,H» -e .IS undecided; what in experi-
ence satisfies the conclusion is left ev,IS iGi an open question. The
argument is intended to encroach minimally on scientific theory
and discovery. No substantive propositions of physics follow
from the conclusion. Generally, transcendental propositions
are not axiomatic, and need have no. non-trivial deductive
consequences, imply' no empirical claims. 38
And so the basic error in the postulationist criticism of
Kant is perhaps best exemplified in yet another proponent.
Swing, Who in his book on transcendental logic, says that the
indispensability of principles cannot be established, since
it is logically impossible to prove the uniqueness of any
postulate. 39 The simple answer to this is that postulational
uniqueness is not indispensability of principle. Indispensable
principles cannot be unique and need not be postulates. They
cannot unique because logically necessary conditions cannot
be unique. They need not be postulates because necessary
conditions of some proposition need not be sufficient condi-
tions for that proposition. Once again, all that we seek is
the logical derivation of one proposition from another, cer-
tainly true proposition. That other derivations of other
propositions can be constructed in no way diminishes our
accomplishment. And notice, to return to the final clause
of Walsh’s account, that if the premise is self-consistent,
and the argument is valid, then the conclusion is self-consistent.
Finally, in addition to other versions of the postula-
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t.onal account
- instance Led.en Wooa-s conception of the
transcendental method as proceeding fro. abstractive analysis
Of ^ experience (insofar as it is structural) to a
regress to its presuppositions, which he identifies with the
hypothetical method of science — there is a. Straws on—pos"tu-
lationist hybrid offered by Wilk-rsony w j.K..rso . Using the notion of
material sufficiennvIi cy
- resources sufficient for a task -
Wilkerson shifts the burden of proof to the skeptic. If the
truth Of a transcendental principle does provide an explanation
Of our linguistic practices, then anyone rejecting that ex-
planation must provide an alternative. The expectation, of
course, is satisfaction at the skeptic's failure.
After concealing our disappointment in learning that
the paradigm linguistic practice needing explanation is our
distinguishing between the subjective and the objective. 'I „e
may justifiably complain that, as with the anti-skeptics of
chapter III. WilKerson fails to realize that the skeptic need
not attempt to replace some of the features of empirical dis-
course by others regulatively preferable. The essential skep
tical charge is that the system in use lacks rational justi-
fication. The skeptic does not dispute the coherence of the
system, but the possibility of demonstrating that it corres-
ponds with reality. And so even if the skeptic cannot offer
a viable alternative, it does not follow that the system he
is criticizing is rationally supported. But the skeptic
can provide an adequate alternative. If the world being as
we think it is is materially sufficient tny ii o account for our
system m use, then the mere thought that
e world is as we think is materially sufficient as well
And even if such thought were also 'materi^n-Lso materially necessary, '
since I showed that conceptual prioritv hno • 4.F d-L y as no interesting
oross-oategorial implications, the conceptual priority of
objective particulars would be insufficient to show that they
are not subjective or mind-dependent after all. or that we
cannot know otherwise aa+vid ‘ j.
-r , as the epistemological solipsist suggests.
In a series of recent articles Gram provides the following
account of transcendental arguments.'^2 Let 0 be an unspecified
epistemic operator, and let S be a person. Then an epistemic
premise is a premise of the form S0(Ex)(Px)' which states
that S is in a certain epistemic relation de dicto to a thing
under a certain description. '+3 Transcendental arguments are
indirect proofs whose only assumption is an epistemic premise
with subjective predicate as descriptive predicate F. where
subjective predicates are such that the skeptic affirms that
they, but not their negations, are knowably applicable. As-
criptions of negations of subjective predicates, objective
epistemic propositions, are transcendental propositions.
, schematically, we argue transcendentally when we argue as
follows. (1) 30(EX)(PX)
... (n) q ... (n,m)
-q ./(n.m.l) SC(Ex)(-P.
Gram argues that no successful argument of this form is
-concept o. t.e episte.tc relation contained in t.e epis-
-io precise
.a. no indepenCent support, its inclusion in
e pre.ise-set of a transcenaentai argument wouia aestroy
-s (essentiaiiy) reauctive strategy (aince suoH a precise
dubious as the epistemic premise itself). (b) if
a partially analytic precise haa inaepenaent support, sinceit would state necessaT*v r>nyiHi 4-'xi^oe sary conditions of beine in .uu g the epistemic
the argument would become superfluous. And (c) if
such an inaepenaently supportea precise is true. „e coula in-fer its necessary conditions solely fro. the description of
the thing to which s is episte.ically related (so that the
epistemic premise is superfluous).^^
In effect. (C) tells us that if the description of so.e
phenomenon does not imply the existence of some other pheno-
menon. then the perception or awareness of (or whatever epis-
temic relation in which we stand to) the first cannot require
the existence of the second. But (C) is false. Hintikka
correctly argues that the description of sensuous color pheno-
mena does not imply the existence of visual sense organs, but
the perception or awareness of sensuous color does require the
existence of visual sense organs. '*5 Nor. similarly, is it true
that if the concept of perception implies something, then the
description of what we perceive implies that thing too. The
concept of perception implies the concept of consciousness
(using the elliptical idiom of concept-implication), the
2^3
description of things perceived does not.
o„.
argues that Hintikka-type conditionals, partially analyticpremises of the form 'SO(Ex) (Px)-^ f i7v Wn \iM X j—» (^^x) (Gx)
'
where
'(Sx)(Gx)'does not follow from ’(ExlfPv'i*x)(Fx) alone, cannot be established
transcendentally.'*6
rul_ out transcendental argumanti Hintikka’s
counterexample fails to comply with either (A) or (B), so
rfintikka.s conditional does not threaten Oram-s overall assess-
ment Of transcendental argument. But while (a) is a truth
about indirect proof, we have been given no reason to believe
that transcendental arguments must be indirect, m fact, if
we pause to reflect on our anti-skeptical project, we see that
proceeding indirectly from a single assumption lacks all ad-
vantage. Epistemological solipsism is neither obviously absurd
nor logically, highly complex, so that a reductio of it alone
lacks promise. Supplementary, independently supported premises
needed. But this is just what is needed for direct argu-
mentation against epistemological solipsism, since a success-
ful refutation of our skeptic need not be indirect, (A) is an
irrelevant criticism.
Condition (B), which Hintikka’s conditional allegedly
violates, is false. If it is possible that some of the claims
accepted by the skeptic, other than the epistemic premise, are
partial analyses of some epistemic concept relevant to the
epistemic premise, then it is false that supplementation of
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the transcendental argument by such an analytic precise would
......
.h.. „
'SO,,.,,..,
.....
»y ...
...p...,
....
, pp„i..,
or «...
..
^
tely aware that' -- (B) is faiao n^v.its; IS lse. Therefore, transcendental
arguments can have both an episte»ic precise and an indepen-
dently, but not transcendentally, supported premise. The point
IS this, addition Of an independently supported, partially
analytic premise does not render transcendental argumentation
superfluous, since although the consequent of such a premise
states a necessary condition of the epistemic premise, it does
not give us the necessary condition we seek.
Transcendental arguments are not ruled out by conditions
(A). (B), or (C). But Gram's version of transcendental argu-
ments can be ruled out. The argument-schema exhibiting Gram's
account is not indirect or reductive. If the objects satis-
fying premise (1) and conclusion (n+m+1) are distinct, the
two propositions are simultaneously satisfiable, and hence
consistent. And relocating the negation sign in (n+m+1) from
within the propositional function to the front of the formula —
giving the negation large scope — while producing a proposition
contradictory to (1), makes the argument intolerably strong,
concluding that the skeptic cannot truly affirm the application
of even the subjective predicate to anything. So long as 'O'
represents an epistemic relation the skeptic acknowledges he
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has to something de dicto thio, this consequence follows. And if
we construe 'O' differentitr +kferently, the skeptic will not embrace the
epistemic premise. Therefore (’ro™tin . Gram's transcendental argument
IS either too strong to he credible or too weak to refute
epistemological solipsism.
can extend this last obiection to show that transcen-
dental arguments cannot be indirect, if that means reductive
Of a single premise. The single premise is either epistemic
or not. If it is not, then it is either a proposition with
no epistemic operator at all or a de ^ epistemic proposition.
In either case, the proposition is existential. Now if the
existential proposition is accepted, then the argument's con-
clusion will be unacceptably strong. And if the existential
proposition is contested, then the argument is question-begging.
Given the result of the previous paragraph, we can conclude
that, whether based on an epistemic premise or not, transcen-
dental arguments are not reductive.
There is a weaker sense of 'indirect proof in which
supplementary premises are permissible, m this weaker sense,
Ruf. Howell, and others have insisted that transcendental proof
must proceed indirectly. Against this one might adduce Kant's
own remarks on the illegitimacy of reductive method in proving
synthetic principles outside of mathematics. '8 But these re-
marks have been entirely misunderstood, and on Kant's (and my
own) view, the issue of reductivsness is a red herring.
. Kant tells us that direct proof is desirable because.
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unlike reduotio. we see from what our conclusion follows. He
then says that the impossibility of the joint truth of not-p
and some subjective conditions under which alone anything can
be conceived by our reason does not entail p.49 But 'subjective
conditions- here concerns the Ideas and dialectical illusion,
such conditions may
-be false.- confusing the subjective with
the objective. In essence, Kant-s "restriction" of apagogic
method to mathematics amounts to nothing more than the admoni-
tion not to use reduotio when the assumptions of the proof
are not certain. So instead of deducing q from p we can assume
not-q, deduce not-p. and conclude that, since we know for cer-
tain that p, not-not-q. that is, q. The denial of a transcen-
dental principle can be shown to be false, though not self-
contradictory, by showing that it has a certainly known false-
hood as a consequence. But we need not proceed indirectly.
But if. as we acknowledge, our transcendental conclusion
IS existential, Howell has a general argument in support of
his view. 50 He says that existential conclusions can be validly
inferred only by existential generalization or indirect argu-
ment. Admittedly, in our own case, existential generalization
is unavailable -- wo cannot commence debate by confidently
pointing to an objective particular. So our argument must
be indirect.
The major premise of his argument is false. With the
help of necessary truths, existential conclusions can be in-
ferred directly from other existential propositions. And if
24 ?
e exxstent.al premise, cor.iolned with necessary truths only
entails the conclusion, then the premise hy itseli entails thl
conclusion. And this accurately depicts our own strate*,y. By
the use Of necessary truths, we deduce the conclusion that oh-
lootive particulars exist from the privileged, and hence cer-
tain, existential proposition that judgment is occurring (which
IS Itself derived by existential generalization from the car-
tainty that I am judging).
XI
Rufs theory of transcendental argument contains several
avoidable blunders. He argues that transcendental arguments
are not deductive, but presupposltional
,
on the grounds that
their conclusions must be synthetic a priori
. but if their
premises were solely analytic, their conclusions would not
be synthetic, and if their premises were solely empirical,
their conclusions would not be a priori
.
51 This overlooks the
possibility of a mixed premise-set, which turns out to be char-
acteristic of Rufian transcendental arguments. It also over-
looks the possibility of explicating presupposition in terms
of deductive consequence, which also turns out to be charac-
teristic of his theory. Carelessness in distinguishing in
practice between definitlonally distinguished propositions and
statements also engenders needless difficulties. Suitably
refined, however, Rufs theory is interesting.
Statements are datable acts with spatiotemporal identity
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conditions. 52 a statement
'exists' if a e
...
^
^"<3 wly if it has a
value. A statement p 'pnesupposes' a statement p ifand only if the truth of p i. a necessary condition of the
exzstence of p. a 'transcendental presupposition' is a state-
ment Whose own existence entails a fact which secures the
truth value of the statement itself. 53 Transcendental pre-
suppositions are svnthp+io o
,,
.
y et c a transcendental statements.
P IS such that its existence entails its truth, then p
as a synthetic a Erlori truth, if p ip 3,,, ,,,,
entails its falsehood, then p is a svnthetir • •F xtp d y xn c a prion false-
nood. Transcendental proofs of synthetic a priOEi falsehoods
are indirect, The joint assumption that p is true and that pIS stated or supposed entails a contradiction. Transcendental
proofs of synthetic a Eriori truths are indirect. The joint
assumption that p is false and that p is stated or supposed
entails a contradic tion.
Rufian transcendental arsuTn-^^ntc! +horhi^um.. s, then, can schematically
be represented as follows;
(1) S asserts or supposes that p. (Supposition)
(2 ) -p
,(Supposition)
(3) If p exists, then p has a truth value.
(4) If p has a truth value, then S asserts or supposes p.
(5) If p exists, then S asserts or supposes p.
(n) q
(m-^n)
-q
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(rntn+l)
-(S asserts or supposes p, and
-p).
(m+n.2) If s asserts or supposes p. then
-(-p).
im+n^3) If p exists, then
-(-p).
(m+n+4) If p exists, then p.
(m-.n^5) Necessarily, if p exists, then p.
(1) and (2) are suppositions for indirect proof. (3) fonowa
from the definition of statement-existence. (4) follows from
the definition of statement-existence and the nature of state-
^ants. (5) follows from (3) and (4) by transitivity of impli-
cation. (m.n.l) follows by indirect proof, and entails, via
material implication and De Morsan's theorem, (m+n+2). By
transitivity of implication. (mrnt3) follows from (5) and
(m.n.2), and (m.n.4) follows by intervening use of double
negation, since to suppose that (min+4) is false leads to
contradiction, given only definitional and logically true
lemmas, (mtn+4) is necessarily true, that is, (m+n*5).
Ruf compares his transcendental arguments with arguments
from self-refutation, and notes the strength advantage of the
r er. Transcendental arguments begin with mere supposal
s
on the part of anyone
.
whereas arguments from self-refutation
require actual assertions by a particular person.^'* Now as
Ruf sees the advantage, there is effectively no advantage at
all. After all, we are dealing with datable, occurrent speech
acts -- not abstract propositions which may or may not be
actually affirmed by someone - and we are dealing with an
epistemological solipsist who procedurally assumes the egocentric
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prsdicamont, for whom the someone performing theu speech act
IS always himself. Henc« ac, wi +v,s W th mv Verc;inn^ '-rs o , any successful
-stance of Hufs transcendental argumentation must begin with
act of judgment.
However, behind Rufs comparative evaluation may be the
unexpressed insight that, whereas arguments from self
-refuta-
tion establish the falsity of a proposition expressed by a
sentence-token used in a speech act b^ appeal to the event
epesch act, transcendental arguments establish such
falsity (and consequently truth of the negation) ^ appeal to
SHa anal^ refluirements for the occurrence of an^ speech
But if this is true, as I think it is, then transcendental
arguments need not begin with the assertion or supposition of
epistemological solipsism, the denial of epistemological solip-
sism, or any other proposition in particular. The mere fact
that something or other is being asserted or supposed suffices.
And this IS obviously an awesome advantage in power over
alternative anti-skeptical methods.
Notice that transcendentally established claims are syn-
thetic a priori
,
on Rufs account. Since the asserted or
supposed p is logically contingent, it is synthetic. But
since (m+n^^5) expresses a necessary truth, p is knowable a
priori. If the fact that a statement has a truth value
entails that that value is true, then, if the fact that it
has a truth value can be ascertained without recourse to
particular observations, its truth is knowable a priori
. That
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a statement has truth value can be ascertained • .kd.scertai without recourseto particular observations. Therefore, the truth of t^ T transcen-dental statements is knowable a priori .
% more powerful account of transcendental arguments
retains this virtue. The fact that I am judging is logically
contingent, as is the existence of objective particulars. But
the speech act premise, since self-affirming or self
-verifying
13 knowable a
,,,
cally necessary, and so knowable a Eriori. since the tran-
scendental conclusion that objective particulars exist is a
deductive consequence cf?premise-set. each of whose members
IS knowable a Eriori. it is knowable a Eriori
. But it is also
synthetic. Therefore, it is synthetic a priori
.
Finally, recall that the reductive strategy employed in
Rufian transcendental arguments is inessential, since premises
supplementary to the assumption for reductio are used, we may
optionally, with’ equal propriety, proceed directly. And in
case of my version of transcendental argument, it is only
natural to proceed directly. It would be a pointless compli-
cation to assume that objective particulars do not exist.
XII
The strategy of a Kantian transcendental refutation of
epistemological solipsism is to show t.hat the existence of
Objective particulars is a necessary condition for the occur
rence of judgment. Since I judge, judgment occurs, and so
Objective particulars exist. Since 1 a. certain that I Ju.ge
I can (hy following the proof)
.now with certainty that ob-jective particulars exist. This is +h= i- ,
' IS the anti-skeptical thesis.
I claim that if one shows the existence of objective
particulars to be a necessary condition of the occurrence ofjudgment, then one can know with certainty that objective
particulars exist. But in chapters II and in anti-skeptics
such as paradigm case, non-vacuous contrast, and parasitism
theorists were defeatpii htrer ed by the following skeptical rejoinder:
•For the acquisition of concepts, for learning the meaning of
»ords. etc., belief is as good as knowledge, and so reference
or actuality is not guaranteed. Therefore, no kind of argument
can establish that a kind of objective entity exists. In prin-
ciple. at best one can establish that particular beliefs must
be held. But to this result I am indifferent.'
This skeptical counterargument is not possible for tran-
scendental arguments. A valid transcendental argument pre-
cludes further question as to whether we can really know its
conclusion. If the argument is valid, so that the fact of
judgment-making — whether the judgment qua representation
is true, false, justified or gratuitous — implies the truth
of the judgment that objective particulars exist, then what
sense can we make of the judgment that there is a belief-
knowledge gap between which a resourceful skeptic may sneak?
If a transcendental argument is valid, it is sound. The very
act of going through the argument is itself a judgmental act.
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P position s truth is necessary for all judgment, then
that proposition cannot correctly be judged false by anyone,
and Its negation cannot correctly be judged true by anyone.
More precisely, if a transcendental argument is valid.
If Its conclusion were not true, no judgment could fal-
sify it. But if no judgment could falsify it. it could not
Pe falsely believed, since it is not possible that there be
a judgment when it is not true. Hence, the conclusion of a
valid transcendental argument is unmistakable. But this does
not entail that a transcendental conclusion is a certainty,
since, as we saw in chapter I. irrevisability is necessary’and
sufficient for certainty, but unmistakability is neither ne-
cessary nor sufficient for irrevisability. yet transcendental
conclusions are irrevisable, they could not be revised so as
to be unwarranted in the light of subsequent reasons, since
to adduce further considerations requires judgment, and judg-
ment entails them. In fact, transcendental conclusions are
maximally warranted, so long as their proofs are fully grasped,
since no state of affairs which we could describe would render
any other proposition more warranted than them, since whichever
state of affairs we would describe, we would be judging, and
judging, the occurrence of which we know with certainty, en-
tails them. Therefore, valid transcendental arguments issue in
philosophical certainties.
Notice that no vorif icationist principle is used in any
of this. Therefore, the view that any transcendental argument
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requires supplementation by a verif ioationi
-t premise in orderto succeed is fal^Pse. And notice that the skeptic cannot es-
cape hy saddling himself with the in any case uncciontahle
e i=f that Objective judgments are meaningless, since all
luagments. and not jnst some proper subset of judgments,
entail the anti-skeptical conclusion.
How could we show that the fact that judgment occurs
implies that objective particulars exist? m chapter I sec-
tion III. I ,et forth three individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for objective particularity
- reiden-
tif lability, existential independence, and attributive inde-
pendence — leaving it an open question whether reidentifia-
bility implies the other two. Now it is natural to distinguish
the temporal dimension of objective particulars, that persistence
and continuity embodied in the notion of reidentif lability
.
from the non-temporal features of existential and attributive
independence. This distinction elicits two overall proof-
strategies. We either establish the necessity of there being
some kind of reidentif iable entity for judgment to occur, and
then argue that only something which is neither a self nor a
state of a self could be reidentif iable
, or we show that judg-
ment requires the existence of something external to our minds,
something identifiable and independent, and then go on to argue
that such a thing must be reidentif iable
.
This dissertation has provided ample evidence that other
methods -- methods which begin from the content of judgment —
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Which try to give a Cartesian answer to a CarteXO sian question,
cannot succeed. One cannot get from inner content to outer
content, from conceptual content to what must exist. Onto-
logical arguments for descriptive expressions or concepts are
Lpossihle. Having a sense does not imply Having a reference;
understanding does not imply knowledge.
But the existence of one sort of thing can imply the exis-
tence Of another sort of thing. And when the existence of the
first is a philosophical certainty, we have an unanswerable
proof of the existence of the second. But this dissertation
has also exposed the pitfalls of straining to leap directly
from the existence of conscious activity to the existence of
some non-self.'’^
the
A Kantian transcendental argument innovatively pursues
remaining alternative by showing that judgment, which is
an act. guarantees the possibility of our awareness of some-
thing Which can be identified as the numerically same thing
in different perceptual situations at different times (some-
thing reidentifiable). which implies the existence of some-
thing reidentifiable. which in turn implies the existence of
something different from the self and any of its states, that
IS. something outer. Consciousness is intentional, but it is
an intentional act. By focussing on the activity of judgment
rather than its representative function. Kantian arguments
offer new promise of showing that any world in which conscious-
ness is present is a world in which objective particulars exist.
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Kantian transcendental arguments offer genuine promise
Of refuting epistemological solipsism in that, of all the
available alternatives, only they (i) comply „ith all of the
skeptic's procedural assumptions, (ii) satisfy all of the
formal requirements induced by the nature of the anti-skeptical
conclusion, (iii) avoid imposition of any gratuitous restric-
tions. (iv) do not overstep their bounds in purporting to
decide substantive scientific questions, (v) foreclose all
avenues of escape, and (vi) do not include conditions which
preclude the possibility of their sound instantiation. The
difficult question of whether a sound instance of a transcen-
dental argument can actually be produced depends for its answer
on the acceptability of its analytic premises, that is. the
alleged analytic requirements for the occurrence of any judg-’
mental act. But this rests on the very large question of the
nature of judgment. It is not my purpose here to provide a
theory of judgment. But it remains an entirely open question
whether a Kantian theory, sufficient to support the needed
analytic premises, might not after all be tenable. ^7 To this
extent, Kantian transcendental arguments are very much viable
candidates for the long sought conclusive refutation of epis-
tfimological solipsism.
NOTSS
CHAPTER IV
25 ?
1. This so-called principle of epistemio +•has been disputed, but if the^Vnnwi ^ ^®<^^ctive closuretemic logic behav;s ^he Li^e a^tho^ operator in epis-in alethic modal logic then . ’^^^ossity operatorits analogue
— (N(p entails a) true, sinceIn any event, the t?uth of^this po-iti ve^^iquired for my criticism* it onlperhaps acceptable inference-form exhibit another,form I am criticizing. ’ confused with the
2
.
4
.
EEiori synthesis. See AlOl-102. B154 kni Bl6o! ~
o“Kanf-s'^?hought'o^'’thC^
we must reject the theory depicted' ^ analysis,
outside ourraindr-'^bur^ather'^-a®
existing independently
sary and universlily t^ur* Lt
i: 54%ri'i3^
Tz^S T/il perc'e^rionn ^arffongan-
fw K^^t L correct.- fu?
a
-that Which', the object ft thf^onnepwinn^ninc't
ideSisn c^flaKn j“<3g^chts. This transcendentil
’
verv leL? ?
the conceptual and the real. At the
IS not a suitable way of refuting theskeptic on his own territory
^^l i xn
And there are other problems 'with the notion of universal-ity. Does it mean 'universal applicability'? Then ifobjective particulars exist' i^an objectLe jSentand so characterized by universality, is everyS an
u^?n of question Ly motivatevarious species of a priori , synthetictruths, as Kant seems to do, as follows: fi) Taking the
gulSh'^'f
‘categories' seriously, we distin-
fr*P
metaphysical, categorial principles which
ThP-r^ I
everything in the universe, taken distributive ly.
sub-species of categorial principle: (a) Dy-namical transcendental principles are synthetic a priori'^propositions which are discursively certain (provable via
concepts) and conditionally necessary in relation to empi-
rical thinking; (b) Mathematical transcendental principles
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5 .
6
.
7 .
8
.
certaL^?pJovabllTf^ons°?Sot^ which are intuitively
ditionally necessary in relation uncon-(ii) There, are non^atLorS? ?r.n experience,
conditionally
nece;sarr?n"rela?fSr?:;:‘’!’^^-^.P’'°P“'’ it ions
,
in general but not about evern^ne thinkingThere are geometric and ^ ^ exists. iii)
propositions, for which synthetic a priori
There are dynamical but^not account. (iv)
a priori truths^liih as Newtont=®i • ®y"thetic
and action-reaction, for which princTni conservationAnd (v) there are sub iecti vpI tr ? ^2^}Pies (la) account,
propositions fsurh no 0 ^ 1 f ®ftain, synthetic a priori
are not necessarror un?vf
the proposition that ^ ^ay that
tranLendentarbS no? cateaorief^""i!i^y" ^
cu?^S?r?a:fr??rr?S?rb?? ?? ' li-
Sirs; s » il; -suniversal applicability, see w'k wLsh i ™st have
S?j;.sSS!S;
IHrfsLlHrjIrE:^
difficilt-^’"'^
ourselves in^linguisUras^welfas practicaf^’
be tolerated.’
that some disorder and cLos can
instantiation of our transcendental conclusion onthe other hand, is neither privileged norcertain?’
See Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge
, p. 180.
Lewis White Beck, ’Once More Unto the Breach -- Kant'sAnswer to Hume, Again,' Ratio (June, 196? ) j 33 - 37 . Thepremise Beck uses is a proposition about how constantconjunction of empirical events leads us to judge a causalconnection between them. J ^ i
To be careful, we may say that the truth of necessarypropositions cannot be ascertained by recourse to first-hand observation, since it might be argued that we canlearn necessities by the testimony of authorities.
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9 .
only knowable a
correct proof in modal logics
Kripke argues that there are know^hioare not knowable a priori necessities which
ments containing onlTl^pe rename state-
If true, but some such identities\rr-"''’’'?®^''“^SSster^ The following il l
thrvarfables,''wrcL"serhoridenUUe^
tK trutrormL^STOh^idcnUtierw''”''®^^’ '^'iP^®"argues,
pirical discovery (and hr^^.t^v, ’».v cm-have been establLheS otherwise) qo "ot
cation from knowable necessitv to
?he Kantian impli-
Kripke's argument rests on his view
knowable is faulty,
holds that proper names do no? lit Pi'ePer names. He
finite descriptionr like de-
de dicto amMSi?rin mSdal re-
obvrSTfily canf This leads^h?m ’^i'^,'3®acriptions
disguised description the?r? of PPege-R«ssell
View that namefa^^O^^l^^^r-^i^LTOOPnaTorrdesignators which denote th- same thin^ f’ ^ !
world in which they denote anythinr^? all ^IS that names are always rigid desisnator
^? is argument
generally are not rigid desfvnatOOO ?for example, 'the prime number between 3 and 7?
actuals. For example, if names are not rigid designatorsthen you cannot say truly that the teacher of Alexandermight not have been a teacher
- you cannot Lvtha?Aristotle might not have been a teacher. For LnsiLr
necessary that the teacher of Alexander is a teacher ’On Its ^ dicto reading, it is true, but on its de rr
thP^dpfAr^T^+^^
the modal operator is within the scope ofe escription, it is false. Now replace 'the teacher' ofAlexander' with 'Aristotle.' According ?o Kripke. onthe Frege-Rupell view, the resulting sentence expressesa necessary truth. But the proposition expressed is notnecessarily true. Therefore, we must reject the descrip-tion theory and hold that names are rigid designators.
Zu ? Vanderbilt University, Leonard Linsky notedthat there is^for Kripke an unjustified connection between
meaning" theories and ^ dicto readings such thatthe descriptions which do the fixing of meaning force the
26o
them. But Kripke always int-rpr^t containingcontaining names de re^-- modal propositionsinduce the de re-3de“dioto again, names cannot
these interpretations by Kripk«^ar<='^rratl^^t argued,allow modal propositions hav?np- If we
re interpretation^ descriptions to have de
them (as well as names )"todescrihP^^’
ations. In particular +ho +vi • counterfactual situ-
designators is logically equivalent^to*th»"'?hnamss cannot induce the d--V--drd 5 ^+„^*^modal contexts, given KrT^k^o ^ ambiguity in
modal logic, so that the lattor» quantified
argument fo;* forme!?! consideration is not an
('a)^qanta^p? Linsky asks us to consider*
(hi T? ?
Claus does not live at the North Poled) It IS not the case that m . r .
Now ordinarily, there are no North Pole.
of negation with simple predicatLns™ah^^+^^®a •But this is due to tha about individuals.
logic - constLt:
with vacuous names such as •qanl»®rir semantics. But
are functional. Witness operators
tion obtains with respect'to moLl Ligui?i!^°®°Por"'^“^’
The^^?Uad or
^o::r"e°xisttdf
-rtr^ F^icould not have but beeA an autLj So'LmefcaHaducr'’^"scope ambiguities in modal contexts.
The crux of the issue is whether we give the desienator
in SripkrseLn??cf interpretation as in a lorfafsystem,
dicate.^ and th^n ' i +
assign an extension to each pre-
posSbie world well-formed formula at eachP SiD . De die to necessity claims reauire evalna-ion of descriptions at each possible world (since the same
woridsf^uno^Se f individuals in%l??erertorias;. But for ^ ^ claims, we keep the value of thedescription fixed and see if it falls Snder the extLsiLof the predicate in all the other worlds. There is n^reevaluation of the description. With rigid designators
^e^int° procedures will always give thf^samer sul -- the ambiguity collapses.
So modal propositions with constants get the same valuede dj^jU or re. The relevant question is whether
ordinary proper names should function as constants inthe formal system. To assume so is merely to assumethe non-descriptive rigidity of names. If you know that
a name should be so treated, then not only are identities
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containing the name necessarilv * 4^knowable a priori as well' And true, they arebe this: Nal^s have senses f Position shouldtions of names as constant' +11 ^ the sense func-them are necessarily true if identities containingIf we do not treat LrsLsI knowable a prifri .they can pick out different indi?Hrt^'^n constant, ifworlds, then identitiercS^ta?ntni differentbe knowable a posteriori y.l+ ^ will only
Therefore, KanVi^fK^’ a^Knnt^ necessary,
unscathed. ^^sis, s Kan understood it, remains
10. This account of containment applies tn > •predicate judgments too. PPH^ o non-subject-
11
.
12
.
13 .
analytic/ 5e ^eefnol
IS uncontroveraially both contingcnt'^anJ aSt"
See, for example. Critique of Pure Reason
. B764.
trace Kanfs journey to the ne/h^'LS/^ir-^^^orsiMUt^Of
-experience interpretation of aprioritv ' t +
tive^criterIa~ fo?^a negative and two posi-
„ / . priori judgments; independence fromexperience, universality and necessity. If expSriencrcan never give necessity and universality, the negative
verse?/" ^he positive/
equivalent, reflecting Kanfs belief that everv a nri orijudgment takes the form of a universallv auantifTAd*~propositional function that can//be fLImed Butthis view IS no good for Kant. That space is iAfinite
/t!rif/Sb/^ hence not universal, thlt/ome
not ?niv?r/n a?? ® ^ut particular, henceu versal. All the genuine principles of the Analvtichowever are universal in form. But sLce necessitrcan
judgment regardless of its form,it IS the^test that survives.
If necessity is taken as the sole defining property of
Kant“af?/?^f’+ - EEi2Ei. hecomes a purely logical notion.nt also suggests a genetic account: ’a priori iudgment'means '.ludgment which has arisen completelFlI^ri/i?'that is, all the constituents of the judgment^hon-empirical
or pure. The constituents are pure intuitions and pure
262
14.
15.
16
.
17
18.
19.
pure intuitions, as badly onthe existence of
we should junk it. And in the Aesthetic,
adinissioni of pure and iirmurp n edition Kant’slead to the atendonment of thTs^ee - j“‘^Sments does
suggests that a judgme^tls
^;r^or^ifat"?
the orrprF^ri'iud^e'nr^'"^ demonstrating
are necessary f or“th?§6^sib?fTtr^^^:>^^ showing that they
see Chapter I t>f Sw^ng?s book!'""^
experience.
Note 3 Of
-Refutation of
see B138. and then B234-235. where Kant disambiguates
-object..
msifrlfff^AcrKaS^^^ We must reject the view
valid consciousness or judgment’^ma74^^a?i °d^‘T
we might just balk at Kant-s too etrLg°usf^r"rp:kenL
.
-
Muck offers a version of speech act th^oi-v or, 4.IS unacceptable in that it assumes that all intentionalrational, thus begging the question See hisTJie gganscendental Method (New York: Herder & Herder i oAft ^
Transcendental Method^
^
^91^342-3827^ ' 3 (September.
John Mahaffy, j^nt ' s Critical Philosophy
.
SkeSfm"°a''d-^ Meerbote, in his Kant-s Transcendental^^^sertation written at Harvard" in 19? 0,Kant holds that objective validity for humans gives
tfv4'"44?f^?°" “does not entfu objec-
tevtiioi
'^hat IS, truth. I do not see much
interpretation, but it is inter-
!'“yf -ffy?" y® chapter I that maximal warrant
i®’?? condition for certainty. This leads to
Ko+i ^ Frankfurt's, on which all thatboth Descartes^and Kant were seeking were reliable foun-dations for science. Of course, if this is the correctinterpretation of 'objective validity,' then my version
arguments all the more easily establishes
objective validity.
20
. Kemp Smith should have translated
claim,' not 'knowledge.'
iirkenntnis as 'knowledge-
263
21
22
23
. See B236 also, and B848-8-^Q •
views on knowledge, belief ’and expressing hisinter-sub jectivQ agreement ^ c. n Kant says that
pondence with the objeo?! “ ^^nseguen^ of corres-
(New York: The Free Pr^ss, 1959)rf^9|rf5|^
The question of whether facts art^ -1110 + +judging (as Sellars puts it) for species ofdifficulties that cannot be fLpd^in^tMa'^d^Consider the following-
-ornhiom e
^dis dissertation.
(B19'») that tL veri?yinr?Wrd ?hiS
empirical propositions if TocTss to Ll’l °[which is achieved by observftifn L
must differ from iuLw ,, o'^servation
view. But if observation doef «ffe? frfm^fdf?nr"Ttbecomes of the tenet that judging, what
I. observation af fnconffifus ac??''?hir?s O^df^ental?the other extreme at J At
that io ^ claims that observationa- IS, intuition or immediate reor-sentatinn nt ’individual thing, is a species orknoSr L tha? not
would require judgment. If'^we discoverinconsistencies in a theory, we should choose the pro-p oition which makes
-the theory more plausible. Withinthe context of an anti-skeptical theory, I choose theinterpretation I have offered.
n
24.
25.
26
.
27.
1 ^
Current Philosoph ical Issues(New York; New York University Press
,
I961 ) .
”
otephan Korner, Kart (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955).
Jaakko Hintikka,
Spurious,' Nous.
Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and
VI, 3 (September, 1972); 274-281.
William H. Bossart, 'Is Philosophy Transcendental?' TheMonist
, 55 , 2 (April, 1971); 293 -311 .
28. This is one horn of the dilemma Scheffler, in Science
^P.jcc tivi tv
.
pp. 13“14, dubs the 'paradox of
categorization.' The other horn, that if my categories
ao not determine what I observe, then what I observe
IS formless, nondescript, or ineffable, raises other
problems.
29 . Henry E. Allison, 'Kant's Transcendental Humanism,' The
Monist
, 55; 2 (April, 1971): 182-207.
Martin Kalin, Kant ' s Theory of Transcendental Propositions
.dissertation written at Northwestern University, 1970.
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30 .
31 .
32 .
33 .
3^.
35 .
36 .
ICS
fhilosoSi ’
,
H™an
-:xperienoe
,
• The
The mioso^MS4orX(SpriL^ Skepticism,'
5;L^2?Tfe:srsi » s:
26, 196?), 533-557: — Sl^Tosoph .v , LXIV, 20 (October
Kant, Prolegomena, paragraphs 20-22 (pp. 47-52).
S.^Kant!' ed^^CaTw^^ifl io The Philosooh'r
W^lntriduction; sectio^T(^ 'bxguity Of 'obaeof makes even paLag^inJeL?"'
Kant4tid^,^He^^^ Kant's Critique,'
Il>id.
. p. 196.
1970)^°anrhf ErameworL (^ordfLacLell!^
gophy (October I3, 1966). ^^1-^66 at
^
nnSiTSibSi,^^)- — of science (New YoTkT
paragraph summarizes the accountof Korner's argument given by Sva Schaper in 'A?guinrTranscendentally ,
’ Kant-Studien
. 63 (I972); IOI-II6.
Korner s view about formal theories is oresented in Ex-
MacKinnon^"^
—
l'^2-178, as cited in Edward
of ^^?enci Problems in the PhilosophyI oci e - I, The Review of Metanhvsi r s yyiT i(September, 1968)TTl3lT3^ L<^P,8.ysic , aa i, l
Kekes, 'Skepticism, Rationalism, and Language,’
'
J^ly* 1971 J 'Transcendental Arguments
IV^ 3^^22-431^^^
Challenge,' The Philosophical Forum
.
Crawford gets this right.
Ihe A Priori
, pp. I8I-I83,
Gram, in Kant
, Ontology and
gets this wrong.
38 .
265
39.
40.
41.
42.
^3 .
44.
^ 5 .
46.
4?.
48.
49.
Swing, p. 118.
^
in The Heritage
Fl* Rnssell & RusLn! l962),^pp
g^hioal auarterl^
. 20 (July, 197ofr200-k2r^
Wilkerson does "try to argue that thio a>i'iTi+ 4.guish the subjective and the objeJuve f^noLam conscious of a series of representa4 nio n I ?time.' But in chapter II I arguerthat +h?’ ^ndoes not hold.' ^ th t is entailment
llFebruarv°’'?9k>'^’'?t®Sr‘*'^"^^ Arguments,' Nous. V,1 vieoruary, 1 71): 15-26j and 'Must TranscendTTTtaite Spurious?' Kant-Studien (1974h
book ind
about transcendental arguments in^his
ten an^World 6 'f''^n=’®®ndental Arguments,'wor^ b, 3 (September, 1973 ); 252-269 RntIt IS extremely difficult to sort out the relahonfbe
exnositto
claims and arguments, and so forp i nal ease I have pursued his most recent andsystematic account. This section on Gram benefits
Arguments *T ’ Structure of TranLendental, an unpublished paper by Scott Shuger.
Gram, Nous
, p. 22.
I^id.
. pp. 23 -26 .
Hintikka, 'Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious.
•
Gram, Kant-Studien
. pp. 307-308.
Henry Ruf
,
* Transcendental Logic; An Essay on CriticalMetaphysics,’ Man and World (I969 ); 38-64'.
Robert C. Howell, Transcendental Arguments , dissertation
written at University of Michigan"^^ 1967 .
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
. B817-822.
Ibid.
. B820
50 . Howell, pp. 112 -113 .
51 . Ruf, p. 48.
52 . Ibid
.
. pp. 40-41
266
* « P« ^9 • Rsfsrsnof* F>a«-»4-
I dispense with them in what fdefines statement-axistenorin ^^at Raf
statement has a trath value,
5^K Ibid.
. p. 51.
tmpijiaSofLusT'ulrobvfius''"^
sition that objective particulars exiR xRRyRheRc!’°'
For example, Bennett in Kant's Analvtie
.
tn ?L'Seta?l1:R"R|R%Re" foiR’'-"the A-edition
' Transcendpn+ai n extrapolation from
tion of ideSismT Deduction' and the 'Refuta-
56.
57 .
( 1 )
( 2 )
( 3 )
( 4 )
( 5 )
( 6 )
( 7 )
( 8 )
( 9 )
(10)
( 11 )
( 12 )
(13)
I am judging.
Some act of judging is occurring.
RLRRR consciousness or
(hRe°a llnTenir"^^ awareness are representative
Awareness of the instantaneous is impossible.
AR^non^^nRa^t"*" is non-instantaneous.
*„L +h=^ ^ content is a successive con-tent, t at 13
,
a series of items occurring in anorder, and not all at a single instant
Awar^f^r^?^ awareness is of a succession of items.reness of succession implies awareness of a
of items as a plurality — awareness
of a diversity or manifold.
Awareness of a plurality of items as a plurality
requires that the plurality be apprehended as a'
numerically identical collection over the time
which the awareness is occurring.
This identity of the manifold over time requiresthat the act of awareness of this identical mani-
I old connect up or relate the various elements
which comprise it, that is, be aware of all the
elements together.
Such a connective awareness requires that' earlieritems in the series be re-cognized together with
the later items, and that all the items be recognized
as belonging to this unity over time.
Only a persisting, identical subject of awareness
can be connective? a series or collection of diverse
subjects of c onsc iousness is incapable of such
connective activity.
26?
( 14 )
( 15 )
( 16 )
( 17 )
( 18 )
( 19 )
( 20 )
( 21 )
( 22 )
( 23 )
( 24 )
( 25 )
An idLtioal 0«dger.
unity of consciousness. ^ ^
But awareness of an obUr' + ioc,^
impossible. i can be awa^e n? itself isby being aware of the obient onlySo awareness of a T3PT'c.io+-^ ^ consciousness,
awareness of a per^'istinp-^nS requires
so awareness of^succesi?™ nf ''• °°"sciousness.
something persisting.
" >^®'iui>'es awareness of
series°"'or*^of^th'*’^^^®^^"® cannot be an item in the
awa
coistUu;:! L^ntll'llfr^^ -prese;tation)
mental Ufl!'"'"®
something is not part of my
But^if something is not part of my mental lifpIt is^ existentially and attributively independent
tSLli?rand whicTpers?ftf ^ P'^'-'^-P^ually
.
aica p ists, it is reidenti f i abi o
of
something required for awarenesssuccession, which in turn is reou 5 r»d fe^ „is an objective particular. ^ ^ -l^^ging,
So I am aware of an objective particular.
TaJU IwL^ora s4e^ activity of judging I deduce that1 am aware of a uccession. The status of the items inseries (subjective or objective) is left an onenquestion. Also, what I judge is wholly irrelevant SoI need not judge that I am confronted with a temporalsequence in order to generate the argument. Eve^if Ijudge that certain features are simultaneously occurringthe same consequences ensue. Awareness of suL^ssion is’shown to require awareness of something persisting it
h's??ng'h°if ofhomettinl'pe”®^^ce such a concept is a concept, and like all
"the items of the series whichconstitute my mental life. The proof shows that I couldnot be aware of any of these items unless there wasawareness of a persistent, so that the persistent cannotbe identical with any of those items.
The argument as presented has weaknesses -- (7) involves
contraries, not contradictories (although this is not
the remaining alternative is an uninter-
rupted, abiding thing, which just brings us closer to
our conclusion that much faster), and more seriously,U) seems to imply that the object of judgment is always
objectual, never propositional. Whether this is so, if
so, whether it is a difficulty, and if a difficulty, whethei
It can be remedied, are questions beyond the scope of thepresent inquiry.
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